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CHAPTER :I 
:IHTRODUCT:IOB 
The Korean peninsula has been geopolitically critical to 
the neighboring three great powers in the Far East - China, 
Russia, and Japan. The peninsula has been regarded by them as 
either a defensive barrier or a dangerous exposed flank. 
Therefore, each of these three great powers have over the 
centuries made strenuous efforts to keep the Korean peninsula 
under their control. 1 
Unlike these three great Asian powers, the United States, 
located about 6, 000 miles away from the peninsula, showed 
little interest in Korea except for missionary activity after 
opening official diplomatic relations in 1882. 2 In 1901 
Admiral Frederick Rogers urged the United States Government 
to negotiate for a naval base in Korea in order to check the 
Russian and German fleets in that area. However, the proposal 
1
. Richard G. Stilwell, "The Need For U. S. Ground 
in Korea," The American Enterprise Institute Defense 
(May 1977), 15. 
Forces 
Review 
2
. James William Morley, "The Dynamics of the Korean 
Connection, " in The U. S. South Korean Al 1 iance Evolving 
Patterns in Security Relations, ed. Gerald L. Curtis 
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), 10-1. 
1 
2 
was rejected by the General Board of the United States Navy 
because Korea was located far from the American Naval base in 
the Philippines and was too close to Russian and German naval 
bases. 3 The following year, the United States government again 
considered building an American naval base at Masanpo in 
Korea, but the plan was canceled because of the General 
Board's opinion that "a Korean base would be superfluous if 
Japan were an ally. With Japan an enemy, it would be 
untenable. 114 
In 1905 the United States consented to Japan's control 
over Korea in accordance with the Taft-Katsura Agreement. The 
Japanese victory over Russia had aroused considerable 
uneasiness over the security of the Philippines. 5 The United 
3
. William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in 
the Pacific. 1897 - 1909 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1958), 131. Immediately after the Spanish American War, the 
U.S. Navy urgently needed a body to study newly gained 
overseas possessions. So, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long 
established the General Board of the Navy in March 1900 under 
the presidency of Admiral George Dewey. The body had no 
executive function but played a purely advisory role. The 
Board generally made recommendation to the Secretary of the 
Navy on policies, war plans, naval bases, etc .. 
4 
. Ibid., 134. 
5
. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American 
People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Meredith 
Corporation, 1969), 519. Howard K. Beale said in his book 
Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power that 
in his eff arts to end the Russo-Japanese war, Roosevelt 
sacrificed Korean independence. Meanwhile, Tyler Dennett 
argued in his book Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War that 
the United States did not sacrifice Korea for the sake of the 
Philippines. Instead, Korea herself had consented to the 
establishment of a virtual Japanese protectorate during the 
Russo-Japanese war. 
3 
states also believed a strong Japan could check Russian 
expansion in the Far East and would help to maintain the 
balance of power in that area. The agreement over Korea was 
a small price to pay for good relations with Asia's most 
powerful nation. 
After 1905 Korea became a forgotten nation for the United 
states. America's ignorance of Korea continued through-out 
world War II. The United States•s relations with the Korean 
people were reopened in September 1945, a month after World 
War II ended, when American forces landed in Korea in order 
to accept the surrender of Japanese forces south of the 38th 
parallel. The United states agreed to let the Soviet Union 
perform the same function in the rest of the peninsula. 6 
In addition to disarming Japanese military personnel, the 
occupation forces under General John R. Hodge had another 
mission, to keep order in the nation until the Koreans could 
organize their own government. 7 
In 1948, President Harry S. Truman decided to withdraw 
American troops from South Korea, partly because the 
occupation forces completed their mission when the South 
Koreans formed their own government through free elections in 
1948 and partly because his National Security Council 
6• Suk Bok Lee, The Impact of U.S. Forces in Korea 
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), 
4. 
7 • Ibid., 7. 
recommended the evacuation of American troops. 
4 
The Joint 
chiefs of staff had decided that "Korea was of little 
strategic value to the United States and any commitment to 
u.s. use of military forces in Korea would be ill-advised and 
impracticable in view of the potentialities of the overall 
world situation."8 
In the middle of September 1948, a month after the birth 
of the south Korean Government, American units began to pull 
out. The withdrawal of about 45,000 soldiers from South Korea 
was completed by the end of June 1949, leaving only a token 
United States military presence. 9 
The heavy military imbalance between South and North 
Korea and Secretary of State Dean Acheson's declaration of 5 
January 1950 that South Korea would not be included in the 
United States new defense line encouraged Kim Il Sung and 
Soviet premier Joseph V. Stalin to communize the whole 
peninsula. The North, supported by Russia, invaded the South 
on Sunday morning, 25 June 1950.10 
Even though the United States still believed that Korea 
was militarily valueless, the Truman Administration, based on 
8
. Ernest R. May, Lessons of the Past (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), 62; Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest 
R. May, Thinking in Time (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 
35. 
9 
. Lee, Impact, 20-24. 
1
~ Hong Nam Joo, America's commitment to South Korea 
(London: Cambridge University press, 1986), 31; Lee, Impact, 
37. 
5 
its cold war strategy, quickly decided to defend South Korea. 11 
The united states forces participated in the Korean war as 
leader of the United Nations forces. During the Korean War, 
American forces in Korea reached a peak of eight infantry 
divisions and supporting air and naval forces, total of 
302,000 men, of whom 33,629 lost their lives and 103,000 were 
wounded. 12 
After the armistice of 1953, the United States pulled 
back six divisions, leaving the Second and Seventh Divisions 
in south Korea to keep the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.13 By 
1971, the total United States force in Korea had dwindled to 
61,000 men. 14 Later a major reduction occurred when President 
Nixon removed the Seventh Division, about 20,000 troops, in 
accordance with so called "Nixon Doctrine.n15 
At that time Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird 
recommended that the president withdraw an additional two-
thirds of the Second Division by 1974, but President Nixon 
forestalled Secretary Laird's plan because he feared that the 
1
~ Neustadt and May, Thinking, 35. 
12• Marc Leepson, "Relations with South Korea," Editorial 
Research Reports 2 (12 August 1977): 607;Lee, Impact, 55; New 
York Times, 30 May 1977. (Hereafter cited as NYT). 
1
~ Lee, Impact, 57-60. The Mutual Defense Treaty signed 
in August 1953, and entered into force in November 1954. The 
treaty provided the basis for the further presence of United 
States forces in Korea after the Korean War. 
l~ NYT, 17 May 1978. 
l~ Ibid., 10 March 1977. 
6 
south Korean Government would pull back its 50,000 troops who 
were fighting in the Vietnam War as an ally of the United 
16 
states. 
According to information provided to the House Armed 
services Committee by General Bernard W. Rogers, Chief of 
staff of the united States Army, the Laird plan remained in 
effect until August 1972, only to be cancelled later after a 
general review of the security of Northeast Asia, especially 
of Japan and South Korea. As Rogers put it: 
Based on a reassessment of the situation in 
Northeast Asia and the contribution these ground 
forces made to the total deterrent strategy •.. It 
was felt that the division took on a much greater 
significance than its combat role. In the political 
military dimension it manifested to friend and foe 
the strength of the U.S. commitment to the stability 
in Northeast Asia and the defense of Korea and 
Japan. Withdrawals from Korea, particularly when 
coupled with the Vietnam drawdowns, would have 
called into question U.S. intentions, reliability, 
the credibility of U.S. commitments, and the future 
rol7 _of 1 lhe U. S. as a power in the Western 
Pacific. 
Meanwhile, having been shocked by President Nixon's 
decision to withdraw the Seventh Division from South Korea, 
the South Korean Government began to prepare a self-defense 
strategy which included the rapid development of the defense 
industries. At the same time, it strengthened efforts to 
l~ Ibid. 
1
~ House Committee on Armed Services, Investigations 
Subcommittee, Hearings on Review of the Policy Decision to 
Withdraw United Ground Forces from Korea, 95th Cong., 1st and 
2d sess., 1977-8, HASC no. 95-71 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1978), 89. (Hereafter cited as Cong. HASC 95-71.) 
7 
influence American policy makers to keep the Second Division 
in south Korea until a military balance could be achieved with 
North Korea. This led to an illegal lobbying scandal which 
involved the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), the 
businessman Park Tong Sun, and Congressional clerk Suzi Park 
Thompson. 
By 1976, when James Earl Carter was campaigning for the 
presidency, no other country was receiving as much criticism 
from the American news-media as South Korea. Newspapers were 
filled with accounts of the illegal lobbying scandal in the 
united States as well as of human rights violations in Korea. 
Press stories, editorials, letters to editors, columns, TV 
documentaries, and even church letters competed in 
criticizing the immorality of the Seoul Government in its 
efforts to buy Congressional influence and restrict civil 
liberties. American opinion, at the time of the Watergate 
affair, was very critical; the scandal was called "Koreagate." 
As criticism of Koreagate mounted, more politicians joined 
the anti-Korea campaign. The restriction of economic and 
military aid was advocated. Therefore, Korea became an 
"Achilles' Heel" to the administration of President Gerald R. 
Ford, at a time when it was fighting for its own political 
future. 18 
Having believed that most Americans would favor the 
18
. Donald L. Ranard, "The U. s. in Korea: What Price 
Security?", Worldview 20 (January/February 1977): 23-37. 
8 
Korean withdrawal policy because of their negative images of 
Korea and their Vietnam experiences, candidate Carter broached 
the withdrawals as one of his major campaign issues from the 
beginning of his Presidential campaign. During the primary 
election, however, few Americans seemed interested in Carter's 
t , 19 troop pullou issue. 
The brutal murder of two United States army officers by 
North Korean guards at the Korean Demilitarized Zone {DMZ) in 
August 197620 reminded the American public of the Vietnam 
trauma, and as the election day approached, more people 
listened to Carter's advocacy of a Korean pull-out. Carter's 
military non-involvement policy became more vivid when he 
stated in an interview with a reporter from the New York Times 
on 16 October 1976 that he would not deploy American troops 
even if an Eastern European country were to fight against 
Russian domination. Candidate Carter also made it clear that 
he would not try to protect Taiwan against a Chinese military 
or naval attack.21 
Carter's new Korean policy became one of the major 
campaign issues when President Ford criticized Carter's Korean 
withdrawal program as "an invitation to disaster." Ford added, 
1
~ Kenneth Adelman, "A Reckless Policy In Korea," Chicago 
Tribune, 29 May 1977, sec. 2. {Hereafter Chicago Tribune will 
be cited as CT.) 
20 
. CT, 20 August 1976, sec. 1. 
2
~ NYT, 17 October 1976. 
9 
"Mr. carter's approach has a strong flavor of isolationism. 
If it is applied to practice in the same way that it is 
described in campaign oratory, there is a significant risk it 
could lead to a major international crisis. 1122 until the last 
day of the presidential campaign, the two candidates continued 
to debate the merits of the Korean withdrawal. 
As soon as President Carter took the oval Office in 
January 1977, he began to form a new framework for American 
foreign policy based on moral value and social justice rather 
than the old balance of power system. In building a new world 
order, he also advocated that the United States should 
cooperate with world powers rather than act with excessive 
"fear of communism. 1123 President Carter made one of the most 
radical changes in United States global strategy since the 
Korean War by attempting to remove all United States ground 
troops from South Korea. At the same time, he advocated 
increasing United States military strength in Europe. 24 
In accordance with his new global strategy, President 
Carter's new Koreanization plan proceeded without getting 
significant public attention or Congressional objection until 
2
~ Ibid., 27 October 1976. 
23
. u. s. News & World Report 82 (6 June 1977): 17. 
(Hereafter cited as USNWR); Time 109 (6 June 1977): 10; Brian 
Klunk, Consensus and American Mission (New York: University 
Press of America, 1986), 120-1. Carter's address on 22 May 
1977 at the University of Notre Dame articulated his new 
foreign policy. 
2
~ USNWR 82 (20 June 1977): 22. 
10 
General John K. Singlaub, Chief of Staff of the United States 
Forces in South Korea, publicly criticized it by alleging that 
the proposed withdrawal plan would lead to war. 25 
Immediately after he criticized the President, General 
singlaub was removed from his Korean post by the President. 
This incident touched off the noisiest clash over civilian 
control of the military since during the Korean War when 
President Harry s. Truman summoned General Douglas MacArthur 
to Washington and forced his retirement. The Singlaub affair 
received heavy American news media coverage, and it was 
followed by Congressional debates and heated academic and 
public discussion on the issue. These controversial debates 
about the nature and extent of United States strategic 
interests in Korea continued among Americans as well as 
concerned foreigners until the President finally suspended his 
Korean pullout plan in July 1979. 
This is a study of President Carter's Korean withdrawal 
policy from its conception to its adoption by the Carter 
Administration, the reactions to that policy, and its eventual 
rejection. The goal is to better understand the formation and 
meaning of President Carter's withdrawal policy, to analyze 
domestic reaction, and to understand how this policy 
influenced United states relations with its key allies in the 
Far East, South Korea and Japan. 
2
~ Washington Post, 19 May 1977. (Hereafter cited as WP) 
CHAPTER II 
ORIGINS OP TBB WITHDRAWAL PLAN 
Jimmy Carter first pledged to withdraw United States 
ground forces from South Korea in 1975, during the earliest 
days of his campaign for President. However, the roots for 
carter's idea can be found in his Annapolis Naval Academy 
school days and his career as a naval officer. As a naval 
academy student, Carter was tremendously influenced by 
traditional naval thinking that the United States should 
support foreign countries with air and sea power, and only if 
necessary with mobile landing forces, rather than stationing 
ground forces abroad. 1 
In 1974 and early 1975, while Carter was still governor 
of Georgia, he consulted with several defense experts such as 
retired Admiral Gene R. LaRocque, director of the privately 
founded Center for Defense Information. Admiral LaRocque 
recalled what he told Carter in his telephone conversation: 
North Korean President Kim Il Sung or South Korean 
President Park Chung Hee or their successors could 
1 
. Don Oberdorfer, "Carter's Decision on Korea Traced to 
Early 1975," WP, 12 June 1977. 
11 
12 
get us involved in a land war in Asia and it would 
tear this country apart. We have to think of the 
Middle East and Europe. On a scale of importance to 
us, I'd put Kor~ about 1 and the Middle East and 
Europe about 10. 
During this time, Carter realized the dangerous 
"tripwire" role of the Second Division in South Korea. An 
attack from the North would require automatic American 
involvement in another Asian land war. 
When Carter announced his candidacy for the Democratic 
presidential nomination in Atlanta, Georgia on 12 December 
1974, the American public knew little about him. 3 At the 
beginning of December 1974, in the two Gallup polls on name 
awareness of possible Democrat candidates, Carter was even not 
listed as a possible candidate for the Democratic presidential 
nomination: 
Democratic Name Awareness 
George Wallace .••••..••••.. 94% 
Hubert Humphrey ••.......•.• 91% 
George McGovern ••.•.......• 86% 
Edmund Muskie .............. 83% 
Henry Jackson •••••••••••••• 58% 
Morris Udall •••••••••.••••• 38% 
Lloyd Bentsen ....••.......• 13% 
2
. Ibid. According to LaRocque, Carter carefully listened 
to what LaRocque told him but did not express his opinion on 
the issue. 
3 
• Margaret c. Thompson, ed., President Carter 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1977), 82. 
When Carter announced his candidacy, only Congressman Morris 
K. Udall had officially declared his candidacy. They were 
followed by Senator Henry M. Jackson (6 February) and Lloyd 
M. Bentsen (17 February). Governor George c. Wallace announced 
his candidacy on 12 November 1975. 
choice Of Democrats 
First Choice 
George Wallace •.••••• 19% 
Hubert Humphrey •••••• 11% 
Henry Jackson •••••••• 10% 
George McGovern •••••• 6% 
Lloyd Bentsen •..•••.• 2% 
Morris Udall ••••••••• 0% 
First,Second, 
Third combined 
32% 
29% 
25% 
21% 
3% 
1% 4 
13 
Even three months after Carter's official announcement 
of his candidacy, a Gallup poll showed that he received only 
one percent of national support.5 Therefore, at the beginning 
of the campaign, Carter urgently needed to obtain national 
recognition by establishing himself as a serious candidate. 
For that purpose, Carter first had to prove himself as a 
southern favorite son among a group of southern candidates who 
included Governor of Alabama George C. Wallace, a conservative 
who was an independent presidential candidate in 1968, Senator 
Lloyd Bentsen, a conservative Democrat of Texas, and 
Congressman Morris K. Udall, a liberal Democrat of Arizona. 6 
Carter had to overcome Wallace's strength among conservative 
blue-collar voters. At the same time, he had to compete with 
a favorite southern liberal, Congressman Udall to get liberal 
support in the South. Because Udall had a record of supporting 
4 
• George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll. Public Opinion 
1972-1977, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 
1978), 384-5. 
5
. Ibid., 443. 
6
. Charles Moritz, ed., Current Biography Year Book (New 
York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1969), 430-2; Ibid. (1973), 
43-5. 
14 
American involvement in the Vietnam war during the Johnson 
Administration, 7 Carter considered the Korean withdrawal 
policy as a main campaign issue to differentiate his position 
from congressman Udall, and other possible liberal Democratic 
candidates, such as Senator Hubert Humphrey and Senator Edmund 
Muskie. 8 The Korean issue would also differentiate him from 
more conservative Democratic candidates such as Senator Henry 
Jackson, Senator Lloyd Bentsen, and Governor George C. 
Wallace. In addition, Carter hoped that he could overcome his 
opponents' charges that Carter had no experience in foreign 
policy by advocating this revolutionary foreign policy. While 
carter referred himself as "a good southern alternative to 
wallace, 119 he carefully began to advocate the Korean pullout 
policy. 
On 16 January 1975, a month after declaring his candidacy 
for President, Carter stated at a meeting with editors of the 
Washington Post that he favored the pullout of United States 
ground troops from South Korea as a means of saving tax 
payer's money. He would begin the process by removing about 
5,000 troops from South Korea as soon as he took the Oval 
7 
. Ibid. (1969), 431-2. 22 October 1977 Udall admitted 
that he made a mistake in supporting President Johnson's 
Vietnam policy in his speech in Tucson, Arizona. 
8 
• Ibid. (1968), 277; Ibid. (1978), 470. 
9• Thompson, Carter, 82. 
15 
. 10 
office. 
TWO weeks later, Carter had an important meeting with 
seven officials of the Brookings Institution in Washington 
D.C .. At the four hour meeting, they discussed the advantages 
and disadvantages of the Korean withdrawal plan. Senior fellow 
Barry M. Blechman emphasized the tripwire role of American 
troops in Korea and advised Carter to remove them as well as 
nuclear weapons within four or five years. 11 Dr. Blechman 
recalled what he told Carter as follows: 
I told Carter we should take out the nukes(nuclear 
weapons) right off and phase out the ground troops 
over four or five years. I said the most important 
reason was to avoid getting the U.S. involved with 
ground forces almost automatically in a new war 
which i~' of course, why the South Koreans want them 
there. 
In May 1975, on his way to Tokyo meeting of the 
Trilateral Commission, a month after the fall of Saigon, 
1
~ Oberdorfer, "Carter's Decision," WP, 12 June 1977; 
House Committee on Armed Services, Review of the Policy 
Decision to Withdraw United States Ground Forces from Korea, 
Report prepared by Samuel S. Stratton, Chairman of the 
Investigations Subcommittee, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 26 April 
1978, HASC no. 95-61 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), 7. 
(Hereafter cited as Cong. HASC 95-61); Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Troop Withdrawal from the 
Republic of Korea, Report prepared by Hubert H. Humphrey and 
John Glenn, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 9 January 1978 (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO), 19. (Hereafter cited as Humphrey Report). 
1
~ Oberdorfer, "Carter's Decision," WP, 12 June 1977. 
Stuart Eizenstat, who accompanied Carter, said that the 
Brookings meeting was "a significant development" in Carter's 
thinking. 
12• Ibid. According to Dr. Blechman, Carter carefully 
listened but did not express his opinion on the issue. 
16 
carter told his aide Peter Bourne that he wanted not only to 
withdraw the ground troops from South Korea but also to remove 
American air force units while significantly bolstering South 
Korean air defenses. Carter said, "What I think we should do 
is strengthen the air force of South Korea and withdraw u. s. 
troops on a rapid schedule, with adequate air cover, so they 
can defend themselves. 1113 
However, Trilateral Commission members warned him that 
a strong air force might tempt the Seoul Government to make 
a preemptive strike against Pyong Yang. Carter, therefore, 
changed his mind and advocated the maintenance of reinforced 
American air forces in South Korea rather than undertaking the 
drastic strengthening of the South Korean air force. In a news 
conference in Tokyo on 28 May 1975, Carter confirmed this 
Korean proposals and announced a five year troop pullout plan. 
In addition, Carter told Japanese correspondents that he would 
seek guarantees from the two Communist super powers that they 
would prevent North Korea from attacking the South. 14 
1
~ Ibid. The Trilateral Commission was a private policy 
research group which provided Carter with many of his advisors 
later. According to Oberdorfer, Carter's campaign staff asked 
Harvard Law School professor Jerome Cohen, an Asian expert, 
to write Carter's campaign statement to be delivered at the 
Tokyo meeting. Dr. Cohen met Carter in Cambridge, Mass., on 
May 13 and suggested him a moderate pullout. At this meeting, 
Carter told Dr. Cohen that he wanted to remove American troops 
from South Korea immediately. 
1
~ Ibid. Oberdorfer argued that some time later Carter 
dropped the idea of seeking an advance guarantee from China 
and Russia. Actually, Carter never gave up this idea until he 
suspended the Korea pullout plan in 1979. Jimmy Carter, 
Keeping Faith. Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Book, 
17 
carter continued to advocate the withdrawal of u. s. 
ground troops from South Korea through out his campaign for 
president. on 6 May 1976, Carter declared in an interview on 
the PUblic Broadcasting System that "I would prefer to 
withdraw all of our troops and land forces from South Korea 
over a period of years - three or four years whatever. 1115 
on 23 June Carter delivered an address at the Foreign 
Policy Association. He stated that; 
I believe it will be possible to withdraw our ground 
forces from South Korea on a phased basis over a 
time span to be determined after consultation with 
both South Korea and Japan. At the same time, it 
should be made clear to the South Korean government 
that its internal oppression is repugnant to our 
people1ind undermines the support for our commitment 
there. 
Even after the brutal murder of two American officers by North 
Korean guards armed with the axes and pikes at the DMZ around 
Panmunjom in August 1976,17 Carter did not give up his hope 
that U.S. ground troops could be brought home within three or 
four years. At this point, however, he began to hedge his plan 
by emphasizing that he would consult with both the South 
Korean and Japanese governments in advance. He also proposed 
1982), 186-211. 
15 
. Cong. HASC 95-61, 7. 
1
~ Frank Gibney, "The Ripple Effect in Korea," Foreign 
Affairs 56 (October 1977): 160; John K. c. Oh, "South Korea 
1976: The Continuing Uncertainties," Asian Survey 17 (January 
1977): 78. 
17 
• CT, 20 August 1976, sec. 1. 
18 
a prior agreement with the Soviet Union in order to secure 
, l 18 peace on the Korean peninsu a. 
While campaigning in Kansas City in October 1976, Carter, 
by then the Democratic presidential nominee, reaffirmed that 
he would remove nuclear weapons as well as the troops from 
south Korea if he became President. But by this time his 
position was becoming more conservative. He called for a 
phased pullout spread out over a five year period.19 
After he was elected, President-elect Carter became even 
more cautious about the Korean withdrawal policy, stressing 
prior consultation with South Korea and Japan. He said, 
I want to establish a feeling within South Korea and 
within Japan that we won't do anything abrupt that 
will disturb them or upset their belief that we are 
sti~l.go~Bg to play a legitimate role in the Western 
Pacific. 
Carter introduced the Korean withdrawal policy in order 
to distinguish himself from other presidential candidates. 
However, it did not attract American public attention during 
the primary campaign period. When the withdrawal became a main 
election issue immediately after the Panmunjom incident, the 
American public, reflecting the Koreagate scandal as well as 
the Vietnam tragedy, favored Carter's withdrawal pol icy rather 
1
~ NYT, 6 September 1976. The New York Times commented 
that it was a not a very fruitful proposition because China, 
not Russia, was North Korea's real sponsor. 
19 
• Ibid., 17 October 1976. 
20 
. Ibid., 28 December 1976. 
19 
than President Ford's Korean policy of maintaining the status 
quo. 
It was a rather close election and there was no big 
difference between the two candidates positions on major 
campaign subjects like energy, taxes, budgets, education, and 
nuclear proliferation. 21 Carter• s popularity rested on his 
promise of a fresh, outsiders, perspective on post-Watergate 
government. The Korean policy was an example of this and it 
contributed to carter's successful campaign. 
After Carter won the election, however, he began to 
soften his tone by emphasizing prior consultation with the 
concerned nations because by then he was no more a candidate 
and his outspoken claim for the pullout could harm the United 
states' relations with its key allies in Asia, South Korea and 
Japan, even before he took the Oval Office. 
from 
Co., 
2
~ Kandy Stround, How Jimmy Won. The Victory Campaign 
Plains to the White House (New York: William Morrow and 
1977), 424. 
CHAPTER III 
THE MILITARY BALANCE BBTWEEH HORTH AHO SOUTH KOREA 
Assessments of the relative military balance between 
North and South Korea in 1977 differed, but generally agreed 
that south Korea possessed advantages in population and 
economy, while the North enjoyed a nearly two to one advantage 
in fire power. 
According to various sources, the North Koreans, who 
preferred offensive deployment, had superior military strength 
in ground, naval, and air forces. The North had more ground 
divisions with larger numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, 
mortars, and rocket launchers than had the South. They also 
had twice the combat aircraft and a better air defense system. 
Moreover, many North Korean pilots had combat experience in 
the Vietnam War or in the Middle East where they aided North 
Vietnam and Egypt. The North also had a four to one advantage 
in naval combat ships and possessed 12 submarines while the 
South had none. Moreover, at the sacrifice of the civil 
economy, the North had greater military production. In 1977 
North Korea produced most of its own military equipment 
20 
21 
Orted by Soviet and Chinese technical assistance. It supp 
included artillery, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft weapons, 
armored personnel carriers, and submarines and tanks except 
for more sophisticated weapons such as aircraft and missiles. 
The south only could produce half of its military equipment. 
In addition, the North had a big advantage in proximity to its 
major allies, China and Russia. 1 
In the meantime, the South Koreans, who favored defensive 
deployment, had advantages in natural barriers of terrain and 
well-prepared defensive positions. They also had more ground 
force manpower, particularly with Vietnam combat experience, 
and a better educated military leadership. The South had a 
better transportation system and more modern combat aircraft, 
including 45 F-4 aircraft, while half of the North's jet 
fighters were obsolete Mig-15s and Mig-17s, which were used 
in the Korean War period. Moreover, the presence of three 
squadrons of American aircraft accentuated the South's air 
power advantage. In addition, the presence of United States 
ground troops equipped with tactical nuclear weapons kept the 
1 
. Cong. Rec., Force Planning and Budgetary Implication 
of U. s. Withdrawal from Korea. Background Paper of 
Congressional Budget Office, 95th Cong. 2d sess., May 1978, 
LC 78-602389 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), 33-5. (Hereafter 
cited as Cong. LC 78-602389); Humphrey Report, 27-33; Cong. 
~SC 95-61, 14-8; Los Angeles Times, 29 May 1977. (Hereafter 
cited as LAT); WP, 10 June 1977; Far Eastern Economic Review 
96 (10 June 1977): 10-1. (Hereafter cited as FEER). 
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ground force balance in the Korean peninsula.2 
A comparison of military balance between North and South 
Korea in the calendar year of 1977 is as follows; 
Population 
Active Forces 
Reserve Forces 
Ground Forces 
combat Divisions 
Marine Divisions 
Tanks 
Armored Personnel 
Artillery 
Rocket Launchers 
Mortars 
North Korea 
16,720,000 
500,000 
1,800,000 
25 
0 
1,950 
Carriers 750 
3,024 
1,200 
surface To Air Missiles 
Anti-Aircraft-guns 
9,000 
250 
5,500 
Air Forces 
Combat Aircraft 
Airlift Aircraft 
Helicopters 
Navy 
Combat Vessels 
Submarines 
630 
225 
50 
425-450 
12 
South Korea 
35,200,000 
635,000 
2,800,000 
20 
1-2/3 
1,110 
500 
2,000 
0 
3,000 
120 
1,000 
335 
46 
13 
80-90 
0 3 
In May 1977 Richard G. Stilwell, an American 
Enterprise Institute defense expert, described the DMZ as the 
"world's most dangerous frontier," due to North Korea's high 
military capability and Kim Il Sung's belligerent attitude. 4 
He emphasized that the leaders in North Korea who provoked 
2
. Cong. LC 78-602389, 33-5; Humphrey Report, 27-33; 
Cong. HASC 95-61, 14-8; LAT, 25 May 1977; WP, 10 June 1977; 
FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 10-1. 
3• Cong. LC 78-602389, 35; Humphrey Report, 27; LAT, 29 
May 1977. 
4• Stilwell, "Need U.S. Forces," 20. 
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the Korean War in 1950 remained in power. In addition, they 
never changed their goals to liberate the South from so-
called, "American imperialism and exploitation" by force. 
Stilwell also stressed the North's substantial advantages in 
military capability. Moreover, most of their combat forces, 
heavily armed with Soviet model offensive weapons, were 
deployed close to the DMZ and ready to attack the South "with 
no more than a few hours warning." He also claimed that North 
Korea had enough stockpiles to maintain an offensive war 
without support from China or Russia. Thus, Stilwell claimed, 
the withdrawal of the Second Division would significantly 
heighten the risk of war in Korea. 5 
A government report titled "Military Strategy and Force 
Posture," which was completed in late June 1977 and submitted 
to President Carter by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, 
expressed a pessimistic opinion about the military balance in 
Korea. It alleged that the North could seize Seoul in a 
surprise attack. The top secret report warned that a further 
pullout of ground 
dangerous. 6 
troops from South Korea would be 
A report, prepared by Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and 
John Glenn and submitted to the Committee on Foreign 
5 
. Ibid., 18-20. 
6 
• NYT, 6 January 1978. This was a part of a Pentagon 
report in response to Presidential Review Memorandum 10 (PRM-
10), a top secret interagency study on American military 
posture. 
24 
Relations of the United States Senate on 9 January 1978, said 
that North Korea had "significant advantages in the critical 
first days of fighting, if the North can achieve tactical and 
strategic surprise." It added, however, that "these North 
Korean advantages are at least partly offset by the presence 
of the United states Second Infantry Division and its 
supporting forces in South Korea. 117 
Meanwhile, a Pentagon analysts' report in May 1977 
further affirmed that North Korea, armed with twice as many 
tanks and combat aircraft, had a certain initial military 
advantage in the event of conflict. On the other hand, the 
south, with nearly twice the population and a much stronger 
economy, would enjoy important advantages over the North if 
war dragged on. The report also said that neither the North 
nor the South was likely to fight war without outside 
support. Thus, existing arms inventories were militarily not 
the crucial factor. 8 
A report of the Congressional Budget Office of 18 May 
1977 claimed that North Korean armed forces were not strong 
enough to break through the DMZ which was dominated by "hills 
and ridges." Therefore, it said that American ground troops 
in South Korea would be no longer needed for purely military 
7 
. Humphrey Report, 31. 
8 
• LAT, 29 May 1977; Christian Science Monitor, 26 May 
1977. (Hereafter cited as CSM). 
reasons. 
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9 
Judging the military balance between North and South 
Korea from the above reports, North Korea significantly 
outgunned the South in every field of army, air and naval 
power. Even though South Korea had the advantage in 
population, economic strength, and border topography, the 
military balance was still in favor of the North. The South 
could keep a military balance with the North only with the 
presence of United States forces armed with tactical nuclear 
10 • , 
weapons. Therefore, the pullout without leaving the 
tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea would heighten the 
risk because the transfer of traditional weapons held by the 
second Division to the South Korean Army still could not 
equalize the military balance in the Korean peninsula. 
There is no evidence that candidate Carter understood 
the military balance between North and South Korea. 
Immediately after he was elected, however, President-elect 
Carter met the Joint Chiefs of Staff twice to discuss 
military affairs, including the Korean issue. Therefore, 
Carter must have known the military balance in Korea by the 
time he took the Oval Office. 
9 
• CSM, 20 May 20 1977. 
1
~ For detailed consideration on this issue, please see 
p. 22 or Humphrey Report, 27-33. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE WITHDRAWAL DECISION PROCESS 
Shortly after his November election victory, President-
elect carter met the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On two occasions, 
in December 1976 and in January 1977, Carter informed them of 
his intention to withdraw United States ground forces from 
south Korea and asked them how to most effectively pull 
troops back home. 1 
At the Blair House meeting of January 1977 the 
President-elect discussed the possible Korean pullout and 
other military affairs such as the SALT II treaty for about 
9 hours with the Joint Chiefs of Staff - Chairman General 
George s. Brown, Admiral James I. Holloway III, Chief of 
Naval Operations, General David c. Jones, Chief of Staff of 
the United States Air Force, and General Bernard W. Rogers, 
Chief of staff of the United States Army - as well as 
National Security advisors, Secretary of State-designate 
1 Cong. HASC 95-61, 7. 
26 
27 
cyrus vance, and Secretary Defense-designate Harold Brown. 2 At 
that meeting the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested to Carter 
the following three points as pre-conditions of the pullout; 
one, that we must assure the economic and 
military capability of the South Koreans to defend 
themselves. 
second, We must insure that the commitment this 
country has to Korea and to Japan under the mutual 
defense treaties of those two countries remains a 
firm commitment. 
Third, that this country must continue to be 
a Pacific power and within the capabilities of this 
country insure the integrity of South Korea. 
carter reiterated his Korean withdrawal plan on 12 
January 1977 at a meeting at the Smithsonian Institution which 
was attended by about 50 members of Congress and his national 
security advisors. The President-elect told them that he did 
not want to implement his campaign pledge hastily "but only 
after very carefully considering the problem of United States 
troops." He also added that "the United States air cover would 
be continued and the South Korean Army would be strengthened 
to defend themselves. 114 
Secretary-designate Cyrus Vance also stated before the 
Senate Foreign Relation Committee that he favored a gradual 
phaseout after prior consultations with concerned countries. 
He added that the presence of the United States Air Forces in 
Korea would not be affected, stressing the mutual defense 
2 
. WP, 14 January 1977. 
3 
• Cong. HASC 95-71, 78. 
4 
• NYT, 14 January 1977; WP, 14 January 1977. 
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treaty with South Korea. At the same time, Vance criticized 
the south Korean Government's corrupt, illegal lobbying 
efforts. However, he repeatedly said that the Carter 
Administration would not withdraw its troops because of such 
• 5 
actions. 
As soon as President Carter entered the White House, his 
campaign pledge of withdrawing the troops from South Korea 
immediately became American foreign policy. On 26 January 1977 
the President sent PRM-13 (Presidential Review Memorandum) 
to executive agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), the National Security Adviser (NSA), the State 
Department, the Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff asking 
them to study the possible courses of the pullout program. 6 
In order to avoid a controversy about the Korean pullout plan 
itself within his administration, the President asked them, 
in PRM-13, how to remove American troops from South Korea 
rather than whether the forces could be removed or not. 7 
Merely twelve days after his inauguration, even before 
his executive agencies completed their examinations of the 
5 
. NYT, 12 January 1977 and 14 January 1977. 
6 
. Cong. HASC 95-71, 78. 
7 
. Oberdorf er, "Carter's Decision," WP, 12 June 1977; 
Cong. HASC 95-71, 78-9; Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical 
Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1983), 128. Vance said in this book that the State 
Department carefully studied the PRM-13, and found that they 
were not allowed to suggest any options except suspension of 
the plan. 
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possible pullout options, Carter's withdrawal policy was 
officially confirmed by Vice President Walter Mondale during 
a visit to Tokyo on the way to Washington from an European 
8 tour. 
vice President Mondale met Japanese Prime Minister Takeo 
Fukuda and other Japanese officials at the Prime Minister's 
official residence on 31 January in order to explain Carter's 
1 ' d h J 1 f 1' t. 9 The new Korean po icy an ave apanese approva o 
meeting marked the first face-to-face contact between the 11-
day-old Carter Administration and the six-week-old Fukuda 
Government. 10 
Mondale assured Fukuda that Carter's proposed withdrawal 
policy would be implemented very carefully in order not to 
disturb a stable situation in the Korean peninsula. He 
promised Japanese officials that the United States would not 
ignore the improvement of the Korean self-defense capability 
through modernizing South Korea's armed forces. Mondale added 
that United States Air Force units would remain in South Korea 
for a nearly unlimited period in order to keep military 
balance between South and North Korea. At the same time, the 
8 
. WP, 2 February 1977. 
9
. David Rees, "South Korea Needs u. s. Troops," Daily 
Telegraph (10 May 1977): 16. 
1
~ NYT, 1 February 1977. Secretary Vance said in his book 
Hard Choices that Mondale was instructed to inform Japanese 
leaders of the American position, and do not discuss any 
possibility of changing the withdrawal policy. 
30 
vice president hinted to Japanese officials that the timing 
for withdrawal would be negotiable by indicating that the 
schedule for withdrawals had not been set and the pullout 
would occur "only in close cooperation with the governments 
of Japan and South Korea." Mondale also emphasized that the 
carter Administration would firmly fulfill American treaty 
commitments to Japan and South Korea in order to maintain 
peace and stability in the Far East.11 However, he advised 
Japanese officials that President Carter wanted to remove the 
hundreds of American nuclear warheads from South Korea . 12 
After having finished two days of talks with Japanese 
leaders, Mondale declared in his news conference at Tokyo on 
1 February 1977 that U.S. ground troops would be removed 
regardless of Japanese and South Korean opposition to such a 
move. 13 rn order to show Asians that the Korean withdrawal was 
not a sign of America's departure from the continent, Mondale 
also stressed that the United States would stay in Asia as an 
Asian-Pacific power and would not turn its back on South 
Korea. He said, 
Turning to regional and strategic issues, I 
emphasized the fact that the Administration does 
not intend to turn its back on Asia. We should and 
will remain an Asian-Pacific power. Our alliance 
with Japan remains central to our policy in this 
1
~ WP, 1 February 1977; LAT, 1 February 1977; NYT, 1 
February 1977; Wall Street Journal, 2 February 1977. 
(Hereafter cited as WSJ). 
12 
. Nation 224 (February 1977): 197. 
13 
. LAT, 1 February 1977. 
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vast and important part of the world. we will 
preserve a balanced and flexible military strength 
in the Pacific, and we will continue our interests 
in southeast Asia. With respect to Korea, I 
emphasized our concern to maintain a stable 
situation on the Korean peninsula. I cited that we 
will phase down our ground forces only in close 
consultation and cooperation with the governments 
of Japan and South Korea. We will maintain our air 
capability in Korea and continue to ass;.1t in 
upgrading Korean self-defense capabilities. 
In his news conference in Washington next day, the vice 
president reaffirmed that the Carter Administration would not 
sacrifice the security of Sout~ Korea in pursuit of the 
withdrawal policy. He reiterated that the policy would proceed 
very carefully and gradually, accompanied by an improvement 
in Korean military capabilities, the maintenance of United 
states air units in South Korea, and constant consultation 
with the governments of South Korea and Japan. 15 
Having been informed by the vice president that the 
Japanese saw the withdrawal policy as "a serious mistake," 
President Carter called General W. Vessey j r. , the United 
States commander in South Korea, to Washington on 18 February 
1977 in order to discuss the problems of the Korean pullout. 16 
On 9 March 1977 in his third news conference, which was 
1
~ Department of State Bulletin 76 (7 March 1977): 191. 
(Hereafter cited as DSB.) 
1
~ Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter 1 ( 2 
February 1977): 64-5. (Hereafter cited as PPP); Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents 13 (7 February 1977): 
135. (Hereafter cited as WCPD); NYT, 3 February 1977. 
1
~ WP, 10 March 1977. 
32 
broadcast live on radio and television, Carter made his first 
public affirmation of his long standing campaign promise of 
a Korean pullout. The President, however, did not give the 
public a rationale for the policy. Instead, he reaffirmed the 
gradual base reduction and stressed that it would not be 
reversible. Carter said: 
My commitment to withdraw American ground troops 
from Korea has not changed ••• I think that the time 
period as I described in the campaign months, a 4 
or 5 year time period, is appropriate. The schedule 
for withdrawal of American ground troops would have 
to be worked out very carefully with the South 
Korean Government. I would also have to be done with 
the full understanding and,perhaps, participation 
of Japan. I would want to leave in place in South 
Korea adequate ground forces owned by and controlled 
by the South Korean Government to protect themselves 
against any intrusion from North Korea. I would 
envision a continuation of American air cover for 
South Korea over a long period of time. But these 
are the basic elements, and I'm very determined that 
over a period of time, as described jQ_ff then, that 
our ground troops would be withdrawn. 
Two hours after Carter's news conference, Secretary of 
State Cyrus R. Vance officially notified South Korean Foreign 
Minister Park Tong Jin of Carter's decision to withdraw the 
troops from South Korea at a State Department meeting. Vance 
told Park that the detailed American plan would be ready for 
discussion with the Seoul Government in late spring. Foreign 
Minister Park did not seek to persuade the secretary to 
suspend the American plan. Instead, the minister expressed his 
1
~ PPP 1 (9 March 1977): 343; WCPD 13 (14 March 1977): 
330; DSB76 (4 April 1977): 307; NYT, 10 March 1977; WP, 10 
March 1977. 
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concern about the continuing United States security commitment 
18 
to south Korea. On the afternoon of the same day, Foreign 
Minister Park met Carter at the White House to discuss 
security issues including the proposed withdrawal policy as 
well as human rights violations in South Korea. 19 ouring the 
session of about 45 minutes, the President assured Park that 
the troop withdrawal would be carried out very carefully in 
order not to upset military balance or create instability on 
the Korean peninsula. He advised the minister that the United 
states Air Force in South Korea would be slightly augmented 
to show American determination to protect South Korea against 
communist invasion. Meanwhile, Carter expressed his "deep 
concern" about human rights violations in South Korea, 
mentioning a number of leading Korean citizens who were 
imprisoned or under house arrest for their critic ism of 
President Park Chung Hee's dictatorship. 20 
On the next day, Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant 
Secretary designate for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, for 
the first time, presented a rationale for the pullout policy 
in a statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific 
Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations. He 
18 WP, 10 March 1977 . . 
19 PPP 1 (11 March 1977): 372; WCPD 13 (14 March 1977): . 
350. 
20 NYT, 10 March 1977; WP, 10 March 1977; LAT, 10 March . 
1977. 
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told congressmen that the changing circumstances in East Asia 
required the United States to reconsider the longstanding 
.American policy in that area. Most of all, the end of United 
states involvement in Indochina, the possible normalization 
of diplomatic relations with China, and economic progress in 
that area reduced tensions in the Far East. Holbrooke stressed 
that all of the major powers favored the continuous stable 
situation in that area "at least for the present." Therefore, 
he claimed, the proposed withdrawal plan was not a dangerous 
21 
one. 
carter's intention of removing all the ground troops from 
south Korea over a span of four to five years was reconfirmed 
at the carter-Fukuda Washington meeting of 20-23 March. The 
joint communique issued on 22 March 1977 stated that; 
In connection with the intended withdrawal of United 
States ground forces in the Republic of Korea, the 
President stated that the United states, after 
consultation with the Republic of Korea and also 
with Japan, would proceed in ways which would not 
endanger the peace on the peninsula. He affirmed 
that the United States remains ffmmi tted to the 
defense of the Republic of Korea. 
In the meantime, on 4 March before the House Armed 
Services Committee in connection with the procurement bill, 
2
~ DSB 76 (4 April 1977): 322. 
2
~ PPP 1 (25 March 1977): 480; DSB 76 (April 1977): 376. 
Th7 Chicago Tribune reported on 31 July 1977 that Japanese 
Prime Minister Fukuda expressed his great doubts about 
Carter's pullout plan, especially the 1982 deadline. He also 
was not seen satisfied with Carter's rationale for the 
withdrawal policy. 
35 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared its official opinion on 
Korean situation, emphasizing its geopolitical importance that 
"any precipitous change in the precariously balanced forces 
there, particularly with respect to the u. s. military 
presence, would have an unsettling and potentially 
destabilizing effect. 1123 
Three days later, with respect to the PRM-13, the Joint 
chiefs of staff forwarded a memorandum to the Secretary of 
Defense recommending the President withdraw about 7,000 troops 
from south Korea by the end of 1982 instead of pulling back 
all ground troops home so as not to erode the deterrence and 
disturb the military balance in Korea. The Joint Chiefs added 
that any further withdrawal should be delayed and the 
situation reevaluated in 1982. The Joint Chiefs' opinion 
became one of several options for the withdrawal. It was 
forwarded to the Interagency Working Group. 24 
Within the executive branch there was little consensus 
on the proper rate of the troop withdrawal. However, most 
staff studies suggested pulling back a smaller number of 
troops from South Korea over a longer period of time than 
Carter wanted. 25 The Interagency Working Group studied 
various recommendations suggested by the concerned executive 
2
~ Cong. HASC 95-71, 99. General Kerwin testified before 
the Committee on behalf of Gen. Rogers at that time. 
24 
• Ibid., 79-80. 
25 
• Vance, Choices, 128. 
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branches and made an interagency report on PRM-13. On 21 April 
the policy Review Committee, chaired by Secretary Vance, 
reviewed the interagency report and decided to recommend 
slower and more cautious withdrawals to the National Security 
·1 26 counc1 • 
on 27 April 1977 the National Security Council chaired 
by the President met on PRM-13 and discussed several of the 
withdrawal options recommended by the Policy Review Committee. 
The NSC members disagreed on the pullout schedule. CIA 
Director Stansfield Turner favored suspension of the plan, 
based on a CIA intelligence report. 27 Secretary Vance, 
secretary Brown, and other members of the NSC recommended a 
slower and more cautious withdrawal. Only National Security 
Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski fully supported Carter's proposed 
pullout program. 28 
Finally on 5 May 1977 Carter made the official decision 
on the withdrawals and sent the Presidential Directive 
(PD/NSC-12) to the CIA, the NSA, the State Department, the 
Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other concerned 
executive branches. 2 9 The Presidential Directive announced 
Carter's decision on the withdrawals of the Second Division, 
26 
• Cong. HASC 95-71, 80. 
2
-Z Oberdorfer, "Carter's Decision," WP, 12 June 1977. 
28 V h . 
• ance, C O1ces, 128-9. 
29 
. Cong. HASC 95-71, 80. 
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its supporting troops,and nuclear weapons from south Korea by 
the end of 1982, while it laid out a specific time-table. It 
stated the United States would withdraw about 6,000 troops, 
including one combat brigade of the Second Division, by the 
end of 1978.30 
As soon as Carter made his official withdrawal decision, 
he instructed Philip C. Habib, Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs, and General George S. Brown, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of staff, to visit Seoul and Tokyo in order 
to begin consultations with officials of South Korea and Japan 
on the timetable for the withdrawals. On May 11, State 
Department spokesman Frederick z. Brown announced that the 
united States would begin formal talks with South Korean 
officials on 24 May 1977 about the withdrawal of 33,000 United 
states ground troops from South Korea over the next four to 
five years. Brown emphasized that the purpose of the trip was 
to hold "full and free consultations" with officials of Seoul 
and Tokyo governments. 31 
In the mean time, the Presidential Directive caused the 
Army to begin to prepare for the withdrawal of the Second 
Infantry Division. Proposals were made to change its 
organization to a mechanized infantry division so as to better 
3
~ Ibid., 80, 149. 
31 
. NYT, 12 May 1977; WP, 12 May 1977; LAT, 12 May 1977. 
The papers reported that the real purpose of the trip was not 
for consultations but to notify the prepared u. s. timetables 
for the pullout to Seoul. 
38 
meet NATO's requirements in Europe. 3 2 At the same time, the 
ArmY also began to study where to build the new home in the 
united states for the Second Division when it would return 
home from South Korea. The Army officials favored Fort Bliss, 
Texas as a new base for the division followed by Fort Benning, 
Georgia. 33 The Pentagon considered Hawaii as well as several 
bases in the mainland as a new home for the division. 34 
However, politicians quietly pressed the Pentagon to deploy 
the division to their hometown in order to buoy the local 
economy. New York's two senators, Jacob K. Javits and Daniel 
P. Moynihan, urged the Pentagon to deploy the troops at Fort 
Drum, New York. Robert c. McEwen, Congressman for that 
district, claimed that Fort Drum was the best place for a NATO 
support force because the climate and terrain was similar to 
that of Europe. 35 speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill, jr., 
Democrat of Massachusetts, urged the Pentagon to include Fort 
Devens, Massachusetts as one of the division's bases, while 
he also supported the idea of any Northeast base. 36 Governor 
of New York Hugh L. Carey sent an eighty-seven page report to 
3
~ Rae T. Panella, ed. Department of the Army 
Summary: Fiscal Year 1977 (Washington, D.C.: 
Military History, United States Army, 1979), 6. 
33 
. NYT, 15 January 1978; LAT, 7 January 1978. 
34 
• NYT, 8 September 1977. 
Historical 
Center of 
35 
. Ibid., 8 September 1977 and 5 January 1978. 
36 
• Ibid., 5 January 1978. 
39 
the president explaining why Fort Drum was the best place for 
the second Division and asked the President to relocate it to 
37 Fort Drum. 
Meanwhile, a few days before Under Secretary Habib and 
General Brown began initial talks with Korean officials on the 
withdrawals, General John K. Singlaub, Chief of Staff of 
united states Forces in Korea, publicly criticized President 
eater's withdrawal policy, alleging that the planned 
withdrawal policy was not only based on outdated intelligence 
on North Korea, but would probably lead to war in Korea. 
Partly because Carter was angered that his primary military 
policy was criticized by a subordinate at a particularly 
sensitive time and partly because he feared that Singlaub's 
remark itself might encourage North Korea to attack South 
after his completion of the pullout, President Carter recalled 
the general to Washington. The general left Korea with orders 
to personally report to Carter at the White House. 38 
37 
• Ibid., 10 January 1978. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE SINGLAUB Al'FAIR 
General John K. Singlaub was born in Independence, 
California on 10 July 1921. He graduated from Van Nuys High 
school and then went to the University of California at Los 
Angeles, where he joined the ROTC. Singlaub did not graduate 
from the university, instead, he began an action-filled 
military career. He became a second lieutenant in January 
1943. In October Singlaub was assigned to the oss (Office of 
Strategic Services) - predecessor of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) - and served in combat and covert operations in 
Nazi-occupied Europe and later in Asia. In 1944 he led a 
three-man team that parachuted behind enemy lines in the 
central mountains of France to train a French resistance group 
to help with coming Allied invasion of Europe. In 1945 Captain 
Singlaub, leading an oss team, helped a Chinese guerrilla 
group fight against the Japanese in Burma, China, and 
Indochina. Just before the end of the Second World War, in 
August, he led a rescue team that parachuted into a Japanese 
Prisoner of war camp on Hainan Island, off the coast of China, 
40 
41 
and freed about 400 POWs. During the Korean War Singlaub was 
a deputy chief of the CIA mission in Korea and then served as 
a battalion commander in the Third Infantry Division. During 
his service in Korea, he was awarded the Silver Star. During 
the Vietnam War he worked on covert operations from a secret 
command post known as the Eagle's Nest from 1966 to 1968.1 
In July 1976, just before the Panmunjom incident, when 
the two American soldiers were killed, Major General Singlaub 
became the chief of staff of United states forces in Korea. 
one of the general's functions in Korea was to serve as the 
senior member of the United Nations Command on the Military 
Armistice Commission. His duty was to conduct discussions with 
the chief North Korean representative at Panmunjom when 
sessions were called. He thus was one of the few American 
military officers dealing directly with Communist officers in 
a situation of military confrontation. During nearly 34 years 
of army service, Singlaub had been wounded twice and was 
honored with many decorations including the Silver Star, 
Bronze star, Purple Heart, Distinguished Service Medal, and 
Combat Infantryman Badge. Singlaub also graduated from several 
distinguished military schools such as the Infantry School, 
Advanced Course, United States Army Command and General Staff 
College, and the Air war College. He also received B.A. degree 
1 
• NYT, 20 May 1977, 21 May 1977 and 27 May 1977; WP, 20 
May 1977; CT, 28 May 1977; Newsweek 89 (30 May 1977): 17; 
Cong. HASC 95-71, 3, 67. 
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in political Science at the University of California in Los 
.Angeles in 1958.2 
General Singlaub was described as a "super patriot," a 
"Soldier's soldier" and a "thoroughly professional soldier." 
singlaub's own commander, General John W. Vessey referred to 
him as a "professional soldier with a distinguished combat 
record. 113 General William c. Westmoreland, Commander of 
American Forces in Vietnam, also praised Singlaub. In his book 
A soldier Reports, he described the Eagle's Nest and its 
covert operations against the North Vietnamese: 
The SOG Commanders were an ingenious group. One of 
the first had been my operations officer in the 
101st Airborne Division, Colonel John K. Singlaub. 
Unknown to me at the time, Jack Singlaub personally 
reconnoitered the site for the Eagle's Nest to make 
sure it could be defended. He and his staff 
developed special clothing and equipment for 
Americans manning the Eagle's Nest and participating 
on patr?l~ Sf that nothing could be traced to its 
U.S. origin. 
According to his military colleagues, Singlaub was 
neither a publicity seeker nor a troublemaker. He was an 
2
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honest, popular, and outspoken man who sometimes got 
frustrated when he was asked by Korean military friends about 
the withdrawal policy because he himself could not find 
reasonable answers for it. 5 He always answered them "I don't 
1cnow why the President did this. 116 Worried South Korean 
military officers frequently raised the issue and urged 
singlaub to influence policy makers in Washington. 7 A few days 
before he gave the controversial interview to the Washington 
fost, Singlaub was invited to a dinner party by a leading 
member of the South Korean National Assembly. The host also 
urged Singlaub to stand firmly against Carter's withdrawal 
policy if the general really thought Washington's decision was 
a mistake. 8 
On 19 May 1977 John Saar, Chief of the Washington Post's 
Tokyo bureau, came to Singlaub's office. He was reporting the 
views of high ranking United states commanders in Korea about 
the withdrawal policy. Earlier that morning, Saar interviewed 
General John J. Burns, the Deputy Commander of United Forces 
5 
. WP, 21 May 1977. 
6 
• Cong. HASC 95-71, 54. Congressman Ronald V. Dellums 
of California, who was a leader of liberal Democrats, 
criticized General Singlaub's undiplomatic answer at the 
hearing. Dellums told Singlaub that he had to answer Korean 
generals that "the President of United States has established 
the policy. I am an officer in the U. s. military. My 
responsibility is to carry out policies, so I am not the 
appropriate person to answer that question." 
7 
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in Korea. They discussed the subject of air power and how it 
would compensate for the withdrawal of ground troops. General 
aurns publicly told the reporter that he was "unhappy to see 
the troops go. " Following that interview, Mr. Saar met a 
civilian adviser Jim Hausman to get background on the key 
issues that were going to be discussed between officials of 
south Korea and the United States that week. 9 
During that interview, Saar asked some purely military 
and technical questions about the Second Infantry Division. 
since Hausman could not answer these questions, he asked 
singlaub to answer them for Saar on a background basis. 
singlaub accepted Hausman's proposal and gave a thirty-minute 
interview to the reporter. According to Saar, Singlaub bluntly 
criticized the Carter Administration by arguing that the 
withdrawal policy was made based on out-dated intelligence on 
North Korea and it would certainly lead to war in the Korean 
peninsula. 10 
As soon as Saar left his office, Singlaub called his 
public affairs officer and asked him the general rules on 
interviews and realized that he should have told the reporter 
9 
. Cong. HASC 95-71, 6-7, 24. Jim Hausman was the 
special assistant to the CINC, UNC. He has been in South Korea 
since 1946. He was at that time the personal adviser to 
President Syng man Rhee, the first president of South Korea. 
H7 also knew President Park when he was a young officer. Gen. 
S1.nglaub said that Mr. Hausman was the most knowledgeable 
American on the subject of Korea and Korean officials. 
1
~ John Saar, "Background on the Singlaub Affair," WP, 
3 June 1977. 
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that it was "off the record" or background if he did not want 
hiS name identified in the newspaper. So, Singlaub ordered his 
advisor to find out what was Saar's intention. The public 
affairs officer spent the rest of that day trying to find the 
reporter but could not. Late that afternoon, about 6 hours 
after the interview, Saar called Singlaub in order to confirm 
that interview was on the record. The general first said that 
it was off the record, But the reporter explained to Singlaub 
his understanding that the interview had been on the record. 11 
Saar told Singlaub: 
Well, you understand what the ground rules are in 
this regard. You didn't tel 1 me it was off the 
record or a background . • • Well, unless you are 
prepared to retract what you have said, or cp~nge 
what you have said, I intend to file a story. 
At that point, the general figured that he could not stop 
the reporter and ordered his public affairs officer to 
persuade Saar to give him the story before it was published. 
But the officer failed to get in touch with the reporter and 
the story was published13 in the Washington Post on 19 May 
1977. On the front page Singlaub was quoted as saying, "If we 
l~ Cong. HASC 95-71, 7-8; FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 12; 
Saar, "Singlaub Affair," WP, 3 June 1977. 
12 
. Cong. HASC 95-71, 8. 
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1
~ Ibid., 8. Saar said in his article "Background on the 
Singlaub Affair" that he was told by a well placed source that 
Gen. Singlaub did not give such instruction and he did not 
rec7ive such message from the general's public affairs 
officer. Saar also said that the general agreed to make the 
story on the record during their phone conversation. 
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withdraw our ground forces on the schedule suggested it will 
14 iead to war." 
President Carter, an early riser, read the Washington 
£_ost report with distress and anger and immediately discussed 
it with his top aides and several key senators including 
senator John C. Stennis, Chairman of the Armed Service 
committee and Senator Sam Nunn, the ranking Democrat from 
Georgia.15 The President called Defense Secretary Harold Brown 
about 10: 00 a.m. and instructed him immediately to order 
General Singlaub back to Washington for a face-to-face meeting 
with him at the White House. 16 
At the same time, Carter, fearing Singlaub's remark might 
encourage North Korea to consider another invasion, warned the 
North that "any potential aggressor should have no doubt about 
the steadfastness of our commitment to maintaining peace and 
stability in that region and our commitment to the Republic 
of Korea. 1117 
The general 's sudden summons was splashed across the 
front pages of most major newspapers and received heavy TV and 
radio news coverage nationwide. Influential newspapers such 
as the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, the New York 
14 
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and the Washington Post likened General Singlaub' s 
recall to the General MacArthur affair. The papers claimed 
that carter's personal recall of Singlaub was the first such 
disciplining of an American general since Truman recalled and 
fired General MacArthur during the Korean War. 18 
Military officials privately expressed anger at the 
treatment of the general and said Carter's action did not 
resemble Truman's recall of General MacArthur because Truman 
recalled MacArthur for refusing to obey his orders in the form 
of a Defense Department policy statement, but Singlaub did not 
disobey a direct order. Moreover, they emphasized the fact 
that singlaub confirmed at the end of his interview that if 
the decision was made he would execute it "with enthusiasm and 
a high level of professional skill. 1119 
On 21 May 1977 Singlaub, wearing his uniform with two 
gold general' stars, met Defense Secretary Harold Brown at the 
Pentagon. After an hour-long interview they drove to the White 
House for a thirty-minute session with the President. In his 
meeting with the President, Singlaub did not try to deny his 
assertion that war would follow removal of the troops from 
Korea. In his defense, however, the general told Carter he 
thought that his interview was to be used by the reporter as 
background, and the quotation of his statement in the 
18 
. NYT, 22 May 1977; WP, 22 May 1977. 
19 
• WP, 20 May 1977. 
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newspaper was taken out of context and "exaggerated" by the 
reporter. The President did not give an explanation of his 
withdrawal policy, but simply said what Singlaub said was 
wrong. The general evoked some sympathy in the meeting with 
the President. After 1 istening to Singlaub' s explanation, 
carter began to believe that Singlaub made a serious mistake 
but that he had not been intentionally disloyal or 
d . t 20 insubor 1.na e. 
Shortly \after the meeting, the Pentagon announced 
singlaub's dismissal from his Korean post. In the 
announcement, Secretary of Defense Brown said that he asked 
the President to relieve Singlaub from his post because he 
thought the general could not do his duty in Korea because of 
his open objection to Carter's withdrawal policy. Secretary 
Brown said: 
Public statements by General Singlaub inconsistent 
with announced national security policy have made 
it very difficult for him to carry out the duties 
of his present assignment in Korea I have 
therefore recommended to the president that General 
Singlaub be reassigned, and with the president's 
concurrence I have directed the s'29.retary of the 
Army to take action to that effect. 
On Sunday morning, 22 May 1977, the nation's major 
newspapers reported Singlaub's dismissal on their front pages 
20 
. NYT, 22 May 1977; WP, 22 May 1977; LAT, 22 May 1977; 
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with the following titles: "President Fires Gen. Singlaub as 
Korea staff Chief" (Washington Post,) "Carter Removes General 
Who opposed Korea Policy" (Los Angeles Times,) "Carter 
oisciplines Gen. Singlaub, Who Attacked His Policy on Korea" 
(New York Times,) and "Carter Removes Critical General from 
Korea Post (Chicago Tribune.) 
The dismissal of Singlaub from his Korean post shocked 
not only the general but also many military officers who 
thought the recall itself was a severe measure for a 
professional and courageous general who had only voiced the 
opinion of numerous senior officers in Korea and at the 
Pentagon. 22 Singlaub himself did not expect his dismissal and 
told a reporter two days earlier, while on the way to 
Washington, that he expected to return to his post in Korea 
after meeting with the President.23 
As soon as Singlaub left Korea for a meeting with the 
President, General John W. Vessey, Commander of United Nations 
and United States Forces in South Korea, confirmed the 
command's willingness to carry out the mission assigned by the 
President in a press conference. At the same time he sent a 
cable to Secretary Brown explaining the controversial 
interview and requested that Singlaub be kept in his current 
22 
• NYT, 22 May 1977; WP, 21 May 1977. 
23 
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job. 
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24 
General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
staff, in his speech to the local Chamber of Commerce in 
Columbus, Ohio, criticized Singlaub by stating that "the 
military have no right to make policy decisions and military 
men should express their opinions with tact." However, he also 
predicted that Singlaub would return to Korea. 25 
Many officials, especially Singlaub's fellow officers in 
seoul, criticized Carter's severe action. They told reporters 
privately that they agree with Singlaub's claim that President 
carter's withdrawal policy would lead to war. One officer at 
the headquarters of United States forces in Korea said, 
"everyone here thinks what he said was right." But, they 
refused to publicize their feelings to avoid a fate similar 
to Singlaub. Many of them regarded Carter's reaction as a move 
to ram the policy down the military's throat. 26 
On 22 May, on the CBS TV program "Face the Nation," 
Secretary Brown strongly defended President Carter's decision 
to relieve the general of his Korean command. He repeatedly 
stated that Singlaub's dismissal was necessary because his 
effectiveness was undermined in South Korea due to his 
outspoken opposition to Carter's Korean Policy. But, Brown 
24 S ' h ' 1 ' . an Francisco C ronic e, 23 May 1977. (Hereafter cited 
as SFC). 
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said, singlaub's reprimand was not meant to curb freedom of 
speech in the military. He revealed that there had been plenty 
of opportunity for the expression of military views on the 
withdrawal policy. Brown emphasized that the new Korean policy 
had already been determined, therefore, officials had no 
choice but to follow government policy if they wanted to stay 
in the military. The secretary said: 
The military are not only allowed, but they' re 
encouraged to express their views during the 
determination of policy through the chain of 
command. However, once a military person has had a 
chance to express his views on a policy that's being 
determined - and the policy is determined - it 
therefore becomes his (an officer's) responsibility 
to support that ~oJ-icy publicly, if he plans to stay 
in the military. 
Secretary Brown added that the withdrawal of American 
ground troops over four or five years would not endanger South 
Korea's security, and said that the withdrawal plan had been 
fully discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior 
military officials in South Korea. He emphasized that the 
South Korean Army had improved its operational skills, 
especially in the use of artillery, tanks, and anti-tank 
weapons. Therefore, if the United States maintained logistical 
support as well as air and sea power, Brown claimed, the South 
Korean Army could defend the country against any attack from 
the North. At the same time he made it clear that any military 
officer who publicly challenged the determined policy would 
. 
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. h d 28 be punis e • 
carter's swift action on Singlaub brought a controversy 
not only among military officers but also among politicians. 
senator John Culver, an Iowa Democrat and a member of the 
senate Armed Service Committee, praised Carter's action by 
saying that "I am very pleased to see this strong assertion 
of civilian control. 1129 Senator Frank Church, the ranking 
Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also 
criticized Singlaub's open opposition to the President urging 
carter to dismiss the general. He said that: 
When I was in the Army it was made clear to me that 
the unpardonable offense was insubordination. If 
this holds true for enlisted men and junior 
officers, even more must it bind the generals ••• 
We maintain an army, not to make national policy, 
but to uphold and enforce it. When a general on 
active duty, in command abroad, publicly criticizes 
or contradicts presidential Y8licy, then he should 
be disciplined or dismissed. 
The senator added that if they asked the general to decide 
when the troops should leave Korea, he might decide to keep 
the United States Army in Korea forever. 
Senate majority leader Robert c. Byrd, appearing on the 
NBC TV program "Meet the Press" on 22 May, also defended 
Carter's action on the Singlaub affair. Senator Byrd, argued 
that Carter did what he had to do in removing Singlaub from 
28 
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his Korean post, said, "I think he had no choice but to do 
this."3 1 senator Strom Thurmond, South Carolina Republican and 
a senior member of the Armed Services Committee, also 
supported Carter's measures on Singlaub even though he 
personally agreed with Singlaub's opinion on Korean policy. 
He said that: 
I'm sure the General did it for the best of reasons. 
I personally agree with him. But I don't think it's 
appropriate for a man in uniform to make statements 
like this unless he plans to retire. 3~s long as he's 
in uniform, he's not free to speak. 
In his letter to the editor of the Washington Post on 1 
July 1977 Congressman Bob Carr, Democrat of Michigan, argued 
that a military man should express his basic policy 
disagreements through channels. Otherwise he should be 
prepared to resign his post before taking his opposition to 
the public. Carr claimed that four generals, whom he discussed 
the Singlaub affairs with, described Singlaub' s action as 
"unprofessional and irresponsible." 
Former President Ford also supported Carter's action on 
Singlaub even though he did not agree to Carter's withdrawal 
policy. At a luncheon meeting with reporters in Washington on 
20 May, Ford repeatedly expressed his objection to Carter's 
proposed withdrawal policy by emphasizing that the maintenance 
of troops in South Korea had kept the peace since 1953. Ford 
31 
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t if he had been elected, he would not have added tha 
considered the withdrawal of the ground troops from South 
Korea. However, Ford, a strong believer in civilian control 
of the military, stressed that a person in uniform should 
expect the consequence if he did not carry out the orders of 
the commander in chief. 33 
Meanwhile, former California Governor Ronald Reagan 
criticized Carter's handling of the general in Buffalo, New 
York Republican fund raising dinner. He said, "frankly, the 
general is right when he says such reduction will lead to 
North Korean attacks on South Korea. The President is just 
plain wrong." Reagan also claimed that Carter's manner in 
disciplining the general was disgraceful. There was no need 
to humiliate General Singlaub who had an impeccable record. 
Instead of recalling Singlaub to Washington, Reagan argued, 
Carter should have instructed Defense Secretary Brown to give 
Singlaub the outline of the President's policy and reasons for 
it. He added that Carter should have left the general on the 
job in Korea. 34 
Congressman Robert Michel of Illinois, a second ranking 
GOP leader in the House, also criticized President's action 
on Singlaub in a speech on the House floor on 24 May. He said, 
Was the general right or wrong? President Carter's 
decision to withdraw those troops was first made 
public in the heat of a presidential campaign. There 
33 
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is no evidence that he reached a dec\~on on the 
basis of advise from military experts. 
senator Barry Goldwater, Arizona Republican, said that 
he was disturbed at the treatment of the general and was 
puzzled at the Carter Administration's policy in Korea. He 
said, "I can't find a policy declaration. It has not presented 
to the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which I am a 
member, and so far as I know it has not been presented to the 
committee on Foreign Affairs. 1136 
The nation's influential editorial writers were also 
divided by the controversy. On 23 May 1977 the editor of the 
Cleveland Press defended Carter's decision. The editor alleged 
that: 
If carter had tolerated the general's published 
remarks which verged on insubordination, he would 
have weakened his hand in dealing with the military 
almost at the start of his administration. And this, 
in turn, could have undermined the principle of 
civilian control over the military that the 
President is commander in chief and he and his 
advisers set defense a~ foreign policies, not the 
generals and admirals. 
The editor continued to argue that the Korean and Vietnam Wars 
proved conclusively that the American public would not support 
involvement in a land war on the Asian mainland. The editor 
criticized Singlaub that he attempted to keep American ground 
35 
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troops in south Korea indefinitely because he did not learn 
anY lesson from the Vietnam war. 38 
on the following day, editors of the New York Times, the 
ws Angeles Times, and the Chicago Sun Times expressed similar 
opinions. They defended Carter's removal of Singlaub from his 
post in Korea. An editorial of the Los Angeles Times did not 
agree with singlaub' view that the troop withdrawal would 
endanger south Korea's security by emphasizing the fact that 
the south Korean Army of 625,000 men and strong United States 
air and naval protection could defend against an attack. The 
editor pointed out that the American tradition of civilian 
authority over the military was deeply rooted in the 
constitution. Once the President made a decision, the editor 
said, no military man could be allowed to challenge that 
position in public. 39 
The editorial of the New York Times also said that the 
"direct challenge of a President's announced military policy 
was simply unacceptable. " It continued to argue that "the 
price of democracy, and of the nation's capacity to hold 
elected officials accountable, was obedience 
bureaucracy, and above all in the military. 1140 
38 
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An editorial in the Chicago sun Times also criticized 
singlaub's action and said American officers should not 
"attack United States policies publicly under the system of 
civilian control of the military." The editor claimed that the 
uniformed men who were against the President's policy should 
use other avenues such as Pentagon and Congress. Otherwise, 
they should resign in advance before going to public. the 
editor said, "it is a system that works. 1141 
In the meantime, the editorials of the Wall Street 
Journal, the Detroit News, the Chicago Tribune, and the 
Washington Post criticized Carter's overreaction on the 
singlaub affair. The editors admitted that a President should 
have control over United States military policy and Singlaub's 
criticism came at highly inappropriate time because high 
ranking American officials were about to leave for Seoul to 
discuss the details of the proposed withdrawal policy with 
South Korean officials. However, they said that the dismissal 
of the general was a presidential overreaction. The editorial 
of the Detroit News on 24 May 1977 stated: 
Even if Mr. Carter felt he had to act to establish 
his authority over the u. s. military, it was not 
necessary for him publicly to humiliate the general 
who had said the planned U.S. withdrawal from South 
Korea was a mistake that could lead to war. To show 
his displeasure, the President could have quietly 
ordered Singlaub transferred to another post .•• the 
entire controversy is a needless and damaging one 
which, we must remember, is a product of another of 
, 4~ Editorial, Chicago Sun Times, 21 May 1977. (Hereafter 
cited as CST). 
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Mr. carter's ill advised campaign promises. 42 
The Wall Street Journal on 24 May stated that Carter's 
decision on Singlaub affair was wrong because it not only 
humiliated the general but also would impose "a gag on the 
entire officer corps." The editor said, 
we certainly do want civilian control and a chain 
of command. We do not want military men trying to 
sabotage a President's foreign policy or leading a 
political campaign against it. On the other hand, 
the ultimate sovereign is not the President but the 
public. And if generals on the scene really do 
believe a President's policy would lead to war. This 
is ce.ffainly something the public has a right to 
know. 
The Washington Post said in an editorial of 24 May that 
carter's decision to defend civilian supremacy over the 
military was understandable. But the editor disagreed with 
carter's claim that North Korea might miscalculate General 
Singlaub's remarks and attack the South. The editor said, 
We suppose it's possible, but only in the sense that 
anything is possible. For it is hard to believe that 
the North Koreans would make decisions on anything 
as important as an attack on South Korea on the 
basis of the indiscretions of one middle-level 
American general. Our own view is that North Korean 
policy makers are quite capable of taking their own 
measure of South Korean capabilities ... High White 
House drama served only to give it far more 
significance and substance than it deserved. 44 
The editorial in the Chicago Tribune of 25 May 1977 
basically supported the principle of civilian control over 
42 Editorial, ON, 24 May 1977. . 
43 Editorial, WSJ, 24 May 1977 • . 
44 Editorial, WP, 24 May 1977. . 
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ailitary policy, but praised Singlaub's courage for speaking 
out his belief: 
under our system, government policy is made by 
civilians and the military must be subservient to 
civilian control • • • Despite all this, we cannot 
condemn the general for speaking out. If an 
experienced military officer believes a presidential 
policy will cause war, the country certainly 
deserves to know about it ••• If Gen. Singlaub's 
effective career is at an end because he has spoken 
out, he has done what he thought right [even if he 
did so more publicly than he expected to.] He will 
not be the first military man to be fired for 
speaking what he believed to be the truth. We hope 
he will not be fge last who is dedicated enough to 
take that risk. 
The weekly magazines were also divided by the 
controversy. The editor of the Nation fully def ended the 
President's decision on the Singlaub affair arguing that 
removing Singlaub from his post in Korea would improve 
national security. The editor said, 
The serious side of this episode is that prominent 
American generals have told the North Koreans that 
they can win a new contest once our ground troops 
have left. There is no excuse for that indiscretion 
.•. Carter was quite right to descend on the hapless 
General Singlaub, and, if "it ends his career," as 
the papers are sayJg1g, so much the better for the 
national security. 
Meanwhile, an editorial in the Economist stressed that 
a serving officer had right to speak out when he believed his 
government policy was wrong. The editor argued that the 
President did not always have better information than officers 
4
~ Editorial, CT, 25 May 1977, sec. 3. 
4
~ Nation 224 (4 June 1977): 677. 
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serving in the field. Therefore, the editor claimed, American 
people had right to hear the soldiers' opinions, especially 
when these military men were in a position to know something 
47 
about matter. 
The nation's columnists overwhelmingly defended Singlaub 
and criticized Carter's decision on the Singlaub affair. 
Patrick J. Buchanan, an influential conservative columnist, 
said in his column "The General Deserves Respect", published 
in the Chicago Tribune on 26 May 1977, that Singlaub merited 
his countrymen's admiration. In risking his career to warn the 
nation of the consequences of what he believed as dangerous, 
Buchanan claimed, Singlaub exhibited "a moral courage to match 
the physical bravery that has marked a long military career." 
He praised the general by saying that Singlaub was acting in 
the tradition of Billy Mitchell and Douglas MacArthur, risking 
his career, rather than leaving his countrymen ignorant of 
potential danger of present policy. Meanwhile, the columnist 
accused Carter of maintaining a double standard in his 
treatment Singlaub and outspoken U .N. Ambassador Andrew Young, 
who openly disagreed with administration policy yet remained 
at his job.48 
47 E . t ( ) 
. conomis 263 28 May 1977 : 67. 
4
~ Patrick J. Buchanan, "The General Deserves Respect," 
~, 26 May 1977, sec. 3. Andrew Young, U.S. Ambassador to U.N. 
(1977-9), generated controversy by his outspoken appraisals 
of such issues as Angola, the PLO, South African apartheid. 
On 25 January 1977 Young said that the presence of Cuban 
troops in Angola brought a certain "stability and order" to 
that country. The State Department immediately criticized 
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columnist Jack Fuller argued in his article "Lashing A 
General Won't End Carter's Military Problem" that the 
president had a reason for his double standard. According to 
Fuller, Carter and Defense Secretary Brown had put together 
a civilian leadership in the Pentagon, and that of course did 
not please the military officers. Moreover, many of the new 
civilian appointees were liberal and did not favor some 
important project such as the B-1 bomber. Therefore, many 
conservative high ranking officers clashed with their civilian 
bosses on strategic issues such as the troop withdrawals from 
south Korea. Under the circumstances, General Singlaub 
appeared to the civilian leaders as more than an "aberrant 
indiscretion." His public position, therefore, urgently 
required Carter and Brown to go beyond the usual need to 
assert civilian control over the military and resulted in 
harsh response to Singlaub's remarks. The columnist predicted 
that the removal of Singlaub from his Korean post would not 
reduce tension between the brass and the civilian leadership 
in the Pentagon. 49 
J. F. terHorst, a national news columnist, pointed out 
in his article "Who Lost Most in Singlaub Firing" that the 
brass in the Pentagon were never asked for advice for the 
withdrawal policy by the President, but simply were asked for 
Young's statement. 
49• Jack Fuller, "Lashing a General Won't End Carter's 
Military Problems," CT, 26 May 1977, sec. 3. 
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way to carry out the reduction of forces from South proper 
The columnist said that the President seemed to be Korea. 
betting that his political judgement was superior to the 
general •s military expertise. If the things turned to be 
right, the columnist said, Carter would deserve all the 
credit, but if it ended in disaster, the brass would not be 
to blame because Singlaub had made the danger clear. 50 
PUblic opinion concerning the Singlaub affair also showed 
disagreement. Letters published in the nation's major 
newspapers show that eighteen out of twenty-three persons 
defending General Singlaub while only five of them backed 
carter's decision on the Singlaub affair. 51 
In the meantime, Congressman Samuels. Stratton of New 
York Democrat, Chairman of the House Armed Services 
Investigations Subcommittee, asked the Pentagon to make 
General Singlaub available for public hearings on 25 May in 
connection with the Subcommittee's "overall review of U. s. 
defense strategy. 1152 The chairman reminded the press that 
Congress had not yet approved Carter's withdrawal plan, said 
that Congress had "the highest interest" in hearing opposing 
views on the pullout. At the same time, Stratton made it clear 
5
~ J F. terHorst, "Who Lost Most in Singlaub Firing?", 
DN, 29 May 1977. 
51 
• NYT, 29 May 1977, sec. 4 and 30 May 1977, sec. 4; WP, 
25 May 1977 and 1 June 1977; LAT, 27 May 1977,sec. 2; CT, 5 
June 1977, sec. 3; SFC, 26 May 1977 and 30 May 1977. 
5
~ SFC, 21 May 1977. 
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that the subcommittee would not pursue the issue of civilian 
right to control over military, but focus on the issue of why 
the general believed the pullout would lead to war in 
53 Korea. 
The singlaub affair was initiated by the Washington 
fost's correspondent John Saar who interviewed General 
singlaub on the Korean withdrawal issue and quoted him on the 
front page of the paper. But, it was enlarged by the President 
himself by recalling the general to the White House. It is 
unclear whether Singlaub agreed with Saar to publish the story 
on the record because Singlaub and Saar contradicted each 
other. Considering his outspoken character and distinguished 
record of service, in my opinion, Singlaub consciously told 
the reporter his views simply to warn policy makers in 
Washington off the record. He did not intend to lead a crusade 
by criticizing the President publicly, nor did he want to put 
the President into a difficult situation. 
Unexpectedly, the Singlaub affair brought the Korean 
withdrawal issue before the American public, who had shown 
little previous interest in it. By recalling and removing the 
general from his Korean Post, Carter gave the public the 
negative impression that he would not allow all Americans to 
participate in the debates on the United States foreign 
policy, something he promised during his campaign. 
5
~ NYT, 24 May 1977; LAT, 24 May 1977; SFC, 24 May 1977. 
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The Singlaub affair gave Congressional opponents the best 
opportunity to rebut Carter's new Korean policy. As a result, 
the President faced strong Congressional opposition as well 
as the public pressures. It not only braked the smooth 
progress of the policy but also damaged Carter's ability to 
carry out the pullout policy in the future. The Singlaub 
affair was a turning point in the whole policy process. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATIVES vs. LIBERAL DEMOCRATS: 
THE SINGLAUB HEARINGS 
The House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee 
began its hearing at 10:03 a.m., 25 May 1977, in the Rayburn 
House Office Building. Presiding was Subcommittee Chairman 
Samuels. Stratton.1 Major General John K. Singlaub appeared 
before a largely sympathetic subcommittee and read his 
prepared brief opening statement. He firmly supported the 
concept of civilian control of the military. The general 
apologized that his naivete about the press had caused 
unnecessary trouble for the President. 2 However, in his 
response to Chairman Stratton, the first questioner, General 
Singlaub reaffirmed that most top United States military and 
civilian officials in Korea did not agree with President 
Carter on the proposed withdrawal plan. He answered, 
I have to say, Mr. Chairman, in all honesty. I know 
of no senior American or ROK official that agrees 
with this proposal to make the withdrawal of all 
1 
• Cong. HASC 95-71, 1, 76. 
2 
. Ibid., 3-4. 
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combat for~es in the time schedule announced by the 
president. 
The general continued to say that United States 
commanders in Korea had not been consulted on the pullout 
decision except on the timing of the pullout, nor did they 
receive any reply from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their 
requests about the rationale of the withdrawal policy and the 
administration's long-term Korean policy. 4 
congressional conservatives, who opposed the withdrawal 
policy, lacked a legislative vehicle to challenge Carter's 
decision because the annual authorization bill and the annual 
Pentagon appropriations measure did not specify where troops 
should be deployed. Apparently they tried to make use of the 
hearings as the best chance to attract public attention to the 
issue and to press the President to back away. 5 Therefore, 
from the beginning of the hearings, the Congressional 
conservative majority lauded the general's long history of 
service to the country and his courage in openly voicing his 
convictions at the risk of his job. First, the conservative 
members focused on the general's contention that Carter had 
3 
• Ibid., 5. 
4
. Ibid., 8-10. General Georges. Brown, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Bernard w. Rogers later 
testified before House Armed Services Committee that the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff was never asked for a rationale for the policy 
by the Korean Command.(See Cong. HASC 95-71, 84, 122). 
5
. Pat Towell, "Carter Troop Withdrawal Plan Attacked," 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 35 (28 May 1977): 1, 075-
6. (Hereafter cited as CQWR). 
made the decision on the withdrawals without 
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full 
consultations with professional military experts. Congressman 
oavid c Treen, a Republican from Louisiana, tried to discover 
if during his presidential campaign Carter had adequate 
professional military advice on the withdrawal issue. 6 
congressman Robert E. Badham, Republican of California, also 
emphasized that military experts had not been properly 
consulted prior the Carter's decision. 7 
In his answers, Singlaub reaffirmed that commanders in 
Korea had never been asked by candidate Carter whether the 
withdrawal was desirable or not. Even after he took the Oval 
Office, Singlaub said, Carter did not ask the command in Korea 
to comment on the desirability of the withdrawal, but asked 
them to comment on various withdrawal options. According to 
the general, all of the different options that the President 
suggested were dangerous choices for the security of South 
Korea. He said, 
Even though we were never asked the question, do you 
think this is desirable, every time we were asked 
to comment on a serious of possible withdrawal 
options, we made it quite clear that some would lead 
to disaster. And we ended up with the least 
undesirgble of some very undesirable courses of 
action. 
6 
. Cong. HASC 95-71, 16. 
7 
• Ibid., 25. 
8 
. Ibid., 16. 
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congressman Treen and other Congressional conservatives 
d keen attention to new intelligence about North Korea's pai 
military strength that was not available to candidate carter 
at the time of his campaign. Singlaub stressed that North 
Korea achieved a much higher level of readiness than the 
united states had estimated earlier. The North increased the 
number of tanks from 500 to 2,000 over a four or five year 
period. They also had similarly increased artillery pieces, 
armed personal carriers, combat ships, and jet fighter 
aircraft during the same period. 9 As a result, the North 
possessed over three times as much artillery and twice as many 
tanks and aircraft as the South. North Korea also had larger 
numbers of rocket launchers and submarines than did the 
south. 10 Therefore, the general claimed, there was a clear 
military superiority in the North over the South even with 
United states troops in South Korea. 11 The general added that 
the North was clearly showing its offensive intentions in its 
deployment of forces12 and by recent moves to shorten 
communication lines. 13 
9 Ibid., 17 • . 
10 Ibid., 34 • . 
11 Ibid., 14 . . 
12 Ibid., 17 • . 
13 Ibid., 60 . . 
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carter's Congressional opponents tried to use singlaub's 
claim that South Korea faced a dangerous military threat from 
the North as a platform for pressing the President to suspend 
his policy. Congressman Robert Daniel, Republican of Virginia, 
focused his question on the origin of these increased weapons. 
singlaub answered that the North Koreans were producing most 
of these new weapons themselves, except highly sophisticated 
ones such as aircraft. The general answered that: 
North Korea has a very extensive industry. They are 
not only producing all of their own artillery, 
soviet design. Their own trucks. They are producing 
their own armored personnel carriers. They are now 
believed to be producing their own tanks. They have 
not as far as we know gone into the production of 
aircraft, but they have received recent deliveries 
of highly sophisticated jet fighter aircraft in 
large numbers. Most of these have come from China, 
specifically the Mig-19. They have received other 
transport-type aircraft. Transport aircraft has 
increased by approximately 60 percent now giving 
them an airlift capacity to a single lift of between 
4,000 to 5,000 troops. They have manufactured most 
of their own ships and boats. These are high speed 
amphibious vessels. They are missile boats equipped 
with what we believe to be the Styx missile. They 
are producing their own submarines. The submarine 
threat is one of those that bothers the Republic of 
Korea most seriously. The14are of Soviet design but North Korean manufacture. 
Congressional hardliner Larry McDonald, Democrat of 
Georgia, and Robert L, Leggett, Democrat of California, tried 
1
~ Ibid., 20, 34. The general explained why the submarine 
was serious threat to the South in his answer to Congressman 
Richard H. I chord, Democrat of Missouri. According to the 
general's explanation, South Korea is regarded strategically 
as island because there is no land route access to allies and 
all its raw materials and manufactures must be transported by 
ship. Thus, submarines pose a great threat to the security of 
South Korea. 
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to paint a picture of North Korea's bellicose attitude by 
reminding the committee of tunnels that the North made in the 
DMZ and the Panmunjom incident,in which North guards killed 
two American officials with axes and metal pikes in August 
1916. Being asked by Congressman Leggett whether tunnels were 
real or fabricated, the general forcefully answered that those 
tunnels in the DMZ were "very, very real" and a serious threat 
to the South. Singlaub confirmed that the tunnels started 
north of the DMZ and got through under the DMZ into the area 
of the southern edge of the DMZ when they were found by the 
south in 1974 and 1975.15 He explained that: 
Those tunnels are dug through solid granite, 
approximately 200 to 300 feet below the ground, 
making it very difficult to detect. And they are 
large enough that you can drive vehicles through 
those tunnels. You can run troops th~%ugh them, 
three abreast without any difficulties. 
Meanwhile, liberal Democrats charged that the hearing 
was held intentionally to frustrate Carter's Korean policy. 
They claimed that the hearing was "inappropriate and only 
embarrassing the President." While liberal Democrats focused 
on the general's alleged naiveness about the press, 
Congressional conservatives sympathized with Singlaub's claim 
that he was mouse-trapped by the press. Congressman Lucien N. 
Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, who was an ardent supporter of 
15 
• Cong. HASC 95-71, 13-4; James N. Wallace, "In Korea, 
War Goes on Underground," USNWR 84 (6 November 1978): 36. 
16 
. Cong. HASC 95-71, 13. 
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carter's pullout policy, doubted Singlaub's naivete, raising 
the fact that the general spent almost ten years in the 
washington area during the period of the Watergate. Nedzi 
suggested that Singlaub, who must have known how to deal with 
the press, intentionally criticized the President in order to 
hamper Carter's ability to implement the policy of phased 
withdrawal of the troops from South Korea. 17 The Congressman 
maintained that the President had no obligation to explain his 
decision to military officers. He said, "this could be helpful 
but not necessary. " Congressman Nedz i asked the general, 
"should the President go to Korea and hold a mass meeting of 
the infantry division and tell them the whole story? 1118 
Congressman Ronald V. Dellums, a leading liberal Democrat 
from California, criticized Singlaub's disloyalty to the 
commander in chief by pointing out the general's open 
opposition to the President foreign policy. Dellums argued 
that the American people did not want to engage in another 
land war in Asia nor did they want to kill North Koreans or 
to die for South Korea. 19 He said, "we don't want our young 
people to go and fight and die in a war that some old men 
dreamed up. That is the result of Vietnam. 1120 
17 Ibid., 28 • . 
18 Ibid., 29 . . 
19 Ibid., 44 . . 
20 Ibid., 45 • . 
The panel 
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also discussed the Second Division's 
contributions to the security of Korea. Conservative Bill 
Nicholas, Democrat of Alabama, asked about the Second 
oivision's strategic value in preventing the North from 
attacking the South. 21 Singlaub answered that the Second 
Division was stationed between two direct corridors to Seoul 
from the North. Therefore, its location had important tactical 
value because the North Korean leaders who were contemplating 
a drive on Seoul would have to attack the di vision. That 
would, of course, be followed by full scale American 
intervention. That was why their Russian and Chinese sponsors, 
who did not want to have trouble with the United States in 
that area, restrained the North from attacking the South. If 
the Second Division was removed, Singlaub argued, the North 
could launch its attack without fear of fighting with American 
ground troops. Moreover, the Russians and Chinese who wanted 
to keep the unified Korea under their influence also could 
support the North without fear of direct confrontation with 
the United States. Therefore, the general concluded that the 
Second Division could not be replaced by any number of South 
Korean combat divisions. 22 
Congressman Thomas J. Downey, Democrat of New York, 
called the hearing "a frontal assault" on Carter's new Korean 
21 
. Ibid., 30. 
22 
. Ibid., 30-2. 
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policy, asked the general the minimum numbers of troops that 
could perform a deterrent role. He asked, "will . a rifle 
company on the DMZ possibly be enough to constitute a tripwire 
or does it necessarily have to be the 42,000 or could it be 
23 less?" 
The general stated that about 40,000 United States forces 
in south Korea including the Second Division fulfilled the 
minimum requirement for the effective deterrent. He also 
raised the point that the presence of those forces in South 
Korea had prevented a war since the end of the Korean War. He 
said, 
The deterrent to be effective, must be believable. 
It must be a believable force, and it must have 
sufficient strength not only to make a military 
contribution, but to be believable that it is 
capable being reinforci~' rather than just being a 
force there by itself. 
Dellums claimed that the presence of American troops 
could not be justified militarily, reminding the general of 
former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's statement that the 
troops in Korea were only there for a political purpose rather 
than a military calculation. 25 The general rebutted Dellums 
claim by saying that many of those officials such as General 
Richard G. Stilwell, former commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, 
and the present commander General Vessey, who believed that 
23 
• Ibid., 43. 
2': Ibid. 
25 
. Ibid., 22. 
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the second Division's contribution to the military balance was 
insignificant, changed their minds after seeing the new 
intelligence coming out of North Korea. 26 Singlaub argued 
that the Second Division, with more sophisticated weapons and 
better communication equipments than any South Korean 
division, had become very important in the military balance 
between North and South Korea in that new situation.27 
congressman Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, questioned 
the general why the new intelligence information came out when 
the administration was about to change Korean policy.28 
singlaub answered that the Panmunjom incident of 1976 required 
United States intelligence to increase its study of North 
Korea. At the same time, more capable intelligence personnel, 
released from Vietnam because of the end of that War, were 
available to examine the strength of North Korea. He answered 
that: 
It is a result of the availability of more analysts, 
as I understand it, in the intelligence community 
having been released from Vietnam, (was) able to 
concentrate on these areas. When these first 
indications came out, more and more have started to 
concentrate, and more of the intelligence is being 
examined, and there was a great boost in this in 
August of 1976. When we had our DMZ incident, trying 
to find out what does this mean? Is this the 
beginning of a major confrontation? And since 
August, there has been a great concentration of 
intelligence collection and analysis. the whole 
26 Ibid., 23-9 . . 
27 Ibid., 31. . 
28 Ibid., 36 . . 
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picture has changed within a year. 29 
The subconuni ttee also discussed the problem of the Second 
oivision's tripwire role in Korea. Liberal Democrats argued 
that because the force was forward deployed, the United States 
had no alternative but to be involved in war should North 
Korea attack. Congress would have no chance to consider 
whether the United States should or should not wage a new war 
in Korea. 30 In case of fighting on the Korean peninsula, 
oellums argued, the United States faced potentially disastrous 
consequences including, "automatic involvement in a new land 
war, early use of nuclear weapons or their being captured by 
North Korea, and the withdrawal of United States forces under 
fire. 1131 
Singlaub tried to remind Dellums of the purpose of the 
presence of U.S. forces in South Korea was to prevent war 
there, rather than to fight. He pointed out that there were 
no troops (save for at Panmunjom) "close to or on" the DMZ. 
Even if a new war broke out, the general maintained, U.S. 
forces would not become automatically involved in war because 
they were stationed far behind the front line. Therefore, the 
President would have enough time to consider the option of 
whether he should conuni t the force or not. The general 
29 
. Ibid., 37. 
30 
• Ibid., 44. 
31 
. Ibid., 53. 
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confirmed that the troops would not be involved in war and 
could not be committed without the specific approval of the 
'd t 32 presi en• 
Both conservatives and liberals showed keen attention to 
cost figures projected for the withdrawals. A Government 
Accounting Office report and the Congressional Budget Office 
report figured that the United States could save a billion 
dollars a year by keeping the troops at home rather than in 
33 
south Korea. 
Singlaub, however, ruled out the possibility of any big 
cost savings from the withdrawals. He argued that lower costs 
of maintaining facilities in Korea and many other benefits 
such as free use of the real estate fully compensated the 
transportation costs for all the supplies and personnel 
rotation. Moreover, taking the cost of building new facilities 
in the United States into consideration, the general 
predicted, there would be no savings. He said, 
We have run some rather detailed studies •.. on this 
subject of whether it is more costly to maintain 
the 2nd Division in Korea with the long distances 
that troops and material and supplies have to 
travel, or to maintain it in the United States. 
Those studies, while not conclusive, because there 
are many factors that are too difficult to measure 
precisely, show that if it is not cheaper to keep 
it in Korea, it is pretty close to it. Despite the 
increased transportation costs for all of the 
supplies and the people that rotate to and from 
Korea, there are many compensating or off setting 
32
. Ibid. 
33 
• Ibid., 18, 48. 
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savings. These are brought about by the lower cost 
of maintaining facilities in Korea - the cost of 
labor is less than it is here. The cost of building 
materials is less there. Some of the other materials 
consumed in the normal operation and maintenance of 
a force there are less. The real estate has been 
given to us free of charge. The training areas are 
free of charge. We are not paying anything for the 
upkeep of those. That is the responsibility of the 
Republic of Korea. And there are other costs that 
the Republic of Korea picks up that 3in the United 
states we would be responsible for. 
Meanwhile, liberal Democrats questioned why the South 
Koreans, who had twice the population and five times the gross 
national product as well as more military personnel, lacked 
self defense capability against the North. 35 Congressman 
Richard H. !chord, Democrat of Missouri, criticized the South 
Koreans for their negligence of building a military capability 
even though they possessed far more population and resources 
than the North. While he did admit that the South Korea had 
been good ally, !chord emphasized that the United States could 
not keep American forces in South Korea forever. He said, "I 
don't think we can continue to support South Korea as a 
satellite nation as the Soviet Union supports North Korea." 
The Congressman concluded that South Korea should develop 
their ability to defend themselves against their enemy. But 
he suggested that the President might adjust the process of 
withdrawal in accordance with a build up of South Korean 
34 
. Ibid., 18. 
35 
• Ibid., 33-7. 
forces. 
78 
36 
Meanwhile, Congressman G. William Whitehurst, Republican 
of Virginia, strongly recommended that the Carter 
Administration reconsider the pullout policy because it would 
affect more than security of South Korea. He argued that if 
the united states took that step, Japan would reassess not 
only its defense relationship but also its entire relationship 
with the United States. It might push the Japanese toward 
rearmament, including their own nuclear weapons. 37 
singlaub and Congressional conservatives thought that it 
was very unwise to withdraw combat forces without some 
countervailing concessions from North Korea. Congressman Robin 
L. Beard, Republican of Tennessee, and Singlaub made the same 
point. 38 When asked by Congressman Donald J. Mitchell, 
Republican of New York, about a schedule for a safe 
withdrawal, the general expressed his opinion that the United 
States could safely pull out its troops when North Korea was 
ready to sign a nonaggression pact with South Korea. He 
maintained that the United States could use the withdrawals 
as an effective tool for bringing about greater peace in the 
Korean peninsula.39 
36 Ibid., 33 . . 
37 Ibid., 48 • . 
38 Ibid., 12, 39 . . 
39 Ibid., 39 . . 
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Patricia Schroeder, Democrat of Colorado, complained that 
the hearing was "a Kangaroo court." She admitted American 
troops in Korea were very important to protect Seoul. But, she 
argued, the United States foreign policy should be made for 
America's priorities in the world rather than for particular 
interests of another nation. Therefore, Schroeder concluded, 
the withdrawal policy should be judged by the President based 
on America's world strategic priorities.40 
Congressman Dan Daniel, a Democrat of Virginia, strongly 
supported General Singlaub' s words that "the purpose of having 
the force in Korea was not to fight war but to prevent it." 
and urged the President to listen to military experts in order 
to prevent another unnecessary war in Korea. he said, 
When we listened to Dean Acheson, and he declared 
that Korea was outside our defense perimeter what 
happened? A vacuum was created and in marched the 
enemy. When I was in Vietnam in 1964, my first visit 
there, we were talking to military people, and I 
believed what they told me; because the evidence I 
think proved it - that if the politicians would stay 
out of their way they could win the war in 6 months 
- I think they could have. In the first instance, 
if we had won the Korean war we wouldn't have had 
a war in Vietnam. It seemed4ro me we are going right down that same path again. 
Congressman Charles H. Wilson, Democrat of California, 
also fully supported Singlaub's cause and said that Carter's 
withdrawal policy was potentially one of the biggest mistakes 
the United States could make in recent history. He said, 
40 
• Ibid., 40. 
41 
. Ibid., 55. 
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I think it is a stupid mistake to telegraph our 
position to say within 5 years - we talked about 
secretary of State Dean Acheson who telegraphed what 
we were going to do. And that is how we got into 
trouble in Korea. An~ 2here we are doing the same 
thing all over again. 
on the next day, the Washington Post covered the whole 
story of the hearing on the front page under the headline 
"House Panel Begins Frontal Assault on Korean Policy." Other 
major newspapers also favorably reported what Singlaub told 
before the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee. 
The papers stressed the general's assertion that all senior 
.American and South Korean officials disagreed with the 
President on the withdrawal plan. And Washington did not 
provide the Korean command with the rationale for it, nor did 
they consult with military officials properly before they made 
a decision on the withdrawals. The papers played up the 
alleged rapid buildup of North Korean military forces and the 
new deterrent role of the Second Division envisioned by the 
general. 43 
While Singlaub was testifying on Capital Hill, Defense 
Secretary Harold Brown was defending Carter's proposed 
withdrawal policy in his speech to the National Press Club on 
May 25. He said Carter's decision was based on South Korea's 
growing economic and military strength. The Secretary said 
42• Ibid., 64. 
43 
• NYT, 26 May 1977; WP, 26 May 1977; LAT, 26 May 1977; 
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that he and General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of staff, believed the proposed withdrawal could be 
accomplished successfully if the United States continued to 
assist in upgrading Korean capabilities as well as maintaining 
its air and navy forces with a firm treaty. The Secretary said 
that: 
I assure you that this carefully planned action 
definitely will not diminish our commitment to South 
Korea's security ••• I believe that withdrawals of 
u. s. ground combat forces from Korea can be safely 
accomplished over the period of four to five years 
under the conditions we have publicly declared, 
namely, the maintenance of U. s. air and logistic 
support, continued strengthening of South Korean 
military forces and the full commitm~2t of the 
United states to the security of Korea. 
In response to Singlaub' s Congressional testimony, Carter 
himself defended his new Korean policy at a nationally 
televised news conference on 26 May. The President confirmed 
that he did not agree with Singlaub' s prediction that the 
pullout would bring war in Korea: "I certainly don't agree 
that there is any cause for a war to be expected." He 
emphasized that the withdrawal policy had been considered by 
the United States Government for many years because overall 
strategic considerations such as the relations among the major 
powers in that area had changed since the end of the Korean 
War. Carter affirmed that he made a decision after full 
consultation with the military leaders as well as the 
intelligence agencies. He also stressed that South Korea, 
44 
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with much more population and a stronger economy than that of 
the North, was strong enough to stand on its own feet. He 
added incorrectly that even South Korean President Park Chung 
Hee wanted to remove American troops from his country. 45 He 
said that: 
I think it is accurate to say that the time has come 
for a very careful, very orderly withdrawal over a 
period of four or five years of ground troops, 
leaving intact an adequate degree of strength in 
the Republic of Korea to withstand any foreseeable 
attack and making it clear to the North Koreans, 
the Chinese, the Soviets, that our commitment to 
south Korea is undeviating and is staunch. We will 
leave there adequate intelligence forces, 
observation forces, air forces, naval forces, and 
a firm open commitment to our defense treaty, so 
there need not be any doubt about potentia]i 
adversaries concerning our support of South Korea. 6 
Asked by a reporter why he fired General Singlaub, carter 
answered that the general was neither fired nor "chastised or 
punished," only transferred to a new position. However, the 
President explained that Singlaub was removed from his Korean 
post partly because of "a very serious breach" of his 
responsibility and partly because his effectiveness in Korea 
had been seriously damaged by his open opposition to the 
4
~ President Park Chung Hee was interviewed by American 
reporters several times. He told them that his country's goal 
was to achieve self-defense. But his remarks were 
misunderstood by the reporters to indicate that Park wanted 
to remove American troops from that country. Later, Park 
denied that he wanted the departure of American troops. 
Instead, he urged American leaders to keep American ground 
t:oops until achievement of a definitive political agreement 
with the North. See NYT, 13 January 1977. 
46 
. WCPD 13 (30 May 1977): 817; PPP 1 (26 May 1977): 1018; ~ 76 (20 June 1977): 654. 
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withdrawal decision. Carter added that Singlaub's continued 
stay in south Korea would have been a "disturbing factor", 
attracting admiration and attention" from others who opposed 
to the policy, and obstructing his superiors from carrying out 
the policy smoothly. 47 
After carter's news conference, an editorial in the 
t,etroit News claimed that the President "still has not 
convinced everyone that General Singlaub is wrong and he is 
right" on the pullout issue. 48 The Chicago Tribune also 
commented in its editorial that "Mr. Carter at his news 
conference gave an answer that is not quite an answer." The 
paper continued to say that the President's explanation only 
left the impression that "this is what you're going to do, so 
shut up and get going. 1149 
The Singlaub hearing heated up the Korean pullout 
controversy among the American public. Before the hearing was 
held, the American public did not care about the realities of 
the withdrawals. There had been discussions about issues of 
4
~ WCPD 13 (30 May 1977): 817-9; PPP 1 (26 May 1977): 
1018-21; DSB 76 (20 June 1977): 653-6; CQWR 35 (11 June 1977): 
1165-7; NYT, 27 May 1977; WP, 27 May 1977; LAT, 27 May 1977. 
Singlaub was assigned to the chief of staff of the Army Forces 
Command at Fort Mcpherson in Atlanta, Georgia. A year later, 
on 28 April 1978, he was forced to retirement from the Army 
after another attack on Carter's decision not to produce the 
neutron bomb. For further consideration, see NYT, 29 April 
1978 and Eileen Keerdoja, "Talkative General," Newsweek 93 (5 
March 1979): 18. 
4
~ Editorial, ON, 27 May 1977. 
4
~ Editorial, CT, 27 May 1977, sec. 3. 
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whether the general was right publicly to oppose the 
president's policy or if the President should or should not 
have removed the general from his post in Korea. But after the 
hearing, many Americans saw that the pullout might lead to 
another Asian land war just as easily as it might free them 
from an Asian involvement. As a result, many Americans changed 
their minds and raised their voices against the pullout 
policy. Carter's news conference, which attempted to explain 
how singlaub was wrong, still could not fully convince the 
American public that the President was going the right way. 
Meanwhile, the Singlaub hearings gave Congressional 
conservatives a platform to initiate a campaign against 
carter's Korean pullout policy in Congress. This Congressional 
movement seriously damaged Carter's ability to carry out the 
policy. 
CHAPTER VII 
HABIB AND BROWN'S TRIP TO SEOUL 
Meanwhile, on the same day President Carter met General 
singlaub at the White House, Philip C. Habib, Under Secretary 
of State for Political Affairs, and Georges. Brown, Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were ordered to attend a White 
House meeting. The meeting included Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 
Warren M. Christopher, Acting Secretary of State, Harold 
Brown, Secretary of Defense, and Richard c. Holbrooke, 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs. 1 Habib and Brown were preparing to brief South Korean 
and Japanese leaders on the withdrawal policy. They were 
instructed to give the leaders of both governments a full 
opportunity to express their views on the decision. At the 
same time, the two envoys were ordered by the President not 
to enter into negotiations with officials of South Korea and 
1
. PPP 1 (26 May 1977): 1029; WCPD 13 (30 May 1977): 824-
5. 
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Japan and not to give them any specific commitments. 2 
on 24 May 1977 both envoys arrived in Seoul, Korea. 
Habib, who had once served as ambassador in Seoul, made an 
airport statement that President Carter ordered them to 
confirm America's "continuing commitment" to South Korea's 
security "clearly and publicly." He also emphasized that the 
withdrawal would be gradually and carefully carried out in 
order not to disturb the military balance and security in the 
Korean peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia. 3 While General 
singlaub was testifying before the House Armed Services 
Investigations Subcommittee, the two presidential envoys 
officially began to consult with South Korean officials on the 
withdrawals at the Blue House, the presidential mansion in 
central Seoul. During a three hour session, Habib and Brown 
made it clear that Carter's pullout decision was final and 
non-negotiable. The envoys informed South Korean officials 
that the United States would remove about 6,000 ground troops 
from South Korea by the end of 1978 in accordance with the 
first phase of Carter's pullout program. They reaffirmed that 
the pullout would be made in a careful and gradual way so as 
not to break the military balance between the North and the 
South or weaken the security of South Korea. President Park 
Chung Hee expressed his thanks to the visitors for all the 
2
. DSB 77 (11 July 1977): 50. 
3
. NYT, 25 May 1977. 
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united states had done for South Korea since the Korean War 
and added that he also did not expect American troops to stay 
in Korea forever. President Park, however, made his position 
clear that he would accept Carter's decision on the condition 
that south Korea was compensated by the United states in 
4 
return. 
In their three-day talks, Korean officials made it clear 
that they would prefer to keep United states forces in Korea. 5 
Meanwhile, they requested the envoys to give them control over 
some of the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea 
which had been tightly controlled by American troops in Korea. 
This was Park Chung Hee•s idea of compensation. The Koreans 
also presented a shopping list of needed conventional weapons 
including tanks, anti-tank missiles, aircraft, and aircraft 
rockets. Habib and Brown expressed their opinion that there 
would be no difficulty about conventional weapons, but they 
refused to even discuss nuclear weapons. 6 Korean officials 
asked the envoys to provide details on how the United states 
intended to continue its security commitment to their country. 
They requested that the United States strengthen the Korean 
Mutual Defense Treaty in order to guarantee automatic American 
4
. NYT, 26 May 1977 and 6 June 1977; LAT, 26 May 1977 
and 6 June 1977; Time 109 (6 June 1977): 28; Newsweek 89 (6 
June 1977): 49. 
5
. DSB 77 (11 July 1977): 49. 
6
. FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 11. 
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involvement in the event of war in Korea. Habib and Brown made 
it clear that to amend the treaty was well beyond the scope 
. . 7 
of their mission. 
The three day talks produced nothing except that 
consultation was officially started. Details of the pullout 
program were scheduled to be discussed at the tenth annual 
Military consultative Committee meeting in Seoul in late July 
or early August 1977. However, the South Koreans clearly 
understood that the withdrawal decision itself could not be 
negotiable and all that remained before them was to decide 
time table of the pullout and the size of compensation in 
return. 8 
At his farewell news conference in Seoul on 26 May, Habib 
reiterated American determination to keep its security 
commitment to South Korea and expressed his sympathy on Korean 
requests for compensation by saying it was "perfectly 
reasonable and rational. 119 Meanwhile, General Brown left no 
doubt about the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons from 
South Korea by stating that all missiles would be taken out 
from South Korea with all American ground combat elements. 10 
However, the general disclosed that not all American ground 
7
. Ibid. 
8
. CT, 6 June 1977; FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 10-1. 
9• FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 10. 
l~ NYT, 27 May 1977. 
troops would be withdrawn. Brown did not specify 
89 
the 
re•aining force but he implied that duties of those troops 
were to support the United States air force units and some 
. t' d . t' 11 soldiers for logis ics an communica ion. 
on the way to Washington, Habib and Brown stopped in 
Japan to explain the background of Carter's decision to 
Japanese leader. They met with Foreign Minister Iichiro 
Hatoyama and Asao Mihara, Director-General of Japan's Self-
Defense Agency. The envoys reportedly informed the Japanese 
that carter made his final decision of the withdrawals only 
after he had obtained assurances from Peking and Moscow that 
the two Communist empires had no intention of encouraging 
North Korea to heighten tension in the Korean peninsula after 
the American pullout. 12 
The Japanese leaders diplomatically conveyed their 
concerns over the security of South Korea and Northeast Asia. 
They suggested the pullout should be carried out in an 
l~ LAT, 29 May 1977. 
12
. NYT, 6 June 1977: WP, 6 June 1977: LAT, 6 June 1977: 
CT, 6 June 1977. NHK, the semi-governmental radio and 
television network, reported this, quoting an unidentified 
Japanese government source. A Washington Post correspondent, 
John Saar, reported that both China and Russia had been told 
that the United States was determined to defend South Korea 
that any military action to the South would lead a direct 
confrontation with Washington. The New York Times quoted one 
official in Washington that he did not expect either Peking 
or Moscow to start trouble or to encourage the North to do so, 
no formal assurance had been received from China or Russia. 
The Los Angels Times quoted one independent source that called 
this report "imaginative." 
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appropriate manner in order not to disturb peace and stability 
13 
in that area. 
The two presidential envoys told Japanese officials that 
at the end of the withdrawal program, only 6,000 non-combat 
American ground troops out of 32,000 would remain in South 
14 t Korea; bu , they said, Carter would not carry out the 
schedule for the withdrawals regardless of what happened in 
Asia. The envoys also stressed that the five year framework 
for the pullout was a "basic goal," but it would be alterable 
and the withdrawals would be done step by step and 
circumstances in Asia would be scrutinized at each stage 
before proceeding to the next stage.15 
On 10 June Habib and Brown were called to the 
Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs 
and Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on 
International Relations to brief Congress on the results of 
their Far Eastern trip. In his statement before the 
subcommittee, Habib defended Carter's pullout plan by saying 
that the withdrawal "is a natural, proper development in our 
ongoing security relationship" with South Korea. He emphasized 
that the decision was made after the Carter Administration had 
"carefully weighed the military 
l~ DSB 77 (11 July 1977): 50. 
14 
. WP, 6 June 1977. 
15 
• LAT, 29 May 1977. 
and international 
S 1'derations involved. 1116 con 
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General Brown also testified before the Subcommittee that 
there would be some risk involved but "it is of an acceptable 
degree." He further assured that war would not break out from 
"a rational decision" of the North Korean leaders in case the 
united states carried out the withdrawal program. The general 
added that the United States Government could not make foreign 
policy based on "irrational acts. 1117 
The two envoys also testified before the Subcommittee 
that Seoul and Tokyo officials accepted the withdrawal plan 
on the condition that the United States would take "adequate 
measures" in order to insure the security of South Korea and 
Northeast Asia. They also were convinced that American ground 
troops could be removed from South Korea without any risk of 
war because China and the Soviet Union had no intention of 
supporting such an invasion. 18 
Habib and Brown's trip to Seoul and Tokyo was aimed to 
communicate the Carter Administration's decision of 5 May 1977 
on the pullout to the both governments formally. It made South 
Korean officials realize that Carter's decision was final and 
irreversible. The South Korean Government focused its efforts 
on getting more compensation rather than on suspending the 
l~ DSB 77 (11 July 1977): 49. 
17 
. WP, 11 June 1977. 
18 
• NYT, 11 June 1977. 
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poliCY• At the same time, Seoul planed a rapid development of 
its defense industries and seriously considered a covert 
nuclear weapon project for the nation's self-defense. The 
envoys' message dismayed the South Korean people, especially 
Christians, and it incited them to protest Carter's withdrawal 
policy through street demonstrations. 19 
19 
• WP, 27 May 1977; Time 109 (6 June 1977): 29; FEER 96 
(10 June 1977): 11. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THB BYRD AMENDMENT 
The Singlaub affair also ignited Senatorial debates on 
the Korean pullout policy. Senator George McGovern, senior 
Democrat of South Dakota, who was the Democratic presidential 
nominee in 1972, strongly supported President Carter's new 
Korean policy. He argued in his article "The U. S. Risk in 
Korea", which was published in the American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI) Defense Review in May 1977, that the Second 
Division was in a "tripwire position" which guaranteed United 
states automatic involvement in case of another war in Korea 
whoever would start it. He continued to argue that the 
President or Congress would have no choice with American 
troops under fire. Therefore, in order not to become involved 
in another Asian land war, the Senator claimed, the United 
States should give up being a policeman of the DMZ in the 
Korean peninsula.1 
Sena tor John C. Culver, Democrat of Iowa, who was a 
1 
. George McGovern, "U. s. Risk in Korea," AEI Defense 
Review (May 1977): 11-3. 
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member of Senate Armed Service Conuni ttee, stated in his 
interview with the U. S. News & World Report that the South 
Korean Army had grown strong enough to def end the country 
against Northern aggression. He pointed out incorrectly that 
south Korean President Park himself acknowledged the self-
defense capability several times, 2 said, "I believe now is an 
appropriate time to phase out the redundant American ground 
3 presence there." The Senator also stressed the changed 
strategic conceptions of China and Russia by indicating that 
Kim Il Sung, who visited Peking after Vietnam fell, was not 
encouraged to start aggressive moves, and he was not even 
allowed to visit Moscow. 4 
Senator Alan Cranston, Democrat of California, agreed 
with Senator Culver that neither China nor Russia were likely 
to support North Korea's attempt to attack South Korea. 
However, Cranston, while claiming that he had long been a 
student of the Korean issue, was concerned about South Korea's 
possible adventuring into the North. He argued that whoever 
started war first, the United States had no choice to be 
involved in another war in Korea as long as American ground 
troops stayed along the border. Therefore, he claimed, United 
States should remove its troops immediately in order to avoid 
2• For detailed consideration, see Chapter VI, 82. 
3
. USNWR 82 (20 June 1977): 27-9. 
4
. Ibid., 28. 
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its tripwire role.5 
Meanwhile, Senate Republican leader Howard H. Baker Jr. 
of Tennessee sharply challenged Carter's new Korean policy. 
In his written statement submitted to the Subcommittee, Baker 
argued that the Carter Administration was proceeding with its 
withdrawal plan on the basis of "a campaign promise" made by 
carter, not a careful and comprehensive review by the relevant 
military experts. The senator stressed that the pullout would 
create uncertainty throughout free Asia, stimulate regional 
tensions, and risk a major outbreak of hostilities on the 
Korean peninsula. 116 
Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, also 
criticizing Carter's withdrawal policy, said, "I am convinced 
that this action could lead to war in South Korea. 117 Senator 
Charles Percy, Republican of Illinois, and influential 
Democratic Senator John Glenn joined the critics of Carter's 
Korean withdrawal policy. They were followed by Senator Sam 
Nunn, Senator Henry Jackson, Senator Daniel Inouye, and 
Senator Gary Hart.8 
During debate on the fiscal 1978 State Department 
5• LAT, 7 June 1977. 
6 
• WP, 11 June 1977. 
7 
• CT, 17 June 1977. 
8• Vance, Choices, 128-9. According to Vance, Senator 
Percy, one of the most ardent supporters for Asia, told 
Holbrooke, banging his fist on the table, that he would forge 
a united Republican opposition to the pullout. 
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operations authorization bill (HR 6689), Senate majority 
ieader Robert C. Byrd, Democrat of West Virginia, submitted 
an amendment endorsing Carter's withdrawal pol icy technically, 
yet omitting the explicit four to five years pullout 
timetable. However, minority leader Senator Howard H. Baker 
Jr. and angry conservatives did not want to accept Byrd's 
language which supported the Carter's pullout plan, and tried 
to submit an amendment to delete the language in question. 
concerned that Baker's amendment might create a strong 
negative mood in the Senate against Carter's proposed policy 
even if it was defeated, Byrd proposed to modify the language. 
Finally, after seven modifications in three hours, the Byrd 
Amendment was adopted by seventy-nine to fifteen votes. In its 
final version, the Byrd amendment neither supported nor 
opposed Carter's Korean pullout policy but expressed the 
sentiment that United States policy toward Korea "should 
continue to be arrived at by joint decision of the President 
and Congress." It also asked the administration to submit to 
the Senate an annual report assessing the effect of the 
withdrawals. 9 The Senate vote neither bound the President 
legally and constitutionally nor totally rejected Carter's 
plan, but the debate explicated that Carter would face 
substantial opposition from congress if he attempted to carry 
9
. CQWR 35 (18 June 1977): 1204; Congress and the Nation 
5 ( 1981) : 1008. 
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out the policy without modification.10 
on 17 June Carter made it clear that, in spite of the 
senate resolution, he would proceed with his pullout program 
as scheduled. The White House announced that the President 
would respect the Byrd amendment and continue to consult with 
congress on the withdrawal policy. However, carter reaffirmed 
that he would not change his basic decision by emphasizing the 
fact that certain decisions on the deployment of military 
personnel were the sole responsibility of the commander in 
chief. 11 In his interview with Bob Clark and Barrie Dunsmore 
of ABC news on 19 June, Secretary of State Vance also claimed 
that the Byrd amendment could not restrict the President's 
rights to proceed with the policy. However, he added that the 
administration would welcome Congressional cooperation and 
consultation on the Korean policy.12 
In the meantime, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
received a closed door briefing on 20 June about the impact 
of the withdrawal on South Korea from Stansfield Turner, 
Director of the CIA. Afterward, Chairman John J. Sparkman, 
Democrat of Alabama, said, "there had been some confusion over 
the basis of intelligence as it relates to the question of a 
possible pullout of United States ground troops from Korea 
10 
• WP, 17 June 1977. 
1
~ NYT, 18 June 1977. 
l~ DSB 77 (18 July 1977): 78. 
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r the next few years." The chairman added that there was ove 
"no urgency" and the committee would take no action one way 
or the other in the near future. 13 
The Byrd Amendment did not limit President Carter 
legally, nor did it fully reject his Korean policy. However, 
it clearly represented the Senatorial concern over the 
withdrawal policy and constrained the President to modify or 
suspend the withdrawals. 
13 
• WP, 21 June 1977. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE TENTH ANNUAL SECURITY CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE 
For ten years, the Washington and Seoul governments had 
held an annual security meeting to discuss general defense 
issues between two countries without attracting public 
attention. Unlike the previous ones, the tenth Security 
conference had attracted considerable interest especially in 
south Korea because the meeting would define the troop pullout 
schedules. In order to fulfill the policy within the proposed 
period, the Carter Administration had to settle upon a 
specific pullout schedule with Seoul at the meeting. Moreover, 
they had to demonstrate to the public that it could be done 
safely in order to calm the growing domestic and overseas 
objections to the policy. Meanwhile, the Seoul Government had 
to secure adequate compensatory measures from the United 
States to fill the military gaps that the departure of the 
Second Division would create. They also needed a strong 
American defense promise to deter war in Korea as well as to 
sooth the growing fears among South Korean people. 
In order to prepare for the conference, officials of both 
99 
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countries frequently met in Washington and in Seoul. To judge 
f om the number of preliminary meetings to prepare for the r . 
tenth annual conference, the issues were troublesome. On 3 
June in Washington, Korean Ambassador Kim Yong Shik visited 
Philip c. Habib. 1 In Seoul, on 10 June, the first committee 
meeting between both countries military officers was held at 
the united Nations Command headquarters. 2 On 14 June Richard 
L. Sneider, United states Ambassador in Seoul, and Korean 
Foreign Minister Park Dong Jin met to discuss adequate 
compensatory measures that the United States could offer in 
the next annual security meeting in Seoul. 3 On 10 July, two 
weeks before the annual security meeting, Under-Secretary 
Habib visited Seoul again for talks with both American and 
Korean officials on the proposed pullout policy. Besides 
laying the groundwork for the tenth annual security meeting, 
his purpose was also to discourage the Seoul Government from 
attempting to develop its own nuclear weapons. 4 
1
. "Chronology Of Korea - u. S. Relations", Korea & World 
Affairs, 6 (Summer 1982): 361. 
2 
. Ibid. 
3 
• NYT, 15 June 1977. 
4
. NYT, 9 July 1977 and 11 July 1977; CSM, 11 July 1977. 
South Korean officials repeatedly advocated the development 
of nuclear weapons if they were faced serious security threats 
from the North. President Carter, who did not want nuclear 
proliferation, confirmed that South Korea would be 
continuously covered by American nuclear umbrella in his 
interview with editors of the U. S. News & World Report in 
~une 1977. He also hinted that he might use nuclear weapons 
in South Korea if the North were to start another war. See 
U.s. News & World Report 82 (6 June 1977): 19. 
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While officials of both countries were negotiating on the 
pullout plan, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance repeatedly 
confirmed to the public that American troops could be safely 
pulled back home with in four or five years. On 28 June the 
secretary claimed that the South Korean Army could fully 
defend its nation with United States air and naval support. 5 
on the next day, in his address before the Asia Society at New 
York, Vance reaffirmed that South Korea's economic growth and 
military strength were the basis for President Carter's 
decision on the pullout. The secretary, pointed out that 
American ground forces in South Korea only constituted about 
5 percent of the total ground troops in South Korea. He 
maintained that a careful phaseout of these troops over a four 
to five year period would not endanger the security of South 
Korea. He also expressed his strong expectation of China's new 
role in keeping peace and stability in the Korean peninsula 
by stating that "we consider friendly relations with China to 
be a central part of our foreign policy" in that region. 6 
On 23 July Secretary of Defense Harold Brown,accompanied 
by officials of the State Department, the National Security 
Council, and the Pentagon, visited Seoul in order to attend 
the tenth Annual Security Consultative Conference between the 
5• DSB 77 (25 July 1977): 122. 
6
. Ibid., 1 August 1977, 142-3. 
united states and south Korea. 
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In his arrival statement, Secretary Brown stressed 
America's firm intention to respond to any attack from North 
Korea against the South. He said, 
we will affirm the intention of the United States 
to maintain powerful military forces in Korea and 
throughout the Western Pacific in order to respond 
promptly and decisivell to any armed attack against 
the Republic of Korea. 
However, in his greeting statement, South Korean Defense 
Minister Suh Jyong Chul expressed a sharply different view by 
emphasizing the importance of preventing such an possible 
attack. He said, 
our purpose is to deter a renewal of war. I believe 
our combined strength and determination must remain 
strong enough t~ discourage any miscalculation by 
the adversaries. 
At the beginning of the talks, Secretary Brown officially 
informed officials of South Korea that the United States would 
remove 6, 000 troops including one brigade of the Second 
Division by the end of 1978 as the first stage of the 
withdrawals. At the same time, the secretary offered a four 
year US$1.9 billion aid package for its compensation - a one-
shot US$300 million credit for weapon purchases, a four-year 
US$1.1 billion military sale credit (US$275 million each 
7
. NYT, 24 July 1977; WP, 23 July 1977; LAT, 24 July 
1977; CT, 24 July 1977. 
8 
. LAT, 24 July 1977. 
9 
• Ibid. 
103 
r) and free gift of US$500 million worth of weapons and yea , 
equipment held by the Second Division in South Korea. 10 Brown 
also advised Koreans that about 8,000 to 9,000 ground troops 
would be pulled back by 1980. And the rest of them except 
7, ooo air force personnel and about 3,000 to 6,000 troops 
involved in communication, logistics, and intelligence would 
be removed by 1981 or 1982.11 
The secretary also tried to persuade Koreans with a new 
rationale for the withdrawal. He claimed that "a sound five 
year withdrawal program", prepared by Carter, would be better 
than leaving troops in place but open to Congressional action 
that could lead to a "spasm withdrawal," that would not give 
Koreans a chance to offset the loss of military capability. 
He also told Koreans that South Korea would be politically 
more stable if the balance of military power between the South 
and the North could be established without the presence of 
U.S. ground troops.12 
South Korean delegates wanted to keep American ground 
troops as long as possible in order to gain time to build up 
their military capability. They asked the U.S. delegates to 
l~ LAT, 25 July 1977; WSJ, 25 July 1977. (US$1.4 billion 
credit was repayable in seven years at 8 percent interest). 
1
~ Sam Jameson, "Brown's Asian Visit Paves the Way for 
Koreanization," LAT, 31 July 1977, sec. 4; NYT, 26 July 1977 
and 27 July 1977; CT, 27 July 1977. 
12 
. LAT, 25 July 1977; Jameson, "Brown's Asian Visit," 
Lh'.r, 31 July 1977, sec. 4. 
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keep two brigades of the Second Division and its headquarters 
in Korea until the last month of the withdrawal. Secretary 
Brown made this concession to the South Koreans in a meeting 
with President Park. 13 
In the wake of the Vietnam defeat, the South Koreans 
already set aside US$5 billion beyond the normal defense 
budget for a force improvement program over a five year 
period. The Koreans told the U.S. delegates that they would 
need at least US$2 billion in aid to fill in the gaps of 
military capability created by departing American troops. 14 
secretary Brown did not make a specific promise but explained 
carter's plan to ask Congress for a US$1.9 billion Korean aid 
package. Defense Minister Suh asked Secretary Brown to 
complete compensatory measures before the withdrawal began. 
However, Brown made it clear that the United States plan was 
to have them proceeded "in parallel."15 
The discussion focused on what would be left behind and 
what would be taken out. Koreans wanted the United States to 
leave behind 116 latest model M-60 tanks held by the Second 
Division and buy more of this model in order to offset the 
North Korean's sizable advantage in armor. American delegates 
13
. NYT, 27 July 1977; LAT, 27 July 1977; CT, 27 July 
1977. 
14 
. Jameson, "Brown's Asian Visit," LAT, 31 July 1977, 
sec. 4. 
1
~ LAT, 26 July 1977; CT, 26 July 1977. 
105 
rejected the Korean proposal because the older M-48 tanks held 
bY south Korea were equivalent in capability, moreover the new 
weapon would require the South Koreans to assume an additional 
burden for separate logistic line.16 The United States 
delegates did agree to hand over sizable numbers of 
helicopters and armed personnel carriers held by the Second 
Infantry Di vision to South Korea. But the United States 
offered only a limited ammunition stockpile in South Korea, 
between 250,000 and 300,000 tons (about US$700 million value) 
that the Korean troops could use for thirty to forty-five days 
in case of military confrontation, even though the Korean 
delegates wanted to have a stockpile several times as large. 17 
The south Koreans were eager to buy more sophisticated 
weapons from the United States, but the United States 
delegates advised Koreans to concentrate on defensive rather 
than offensive weapons because they did not want both Koreas 
to accelerate an arms race.18 However, Secretary Brown 
promised to let South Korea buy American weapons "on a 
priority basis" including the sophisticated F-16 fighter. He 
also promised that the United States would help with the 
development of South Korea's new defense industry. At the same 
time, the secretary promised to expand joint military 
16 
• NYT, 27 July 1977; WSJ, 25 July 1977. 
17 
. WSJ, 25 July 1977. 
l~ Ibid. 
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exercises, establish a combined United States - South Korea 
Military Command, and strengthen the United States Air Forces 
19 in Korea. 
The issue of 600 tactical nuclear weapons held by 
AI11erican forces in Korea was one of the most sensitive points 
in the two days of talks. The United States made it clear that 
south Korea should rest its defense on non-nuclear weapons, 
while confirming that South Korea would continue to be 
protected by the United States nuclear umbrella. 20 
Meanwhile, Secretary Brown gave President Park a personal 
letter from Carter. The letter reaffirmed the United States 
commitment to South Korea in spite of the withdrawals. the 
President confirmed in his letter that the United States would 
provide "prompt support" to help South Korea against any armed 
attack in accordance with the mutual defense treaty of 1954, 
and added that "neither North Korea nor any other country 
should have any doubt the continuing strength of this 
commitment." In his letter to Park, Carter offered a new 
pledge that he would keep American ground troops involved in 
communication, logistics, and intelligence in South Korea "for 
the indefinite future. 1121 
After ending two days of talks, both parties issued a 
19 Jameson, "Brown's Asian Visit," LAT, 31 July 1977, . 
sec. 4; LAT, 27 July 1977. 
20 WSJ, 27 July 1977; LAT, 27 July 1977. . 
21 NYT, 26 July 1977; LAT, 26 July 1977 . . 
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seven page joint communique. The gist of the joint communique 
is as follows: 
The first 6,000 Gis would go home by the end of 
1978. 
A u.s. - Korean Command would be created after the 
first phase of pullout was complete. 
The U.S. Air Force in Korea would be strengthened 
as ground troops return home. 
The American nuclear umbrella would continue to 
cover South Korea following the withdrawal of ground 
forces. 
The U. s. would help South Korea beef up its own 
armed forces and help with Korea's new defense 
industry. 
Congress would be asked to approve a Korean aid 
package totaling an estimated US$1.9 billion. 
The u. S. agreed in principle to sell weapons on a 
priority basis, including F-16 jet fighters, to 
South Korea. 
The U. s. commitment to the defense of South Korea 
made in the 1954 treaty would be unchanged. 
The u. sand South Korea urged North Korea to 
agree to the resumption of 2the S-N dialogue 
suspended by the North in 1973. 
The successful completion of the tenth Annual Security 
Consultative Conference brought the Carter Administration one 
step close to the withdrawals. However, it still could not 
calm the growing domestic and overseas objections to the 
policy. Nor did the security meeting mi ti gate the 
Congressional conservatives' movement to suspend the policy. 
22
. NYT, 27 July 1977; WP, 27 July 1977; LAT, 27 July 
1977. 
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such an opposition threatened Congressional approval for a 
us$!. 9 billion Korean aid package, which was essential in 
managing the withdrawals. Therefore, carter's successful 
completion of the proposed withdrawal program was still 
unclear. 
CHAPTER X 
SAMUELS. STRATTON AND CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATIVES 
Samuels. Stratton was born in Yonkers, New York on 27 
September 1916. He was educated in the public schools of 
Schenectady and Rochester, New York and at Blair Academy, 
Blairstown, New Jersy. He graduated from the University of 
Rochester in 1937. Stratton entered Haverford College in 
Pennsylvania and got a M.A. degree in 1938. For next two 
years, he continued to study philosophy at Harvard University, 
and in 1940 Stratton obtained his second M.A. degree there. 
After that, Stratton started to work for Congressman Thomas 
H. Eliot of Massachusetts for 2 years. In 1942 he joined in 
U.S. Naval Reserve. In 1943, after he had studied the Japanese 
language at the University of Colorado in Boulder for one 
year, Stratton worked at headquarters under General Douglas 
MacArthur's Command in Australia as a Japanese interpreter. 
He participated in landings in New Guinea and in the 
Philippines during World War II and received the Bronze star 
Medal twice. From 1948 to 1954, Stratton taught philosophy at 
109 
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union college in Schenectady and at Rensselaer Polytechnic 
rnsti tute. At the same time, he joined local radio and TV 
stations as a news commentator. During the Korean War, he was 
recalled to active duty. In 1956 he was elected mayor of 
Schenectady. As mayor from 1956 to 1959, he reformed city 
government and campaigned to wipe out gambling in the city. 
one local journalist described Mayor Stratton as "the most 
controversial figure ever to stir up political sparks" in the 
history of the city. In 1959 Stratton became a United States 
1 
congressman. 
since taking his seat in the House, Stratton had been a 
member of the Armed Services Committee. He advocated 
effective military management and did not favor an increase 
in the defense budget. Meanwhile, in the area of foreign 
policy, Stratton always supported U.S. military assistance and 
other foreign aid programs. 2 
As soon as the Singlaub affair occurred, Stratton called 
for Congressional hearings, pointing out that Congress had 
never been officially advised of President Carter's withdrawal 
1 
. Adcock, Edgar, Jr., Beverley McDonough, Judy Redel, 
eds. Who's Who In American Politics 1988-90 (New York: R.R. 
Bowker Company, 1989), 1160; Congressional Directory. 95th 
Cong. 1st sess., (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977), 130; Charles 
Moritz, Current Biography Yearbook (New York: The H. w. Wilson 
Company, 1966), 392-4. 
2
. Moritz, Biography 1966, 394. Stratton was the only 
opponent among members of the House Armed Services Committee 
to a bill of 1965 requesting salary increase for military men 
a US$1 billion each year. 
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policy, nor had the policy been discussed in the Congress. As 
of the House Armed Services Investigations chairman 
subcoJlllllittee, Stratton encouraged General Singlaub to present 
his beliefs and urged fellow Congressmen to decide whether 
the proposed policy risked a war in Korea. 3 
Having concluded from the Singlaub hearings that the 
pullout would involve the risk of a war in the Korean 
peninsula, Chairman Stratton and other Congressional 
conservatives decided to continue their examination of the 
policy. They asked the Pentagon to make General George S. 
Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General 
Bernard w. Rogers, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, 
to be available for Congressional hearings. 4 
At the same time, the House Armed Services Committee 
officially requested the National Security council (NSC) to 
provide copies of the Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM-
13) and Presidential Directive (PD/NSC-12) on Korea in order 
to know the details of the withdrawal plan. However, the NSC 
rejected the Congressional request by answering that those 
documents were too sensitive to be presented to the congress 
3• Cong. HASC 95-71, 2-10. During the hearing, Stratton 
frequently requested Gen. Singlaub to repeat his views, 
repeating them himself in his questions, e.g.: "In other 
words, General, what you are telling us is, as far as you know 
t~e overwhelming majority of people on the spot in Korea, 
either military or civilians, feel that the withdrawal of all 
U.S. ground forces from Korea is a mistake and could run the 
risk of war?" 
4 
. LAT, 27 May 1977. 
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. t 5 
at that po1n. 
congressional conservatives censured the Executive for 
ignoring the Constitutional right of the Congress to review 
those documents. 6 Congressman Charles Wilson, Democrat of 
California, complained that "only the President and Secretary 
Brown seem to know what in the world is going on as far as the 
defense of our country is concerned. 117 Congressman Richard 
Ichord, who was a former law school professor at the 
university of Missouri, advised the committee that the 
executive process of the presidential directive would be 
matter of executive privilege, but the directive itself could 
not be the matter of executive privilege. He suggested that 
the committee issue a subpena. However, the committee decided 
instead to again request that the NSC provide Congress with 
the documents. 8 
In the meantime, General George S. Brown and General 
Bernard w. Rogers denied General Singlaub's assertion that 
military experts were not consulted by the President on the 
withdrawal policy except on the timing of the pullout. Both 
generals confirmed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff participated 
in the NSC meeting and other security review processes which 
5 Cong. HASC 95-71, 87-8 • . 
6 Ibid., 77, 92-4 • . 
7 Ibid., 87 • . 
8 Ibid., 93-4 • . 
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ied to president Carter's decision to pullout the ground 
troops from south Korea. General Brown added that local 
commanders in the Pacific and Korea were also consulted by 
9 
carter. Contrary to Singlaub, Rogers and Brown defended 
carter's new Korean policy by claiming that the withdrawal 
would be "an acceptable risk. 1110 
Liberal Democrats expressed their satisfactions with both 
generals' testimony on the withdrawals. Congressman Dellums 
told Brown that: 
This is a very interesting moment for me, today, 
General Brown ••. I am having a great deal of fun 
this morning ••• Based on all those factors you came 
to the conclusion you are in support of the 
President's policy with respect to phased withdrawal 
of troops in South Korea. And that, to use the 
military term, you perceive the risk but that risk 
is within acceptable range. I would seem to me that 
testimony ought to be adequate for all members of 
this committee and Congress. That is that the 
president, the State Department, the Pentagon, (the) 
Joint Chiefs of staff, everyone has looked at it 
from a multiplicity of perceptions, factored in a 
multiplicity of considerations, and has 'i.Ofle to the 
conclusion that you can withdraw troops. 
Meanwhile, Stratton officially requested General Brown 
to provide the committee with copies of back-channel telegraph 
traffic, which represented the personal view of military 
personnel on the issue, in order to trace Singlaub's assertion 
that most local officials believed that the withdrawal would 
9 
• Ibid., 78-80, 111. 
10 
• Ibid., 85, 124. 
11 
• Ibid., 138. 
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seriously increase the risk of war. 12 
congressman Marjorie s. Holt, Republican of Maryland, 
conscious that every government officials confirmed the United 
states would remain a Pacific power, asked General Brown how 
the united States could remain a Pacific power if the Carter 
Administration pulled out troops and nuclear weapons from 
south Korea, which was one of the most important overseas 
bases in Asia. Holt said, "what do we do, just stand up and 
say we are a Pacific power and everything will be all 
. ht?"13 rig . 
congressman William L. Dickinson, Republican of Alabama, 
argued that even though the North Koreans did not consider the 
south a threat, they still increased their capabilities 
tremendously in manpower, aircraft, naval vessels, and 
particularly tanks during the past five years. Pointedly he 
asked, "what kind of calculation should a reasonable person 
draw from that? 1114 
Congressman Larry McDonald, Democrat of Georgia, argued 
that since Kim Il Sung did not change his attitude of using 
force in achieving unification, it is hard to understand why 
the administration suddenly made the gesture to withdraw 
troops at that particular moment. He was concerned that the 
12 Ibid., 121-2 • . 
13 Ibid., 132 • . 
14 Ibid., 136 • . 
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~ithdraw policy could be easily be interpreted by the United 
states allies 
getting flaky, 
in Asia as a "symbol of our bugging out, or 
or flakier. 1115 
Stratton and other conservative Congressmen tried to 
block the policy by comparing the situations between Korea and 
NATO. congressman Robert E. Badham, Republican of California, 
argued that the United States did not pull its troops out of 
Germany even though that country had a stronger economy than 
that of Korea. He also stressed that there was much more risk 
of war in Korea than in Germany by pointing out the fact that 
the North Koreans had shot down an American helicopter in the 
DMZ area on the previous day. 16 
Rogers and Brown emphasized that the greatest threat 
still lay in Europe rather than in Asia because Warsaw Pact 
forces had been enhanced in size and sophistication during the 
ten years while the United States was engaged in war in South 
Asia. Both generals also argued that they could not equate 
Europe with Korea because the United States did not face the 
Russians or Communist forces like the Warsaw Pact in Korea. 17 
Stratton admitted that the most important United States 
strategy was keeping a stable situation in Europe. However, 
he claimed that it would not be to the United States' 
15 Ibid., 129 . . 
16 Ibid., 128 • . 
17 Ibid., 98, 128 • . 
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advantage to stir up a war in Korea even though Northeast Asia 
s strategically less important than Europe. He said, "if we wa . 
have a stable balance there and we can keep a stable balance 
there, why should we want to run any risk of upsetting it at 
all ?"18 The chairman, while mentioning his two years of 
service in the Korean War, said, "I certainly don't want to 
go back again or see our country go back again. 1119 He also 
stressed that the Vietnam War proved that the deterrent 
capability of air and naval forces was not as great as ground 
forces. Stratton said, "I think all indications we saw in 
Vietnam that you can't fight an infantry war with air and 
naval power; you have to fight it on the ground. 1120 
Stratton, criticized the government's intention to 
increase a NATO budget by 3 percent while at the same time 
talking about withdrawing troops from South Korea. He warned 
that it might give the enemy impression that Asia wasn't 
really important to the United States. 21 The chairman reminded 
the committee that the United States got into World War II not 
because of what happened in Europe but because of what 
happened in Asia. Americans, interested in the nation's 
security, should pay more attention to what was going on in 
18 Ibid., 99 . . 
19 Ibid., 323 . . 
20 Ibid., 325 . . 
21 Ibid., 429-30 . . 
Asia 
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t han to Europe. Stratton again used the Pearl Harbor 
analogy during the testimony of Roger Sullivan, Deputy of 
foreign Mission, United States Embassy in Taiwan: 
I went through Pearl Harbor and we were told that 
the Japanese wouldn't possibly attack us and 
everything was under control, and it didn't work out 
that way. So we are trying to get to the bottom of 
a situation. We are not zeroing in on you or anybody 
else, . but this 2Jias been a rather revealing 
experience to us. 
Stratton stressed that the North Koreans maintained a 
threatening offensive capability. They could attack Seoul with 
very little warning, less than six hours. He said, "if the 
North Koreans come down and take Seoul in 3 o hours or 
something like that, the ball game is largely over. 1124 The 
chairman also pointed out that only a single brigade of 
American troops kept the peace and stability in Berlin, a city 
that was surrounded by communist power. He, argued that it was 
possible because the presence of American ground troops there 
were a tremendous deterrent, said, "it seems to me the same 
thing would apply to Korea. 1125 
Congressman Harold Ford, Democrat of Tennessee, while 
emphasizing that the goal of United States involvement in 
Europe was to create a deterrent, claimed that the same 
22 Ibid., 256 • . 
23 Ibid., 336 • . 
24 Ibid., 315 . . 
25 Ibid., 99 • . 
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gument should be made in Korea. He said, "if you replace ar 
5 000 u.s. troops with 35,000 South Korean troops, regardless 3 I . 
of hoW well they are equipped, they do not have the same 
b 'l't .. 26 deterrent capa 1 1 y. 
In his written statement to the committee, Congressman 
William M. Ketchum, Republican of California, who was a 
veteran of the Korean War and World War II, expressed his deep 
concern over the proposed withdrawal policy. Ketchum doubted 
the rationale of the policy decision. He did not think that 
the south Korean Army was strong enough to maintain the status 
quo in the Korean peninsula. Peace had been kept only through 
the presence of American ground troops. The North attacked the 
south shortly after the completion of the American military 
withdrawal from South Korea in 1949. He further argued that 
any drastic shift in the delicate balance of power in Korea 
would disturb political, economic, and military stability not 
only in Asia but also in Western World as well. He said, 
The question is not can we afford to remain in South 
Korea, but can we afford not to remain in South 
Korea? We must be made to fully realize the grave 
implications with which we are dealing. The chance 
we take ~9day can only become the peril we face 
tomorrow. 
Meanwhile, Congressman Robin L. Beard, Republican of 
Tennessee, discussed the advantage of using Korean soil as a 
training area for United States soldiers. The congressman 
26 
• Ibid., 98. 
27 
. Ibid., 212. 
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argued that American soldiers got more motivation in Korea 
than in any other place in the United States because they were 
"locked into a situation in a war zone." He maintained that 
unless there was a significant cost savings benefit, it would 
be mistake to give up the most effective u. s. training area 
in the world. 28 
Having heard the criticism of Carter's withdrawal policy, 
Stratton and three other hawkish committee members traveled 
to south Korea and other countries in the Far East in order 
to obtain on-the-spot views of the military situation in 
Korea. During their trip from 2 to 16 January 1978, the 
subcommittee delegation met not only with senior American 
military and civilian officials but also with relevant foreign 
military and civilian officials in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and 
Philippines in order to learn their views on the proposed 
pullout policy. 29 
After completing his Far Eastern trip, Stratton made a 
report entitled "Review of the Policy Decision to Withdraw 
United States Ground Forces from Korea." The report pointed 
out the following findings: 
2
~ Ibid., 239-40. 
2
~ Cong. HASC 95-61, 1-2. The committee heard views of 
Donalds. Zagoria, Professor of Government at Hunter College 
and Graduate Center of the City University of New York, 
Professor Morton A. Kaplan, Director of the Center for 
Strategic and Foreign Policy Students at the University of 
Chicago, and Richard G. Stilwell, a retired general who was 
former commander-in-chief of U.S. forces in Korea. All of them 
criticized Carter's pullout policy. 
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President Carter had arrived at his decision to 
withdraw U. s. forces from Korea well before his 
inauguration. The Subcommittee found no evidence 
that the President had sought any advice; 
assistance, recommendations or estimates of probable 
impact of his withdrawal decision on u.s security 
considerations or stability in the Far East from the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff ••• or from any other 
knowledgeable military sources prior to making his 
decision •••• All of the testimony presented to the 
subcommittee agrees that the presence of U.S. forces 
in Korea, particularly U.S. ground forces, has been 
the single most important factor in preventing the 
outbreak of a new war in Korea .••• on the basis of 
current intelligence estimates and all the 
information made available to it, the subcommittee 
concluded that the North Koreans possess the 
capability of attacking the South with a minimum of 
warning, and that the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division is 
needed for an adequate defense. Were that Division 
to be withdrawn, t~l> defense of Seoul would be 
greatly complicated. 
The report emphasized the significant psychological 
deterrent role of the Second Di vision in addition to its 
combat capability. It also pointed out that the withdrawal 
would not save money, but might well result in increased cost, 
lose the best feasible training ground for American combat 
troops, and reduce America's influence in the Pacific. 31 
The report concluded that the 30,000 U.S. ground troops 
in Korea fulfilled the same deterrent function as some 300,000 
American troops stationed in Western Europe. Therefore, its 
pullout without a proper countermeasure would not only 
significantly increase the chances of war with Communist North 
but also seriously endanger the safety of the remaining 
30 
• Ibid., 2-4. 
31 
• Ibid., 3-4. 
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AJnerican troops in South Korea. 32 The report accepted the 
announced schedule of removing 6,000 troops from South Korea 
on condition that the Congress enacted legislation authorizing 
the transfer of their equipments to the South Korean Army 
before they left Korea. However, it suggested a slower and 
more protracted withdrawal and recommended that the President 
modify his plan and for him to use the remaining American 
forces as a final card to conclude a peace settlement between 
North and South Korea. 33 
Chairman Samuels. Stratton and his fellow conservative 
congressmen played the greatest role in rallying Congressional 
objections to Carter's Korean policy. They not only called for 
hearings but also traveled to South Korea and other Asian 
nations to obtain local commanders' views on the policy. They 
made a report that Carter's proposed policy would only risk 
war without getting significant benefits. Their report 
convinced Congressional conservatives that the Korean 
withdrawal policy was a mistake. It encouraged the 
conservatives to continue to stand against the policy. 
32
. Ibid., 5-6. 
33• Ibid., 6-7, 18. 
CHAPTER XI 
MILITARY OPINION 
The United States' top military officers were 
overwhelmingly opposed to President Carter's proposed 
withdrawal policy.1 After the President officially decided 
the pullout policy on 5 May 1977, however, the Joint Chiefs 
of staff agreed to support the presidential decision on the 
condition that the United States reaffirmed the Mutual Defense 
Treaty, supplied adequate military compensation, and 
maintained U.S. air and naval power in South Korea even after 
the pullout. 2 But the local commanders in the Pacific still 
did not support Carter's pullout policy. Their continuing 
opposition not only inspired Congressional conservatives 
opposition to the policy, but also raised the spectre that 
Carter might face the blame for any future conflict between 
the two Koreas. This debate continued to slow the momentum of 
1• NYT, 6 October 1976; WP, 9 January 1977, 19 May 1977, 
21 May 1977, and 14 July 1977; .LA.l'., 19 April 1977; Cong. HASC 
~5-71, 78-79, 99. 
2• Humphrey Report, 20. 
122 
123 
carter's policy. 
The singlaub affair divided the military leaders into 
defenders or critics of President Carter on the withdrawals. 
General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
staff, who favored a partial and slower pullout, defended the 
president's decision after the Singlaub affair. He argued that 
south Korea, with its strong economy and sizable, well 
disciplined professional military forces, was strong enough 
to defend itself against the North. The United States would 
need to help the South Korean Army to develop additional 
capability in areas such as logistics and intelligence. But 
because of the South Korean's overall defensive capability, 
he argued, it would be unfair if the United States continued 
to let them remain dependent on American protection. 3 In his 
brief statement before the House Armed Services Committee on 
14 July 1977, General Brown defended Carter by emphasizing 
that the President was fully aware of the following views of 
the Joint Chiefs of staff: 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that North Korea 
cannot now attack South Korea with assurance of 
victory. The ROK force improvement program plus the 
so called compensatory actions which are being 
defined, if approved and supported by the Congress 
and carried out in a timely manner, will assure 
successful defense against attack subsequent to U.S. 
ground force withdrawal. If that capability is 
accompanied by a strong, visible U.S. commitment to 
support the ROK through our Mutual Defense Treaty, 
then only an irrational act or a serious 
3 
. Cong. HASC 95-71, 128. 
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miscalculation would lead to war. 4 
General Brown admitted that there would be less risk if the 
united states left its ground troops in South Korea and that 
the withdrawal did entail additional risk. But he said that 
he believed it would be an "acceptable risk." He contended 
that: 
The likelihood of this program leading to war was 
perhaps slightly higher than it would be if we 
didn't do it, but we really don't think war is going 
to come as a result of it. I think that is probably 
as clear and about as close as I can come to 
defining it. It is acceptable. It obviously would 
be unacgeptable if we thought it was going to lead 
to war. 
General Bernard W. Rogers, Chief of staff of the U.S. 
Army, also defended carter's policy by claiming that the risk 
involved in the pullout would be "acceptable." He also told 
members of the House Armed Services Committee on 13 July 1977 
that, "there is a risk involved, greater than the risk in 
retaining the status quo 
acceptable risk. 116 
that the risk will be an 
Meanwhile, United States military commanders in the Far 
East strongly opposed any pullout of the Second Division from 
South Korea. Even before Carter took the Oval Office, General 
John W. Vessey, Commander in Chief of United Nations and 
United States Forces in Korea, who was among the most ardent 
4 Ibid., 111 • . 
5 Ibid., 127 • . 
6 Ibid., 85 • . 
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critics of the Carter's pullout policy, declared in an 
interview with John Saar of the Washington Post that the 
withdrawal would heighten the risk of war in the Korean 
peninsula. 7 On 30 April General Vessey reaffirmed his view in 
hiS interview with the United Press International by saying, 
"In my view the withdrawal of all the American ground troops 
would raise the possibility of war in Korea. 118 The general 
noted that the Second Division was located along a possible 
North Korean invasion route to Seoul. He claimed that this 
deployment was very important to deter war in Korea because 
it gave a clear message to the North that they must fight the 
United States as well as South Korea if they tried to size 
seoul. 9 Vessey emphasized the importance of the Second 
Division's deterrence role stating that "we are here to 
prevent war, not a fight one. 1110 He also argued that "the cost 
of one day of war in blood and resources could equate to fifty 
years of deterrence. 1111 
The general also said that North and South Korea's 
military capability were roughly equal. Therefore, the South 
Korean Army could take care of themselves in a war with the 
7 
• WP, 9 January 1977. 
8
. Ibid., 21 May 1977. 
9 
• Cong. HASC 95-71, 233; WP, 9 January 1977. 
10 
• IAT, 26 May 1977. 
1
~ Stilwell, "Need U.S. Forces," 23. 
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North in case outsiders would not interfere. In such a case, 
he claimed, "I would gamble on a southern victor. 1112 However, 
vessey predicted, the Soviet Union and China would have no 
choice but to support North Korea because of its strategic 
importance to them. He argued that Korea was also 
strategically important to the United States because it set 
right in the middle of the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. 
Therefore, he stressed that stability in that part of the 
world was essential not only to Korea but also to the United 
states' national security. On 3 October 1977 before members 
of the House Armed Services Subcommittee, Vessey clearly 
expressed his opposition to the withdrawal policy by saying 
that "as a military commander, if you want my opinion, I don't 
want you to withdraw any forces. 1113 In February 1978 Vessey 
reaffirmed his unequivocal opposition before the Senate Armed 
Service Subcommittee by saying that "if I had my say, I would 
not withdraw. 1114 
General John H. Cushman, commander of I Corps (ROK/US) 
Group in Korea, argued in his article "Military Balance In 
Korea" that the results of war games showed that the South 
12 
• WP, 9 January 1977. 
13 
• Cong. HASC 95-71, 255. 
14• Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on 
Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations: Fiscal 
Year 1979. Part 3: Manpower and Personnel. Overseas Troop 
D.evelopments for Korea and Related Areas, 95th Cong., 2d 
sess., 1978, s. Rept. 2571 (Washington, o.c.: GPO, 1978), 
1842. (Hereafter cited as Cong. s. 2571). 
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Korean ArmY, even fully supported by United States tactical 
·r naval, and logistic support, could not defend Seoul from a1, 
North Korea's surprise attack.15 He criticized Carter's 
pullout policy by arguing that it was based on "an inaccurate 
assessment of the actual military balance on the Korean 
peninsula. 1116 The general pointed out that the Second Division 
had a deterrent function as well as combat function. While the 
combat capabilities of the Second Division could be 
transferred to the South Korean army, the deterrent function 
could not .17 He told members of the House Armed Services 
Investigation Subcommittee that if the Carter Administration 
pulled back its ground troops in the wrong way, it would 
cause "an unwanted and unnecessary war." However, if the 
united States did it right, it would give the Koreans self-
confidence. "Do it right" in his opinion meant that the last 
American ground forces should remain in South Korea until the 
North realized that they could not take over Seoul by force. 18 
Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, United states Navy, Commander 
in Chief of American Forces in the Pacific, also stressed the 
deterrent value of American ground troops in South Korea by 
1
~ John H. Cushman, "The Military Balance in Korea," 
Asian Affairs 6 (July/August 1979): 362. He was Commander of 
I Corps (ROK/US) Group from February 1976 to February 1978. 
He was a war game expert. 
16 
. Ibid., 361. 
17 
. Ibid., 364-5. 
18 
. Cong. HASC 95-71, 272. 
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arguing that a fully capable Korean Division could never have 
the same level of deterrent value that the Second Division 
had.19 He argued that the North Koreans regarded the Second 
oivision as "a direct indication of U .s. willingness to defend 
the south." He said, "I believe the removal of U.S. combat 
forces would be perceived by the North as a lessening of the 
u.s. resolve and could increase the probability of an 
attack. 1120 He also warned about a negative Japanese reaction 
to the withdrawals because the Japanese historically placed 
a great deal of importance on land forces. The pullout of the 
second Di vision could only be perceived as a reduction of 
American commitment in that area. 21 The admiral emphasized 
that the pullout obviously would unnecessary increase the 
level of tension and the possibility of adventurous action in 
the part of the Far East. Before the House Armed Services 
Subcommittee in January 1978, he said that "from the military 
viewpoint, I would prefer to have the troops stay." 22 
General vessey•s deputy Lt. General John J. Burns 
l~ Ibid., 445. 
2
~ Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on 
Authorization for Military Procurement. Research and 
Development. and Active Duty. Selected Reserve. and Civilian 
Personnel Strengths: Fiscal Year 1978, 95th Cong, 1st sess., 
1977, S. Rept. 1210 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977), 2358. 
(Hereafter cited as Cong. s. 1210). The admiral claimed that 
North Korea could attack Seoul successfully without the 
assistance of China and Russia. 
21 
. Ibid., 2362. 
22 
. Cong. HASC 95-71, 430. 
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expressed his opinion in an interview with John Saar of the 
~hington Post. He also preferred that the Second Division 
staY in south Korea. He said, "the withdrawal must be managed 
to avoid any disastrous change in the military balance on the 
Korean peninsula or credibility of the American commitment. 1123 
The general, who flew 102 combat mission as a fighter pilot 
in the Korean War, added that American air units in South 
Korea should be significantly strengthened in order to fill 
the military gap that the withdrawal of the Second Division 
24 
would create. 
Meanwhile, one United States officer in Seoul expressed 
doubt about the effectiveness of air units' deterrent role by 
saying that "warplanes are like geese. They can honk and fly 
away. Who really believes that if we don't have the resolve 
to keep troops in Korea that we are going to bring them back 
if a war starts? 1125 
George J. Keegan, jr., a retired U. s. Air Force major 
general, also discounted American air units' deterrent role 
in Korea. He argued that the bulk of the military targets were 
well protected by massive underground bunkers and shelters 
and even tactical nuclear weapons could not break them down. 
The general claimed that reinforcing air and naval power could 
23 
• WP, 19 May 1977. 
2
~ Ibid. 
2
~ Ibid. 
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not fill the military gap that the withdrawal of American 
ground forces would create. He said the Korean pullout "is a 
part of the United States world politics of retreat. 1126 
General George G. Loving, Commander of United States 
Forces in Japan, gave importance to the phasing of the 
withdraw process and compensatory measures. The general, 
stressing the reassessment process of each stage, said that 
the united States must be sure occasionally to stop the 
process and check what was happening in North Korea as well 
as in Northeast Asia, and then adjust the plan in accordance 
with changed conditions. 27 His deputy General John Q. Henion, 
who also favored keeping the Second Division in South Korea, 
claimed that the United States had to have a plan to 
reposition the unit in Korea in addition to a full 
compensatory program in order to show the North that South 
Korea was fully supported by the United states. Otherwise, he 
advocated, the withdrawals should be delayed. 28 
General James F. Hollingsworth, former Commander of I 
Corps (ROK/US) Group, who adopted the forward defense and 
massive firepower strategy during his stay in South Korea, 
also emphasized the importance of the time phasing the 
withdrawals by saying that "I support President Carter's 
2
~ CSM, 22 June 1977. 
27 
• Cong. HASC 95-71, 302-3. 
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proposal to withdraw. However, I agree with President Park's 
timing. 1129 The general urged the Carter Administration not to 
begin the initial withdrawal of 6000 troops until Seoul 
completed its five-year army modernization program in 1980. 
He claimed that the United states should continue to assist 
and support in the modernization of Korean armed forces and 
the development of defense industries, especially capability 
for the production of aircraft and indigenous tanks. He added 
that "I think if we got all things that they need now in 
place, then we can consider an orderly withdrawa1. 1130 
Admiral Robert Baldwin, Commander of the Seventh Fleet, 
admitting the fact that the Seventh Fleet was involved in 
Korea very heavily, said that Korea was the most sensitive 
spot in the whole area of its operations from the east coast 
of Africa to the Sea of Japan. The admiral said that he was 
not an expert on the army picture in Korea, so he could not 
predict the consequences of Carter's pol icy. However, the 
admiral claimed, he believed that the withdrawals without full 
compensation would heighten the risk of war in the Korean 
peninsula. 31 
General Richard G. Stilwell, retired as the commander in 
chief of the United Nations and U. s. Forces in Korea in 1976, 
29 
. Cong. s. 2571, 1863. 
3
~ I bid. 
3
~ Cong. HASC 95-71, 213-20. 
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questioned Carter's policy in an interview with Newsweek's 
Tokyo bureau chief, Bernard Krisher. Stilwell noted that Kim 
11 sung had never given up his goal of unifying Korea by force 
in his lifetime. He also emphasized that air and naval forces 
could not replace the deterrent function of the Second 
Division because they were far away from Seoul. For effective 
deterrence, he said, "the deterring forces must be positioned 
between the enemy and any logical objective. 1132 Stilwell was 
also concerned about three possible Japanese reactions to the 
pullout - substantial rearmament, development of nuclear 
weapons, accommodation with the Soviet Union - and claimed 
that the United States ground troops in Korea should not be 
pulled back until North and South Korea achieved a peace 
settlement. 33 The general also emphasized in his article "The 
Need for U.S. Ground Forces in Korea," published in the AEI 
Defense Review in May 1977 that the Second Division played "a 
unique, non transferable function in the prevention of war. 1134 
He concluded the article with the following rationale for the 
maintenance of the Second Division in South Korea: 
They are key to the security and well being of 
36 million human beings and to the protection of u. 
s. interests .•• 
Their presence provides the only lever that 
might force the North to accept the reality of two 
Korean states ... 
They are valuable - indeed essential - assets 
3
~ Newsweek 89 (6 June 1977): 51. 
33 
• Ibid., 51. 
3
~ Stilwell, "Need U.S. Forces," 23. 
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in furthering our major objectives in Northeast 
Asia: strengthening the partnership with Japan; 
minimizing the Soviet presence; improving relations 
with the people's Republic of China; sustaining the 
region's economic momentum; fostering a climate in 
which the kind of democratic ins ti tut ions we espouse 
can take root; and preventing nuclear 
proliferation ••• 
Finally, that band of 30,000 is the symbol that 
the United states is no less concerned with the 
future of the free societies of ~theast Asia than 
those of the Atlantic Community. 
General Stilwell, an ardent critic of President Carter 
on the withdrawal, maintained before the House Armed Services 
subcommittee that another war in Korea would be also a "no 
win" scenario because of the big powers' inevitable 
involvement. Therefore, he advocated, the United States should 
give the concept of deterrence first priority in solving the 
Korean problem. 36 He also predicted that the United States 
could safely leave South Korea within fifteen years if the 
South Koreans kept the same pace of economic development as 
they had over the previous fifteen years. 37 
American officers, who overwhelmingly opposed Carter's 
Korean withdrawal policy, were split into two groups by the 
Singlaub affair. Top officials in Washington such as General 
George S. Brown and General Bernard w. Rogers changed their 
positions and defended the President while most local 
commanders apparently still disapproved of the pullout policy. 
35 
• Ibid., 28. 
36 
. Cong. HASC 95-71, 198. 
37 
. Ibid., 203-4. 
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It could be explained that officers in Washington, who were 
more exposed to political affairs, changed their minds out of 
constitutional as well as political considerations while local 
coDll11anders still judged the situation from a purely military 
point of view. The local commanders' continuing opposition to 
the pullout, even after the Singlaub affair, undermined the 
carter Administration's ability to carry out its policy. 
CHAPTER XII 
SCHOLARLY OPIHIOH 
President Carter's Korean policy also sparked a debate 
among scholars. A review of articles published in major 
newspapers and periodicals shows that most scholars objected 
to the proposed withdrawal. 1 These scholars also influenced 
American public opinion. Many Americans began to doubt the 
safety of the policy because of those experts' opposition. 
Donalds. Zagoria, Professor of Government at Hunter 
College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New 
York, pointed out in two articles, published in the New York 
Times, that President Carter's decision to withdraw United 
States ground troops from Korea was very much Carter's own 
idea. Carter was determined to avoid another war in Asia, and 
1
. I have researched 24 scholars' articles on the 
Withdrawal which were published in major newspapers and 
Periodicals from January, 1977 to July, 1979. None of them 
fu~ly supported Carter's Korean policy. Scholars' letters to 
editors are treated below as "public opinion." 
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his pu11out policy was based on ill advised reasons. 2 Zagoria 
gued that Kim Il Sung, who had not given up his ambition of ar . 
reunification of Korea, had recently showed "a strong hint of 
paranoia," might attempt to take over the South if the United 
states pulled its troops out of South Korea. He pointed out 
that Kim had been preparing for a war since the middle of the 
196os by pouring huge amounts of money into war industries. 
consequently, the North could have a much higher war 
capability over the South. Once the United States ground 
troops were pulled out, Zagoria argued, the well equipped 
North Korean Army could take over Seoul successfully in spite 
of American air and naval opposition. 3 Moreover, the two big 
communist powers were not in a position to prevent Kim from 
initiating a war against the South because the North had 
enough independent military capability.4 If Seoul fell to the 
North, he maintained, the United States would be faced by 
three agonizing options: bombing Seoul, bombing other targets 
in North Korea, or pressing South Korea agree to a cease-fire 
immediately. The first option would require the destruction 
2 
. Donald S. Zagoria, "Why We Can't Leave Korea, " New 
York Times Magazine (2 October 1977): 84-6 and "To Stay or Not 
to Stay," NYT, 2 July 1977. Zagoria sent a letter to 
Brzezinski on 9 June 1977. He urged the Carter Administration 
to reconsider the withdrawal policy. Donald s. Zagoria' s 
letter to Zbigniew Brzezinski, White House Central File: 
.S..ubject File, Box no. CO-41, Executive CO-82. (Hereafter cited 
as WHCFSF.) 
3 
. Zagoria, "Leave Korea," 88. 
4 
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of seoul, the capital city and population and economic center 
of south Korea. The second would risk Chinese and Russian 
intervention. The third, which according to Zagoria most 
.American policy makers would prefer, would make the South 
inferior to the North permanently. Therefore, he claimed,"the 
least dangerous and painful course for us is to continue to 
deter the North from starting a war. 115 
Besides the risk of war, Dr. Zagoria cataloged his 
objections and criticisms. Asians would have the negative 
impression that the U.S. was no longer interested in the 
Pacific. The Japanese might react with a nationalistic lurch 
to the right or left, followed by rapid rearmament or an 
accommodation with the Soviets. China would reconsider Sino-
American relations and might seek a Sino-Soviet accommodation. 
The two Koreas would be engaged in a new arms race, including 
nuclear weapons, over which the United States would lose 
control. The Soviets would try to fill the resulting vacuum, 
politically and militarily. In any case, an excellent 
bargaining chip which could be used to coax the North into 
accommodation with the South would be sacrificed.6 
Finally, the President's policy would not decrease the 
risk of "another Vietnam" but increase the risk of American 
involvement in a new Asian land war. Therefore, he concluded 
5
. Zagoria, "Leave Korea," 89. 
6• Ibid., 89-92. 
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that the Administration should change its withdrawal plan from 
an "unconditional" to a "conditional one," with some troops 
deployed until the two Koreas reached a political settlement.7 
Dr. Ernest w. Lefever, Director of Georgetown 
university's Ethics and Public Policy Center, pointed out in 
his article "Withdrawal from Korea: A Perplexing Decision" 
that the withdrawal policy was decided by Carter and his aides 
who thought that the United States should avoid any 
involvement in Asian conflicts, neither because of domestic 
public pressure nor overseas requests. He argued that this 
abrupt and undebated decision would not only have a negative 
impact on Asian allies, but it jeopardized the United States' 
own interests in the Far East. He agreed with Dr. Zagoria 
that the immediate reactions from Japan, China, Russia, two 
Koreas, and other Asian allies could ultimately affect the 
entire global balance of power and significantly damage the 
American position in the world. 8 
Professor Morton A. Kaplan, Director of the Center for 
Strategic and Foreign Policy studies at the University of 
Chicago, criticized Carter's new Korean policy before the 
7 
. Ibid., 92-95. 
8• Ernest W. Lefever, "Withdrawal from Korea: A 
Perplexing Decision," Strategic Review 6 (Winter 1978): 28-
~5. He was a professional lecturer in international relations 
in the Department of Government and a senior associate of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies in Georgetown 
University. 
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aouse Armed Services Subcommittee on 1 August 1977 by arguing 
that "our current policy increases the risk of war. 119 He 
argued that if a war broke out in Korea, the Carter 
Administration or any successor would have no choice but to 
be involved because of its essential global strategic 
situation.10 or. Kaplan also pointed out possible undesirable 
reactions from Japan, a key ally in Asia, as a result of the 
withdrawals. He maintained that Japan deployed most of their 
troops in the north in order to defend themselves from a 
Russian attack and they relied on South Korea to defend them 
from the other direction. The pullout, therefore, would 
influence the basic Japanese defense conception and might 
excite a rise of extreme nationalism in Japan, which might 
create an unnecessary crisis in relations between the United 
States and Japan. 11 
Edward Luttwak, Associate Director of the Johns Hopkins 
Center of Foreign Policy Research, was also concerned about 
a negative Japanese reaction. He reminded readers that the 
Japanese had always been sensitive to the balance of power in 
Korea. Japan could be driven by Carter's decision and the rise 
of the Soviet Navy in the North Pacific to turn to "a stance 
of neutralism or even accommodation with the Soviet Union out 
9 
• Cong. HASC 95-71, 175. 
10 
. Ibid., 173-4. 
11 
• Ibid., 172-6. 
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of fear for its own security. 1112 He was also concerned about 
china. He argued that the Chinese, who publicly supported the 
American pullout, actually feared the Soviet Union's 
overwhelming influence on North Korea. If the United States 
withdrew its forces, Luttwak argued, the balance of power in 
the region would be so upset that China would have no ability 
to moderate the action of Kim Il Sung. 13 
David Nelson Rowe, Professor of Political Science at Yale 
university, argued in his article "Danger Spot in the Far 
East" that Carter's pullout policy as well as the reduction 
of the American security guarantee to Taiwan would drive the 
Taiwanese to seek help from the Soviet Union. If Russia got 
a submarine base at a Taiwanese deep water port, they could 
triple covert submarine operations in the Pacific. And these 
developments would force the Japanese to into "armed external 
imperialism. 1114 
Joseph M. Ha, Professor of International Affairs at Lewis 
and Clark College, and his research associate, Gregory M. 
Luebbert, emphasized the Second Division's restraining 
influence on both North and South Korea. In an article in the 
Asian Survey they argued that the withdrawal might lead to 
uncontrolled minor conflicts, even though a general war was 
1
~ Time 109 {6 June 1977): 29. 
13
. Ibid. 
14
. David Nelson Rowe, "Danger Spot in the Far East," 
National Review 29 {22 July 1977): 829-30. 
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A renewed Korean conflict would force Japanese 
conservatives to initiate a major rearmament program, 
especially a naval build-up, and expedite a naval arms race 
in that region. It would also make the two big communist 
powers compete for Japanese favor. A rearmed Japan would 
pursue a more independent foreign policy. Moreover, Chinese, 
perceiving a rearmed Japan as a threat, might seek a 
rapprochement with Moscow. Thus, the Pacific and world balance 
of power might be affected and tensions heightened. 15 
If the danger were to increase, South Korea would seek 
to develop nuclear weapons, even though they had signed the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus, the United States should 
reconsider its withdrawal policy, and even after a pullout, 
should try to reduce tension in the Korean peninsula by 
keeping good relations with Japan, China, and Russia and by 
influencing North Korea to change its belligerent attitude. 16 
Professor Ha further argued elsewhere that the Carter 
Administration had three options for Korean policy: 
1. a permanent military presence with no attempt 
at negotiations, 
2. an unilateral withdrawal, by stages or 
otherwise, 
3. negotiations which, if successful, would be 
15 
. Joseph M. Ha and Gregory M. Luebbert, 
Settlement: The Prospects and Problem," Asian 
(August 1977): 735-50. 
16 
• Ibid., 748-51. 
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followed by withdrawal.17 
or- Ha argued that if the United States merely wanted to avoid 
another war in Korea, the administration could follow the 
first option. If the United States simply wanted to eschew any 
involvement in another Asian land war, he said, the 
administration could follow the second option. But if the 
united states would insure peace and stability in the Far 
East, he claimed, the Carter Administration must follow the 
third. He said, "if we recognize this, we will not trample our 
own interests in the pursuit of policies which might yield 
only short-term benefits. 1118 He also suggested that the United 
states, Japan, China and Russia should play a major role in 
reducing regional tensions by encouraging both Koreas to sign 
a non-aggression pact and by agreeing that none would support 
an aggressor. 19 
Astri Suhrke, Assistant Professor of International 
Relations at the American University, Washington D. c. , and 
Charles E Morrison, Professional Lecturer at John Hopkins 
School of Advanced International studies, Washington D. c., 
argued in their article "Carter and Korea: The Difficulties 
of Disengagement" that even though Carter's new Korean policy 
would fail to reduce tensions between North and South Korea, 
1 7
. Joseph M. Ha, "Withdrawal from Korea: A Means, Not an 
End," Orbis 21 (Fall 1977): 621-2. 
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it was unlikely to create any of the immediate destabilizing 
consequences that opponents of carter feared. In the long run, 
both scholars anticipated that South Korea's economic growth 
would overwhelm the North and force inferior North Korea to 
"seek a closer alignment with China or, more probably, with 
soviet Russia." If this would occur, they concluded, "it will 
no doubt be of very great concern to the Japanese and set the 
stage for large power re-engagement, rather than 
disengagement, in Korean affairs. 1120 
Frank Gibney, Vice President of Encyclopedia Britannica 
Inc., pointed out the basic differences between Americans and 
Asians concerning Carter's decision to withdraw U.S. troops 
from South Korea. In an article in Foreign Affairs he argued 
that Americans believed the bad days of the Cold War were 
already over, and that they anticipated that the withdrawals 
would lessen tensions in Asia. However, Asians worried the 
withdrawal policy would actually increase tensions in that 
area. He argued that considering America's isolationist mood 
after the Vietnam War, the withdrawals would seem "logical and 
necessary." He added, however, the United States should 
seriously consider "the ripple effect of a round, shiny pebble 
from Washington suddenly tossed into a still Asian pond, 
2
~ Astri Suhrke and Charles E. Morrison, "Carter and 
Korea: The Difficulties of Disengagement," World Today 33 
(October 1977): 366-75. 
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causing undulations far beyond the point of impact. 1121 He 
pointed out that although American troops made up only a tenth 
of NATO strength, like the Korean brigade, they played an 
obvious deterrent role. He also pointed out both Japan and 
china's nervous reaction to its announced withdrawal policy, 
and criticized cater' s unilateral announcement without any 
concessions from the other side. Gibney continued to argue 
that because the United States air and sea power did not deter 
North Korea's attack on the South in 1950, the South Koreans 
would not trust in Carter's promise of continued air and naval 
22 supports. 
Like Dr. Suhrke, Gibney was concerned about the 
possibilities of the South's adventuring against the North 
with overwhelming economic and military strength in the long 
run. He said that Asians, especially Japanese, feared that the 
able and ruthless South Korean President, Park Chung Hee, 
might attempt to attack the North with his own arms in the 
near future if the U.S. ground troops were removed completely 
from north of Seoul. He was also concerned about the dangerous 
consequences of Japan's rearmament and nuclear proliferation 
in this area after the pullout, and said the Carter 
Administration should reconsider the result of the 
2
~ Frank Gibney, "The Ripple Effect in Korea," Foreign 
Affairs 56 (October 1977): 160-1. 
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23 
Gregory Henderson, Adjunct Associate Professor, the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 
pointed out in an article published in the Washington Post 
that carter's withdrawal policy combined with strengthening 
Korean capability would not decrease the danger of war in 
Korea. He argued that North Korea would not see US$800 million 
of new united States weapons as "redressing of a balance 
between North and South Korea, but an overwhelming threat." 
Therefore, the North also would request Moscow to provide more 
sophisticated weapons such as Mig-24s and 25s, and it would 
augment tension in the Korean peninsula. 24 In an another 
article in the New York Times, Dr. Henderson suggested 
Washington-Pyongyang arms reduction talks. If no progress was 
made, he claimed, the Carter Administration should suspend its 
pullout plan. 25 
Eugene V. Ros tow, Professor at Yale University Law 
School, was suspicious of Russia's attitude. He claimed that 
the Soviets always answered setbacks in one theatre with 
trouble in another. Rostow recalled that the Korean War broke 
out after the Greek, Turkish, and Berlin crises. Thus, in his 
23• Ibid., 166-7. 
24 
• Gregory Henderson, "Koreagate: Essential Questions 
Remain," WP, 27 July 1977. 
25 
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146 
view, the United States' rapprochement with China contributed 
to the Middle East War of 1973. If the United States would 
withdraw the Second Division, he argued, the Soviets might 
again train North Korean forces in Siberia, give them advanced 
weapons, and achieve the same kind of surprise they 
contributed to in the Middle East in 1973 and the Korean War. 
Therefore, Rostow recommended that the United States keep its 
ground forces in Korea intact for the time being.26 
Young Whan Kihl, Professor of Political Science at Iowa 
state University, emphasized in his article "Korea's Future: 
Seoul's Perspective" that the pullout policy would expedite 
Korea's independent development of nuclear weapons in order 
to overcome the North's superiority in conventional weapon 
systems. He pointed out President Park's plan for the 
establishment of research centers such as the Korean Institute 
of Science and Technology (KIST) as well as his campaigning 
to encourage a number of overseas Korean scientists to return 
home. Khil contended that the South Korean Government clearly 
opposed a multilateral agreement on a nuclear-free zone for 
Korea and said that "Seoul has invested in the development of 
its own nuclear capability and indeed may have already crossed 
2 ~ Eugene V. Ros tow' s Letter to Secretary Cyrus R. Vance, 
28 February 1977, WHCFSF, Box no. C0-41, Executive C0-82. He 
sent a copy of the letter to Zbigniew Brzezinski on March 7, 
1977. 
t hreshold of no return on a nuclear time table. 1127 the 
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young Sun Ha confirmed in his article "Nuclearization of 
SJDall states and World Power Order: The Case of Korea" that 
south Korea already possessed enough experts and engineers for 
developing nuclear weapons. He also observed that President 
park had ordered his Defense Development Agency to study the 
possibilities of developing its own nuclear weapons as soon 
as Saigon fell in 1975. Considering South Korea's concern 
over its security after the pullout, its rapid economic 
growth, and its capability for developing nuclear weapons, the 
author argued, the Seoul government might seriously consider 
developing its own nuclear weapon system in order to both 
effectively deter Northern attack and use it as a "bargaining 
chip" in negotiating the withdrawal schedule with the United 
States. 28 
L. L. Wade, Professor of Political Science at the 
University of California, Davis, maintained that if the United 
States unilaterally carried out the withdrawal policy, Seoul 
27. Young Whan Kihl, "Korea's Future: Seoul's 
Perspective," Asian survey 17 {November 1977): 1064-76. 
28
. Young Sun Ha, "Nuclearization of Small States and 
World Power Order: The Case of Korea," Asian Survey 18 
(November 1978): 1139-43. He was a Ph.D. candidate in the 
Department of Political Science, University of Washington, 
Seattle, and a pre-doctoral visiting fellow at the Center for 
International Studies, Princeton University. According to the 
author, South Korea possessed about 1,000 atomic energy 
experts including 250 scientists. It expected to increase to 
about 3,000 by 1981, and 5,500 by 1986.A U.N. report said that 
about 1,300 engineers and 500 scientists would be enough for 
making nuclear weapons. 
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would build its own nuclear deterrent. He said, "surely this 
is the wrong way to conduct foreign policy." Wade also stated 
that south Korea was a middle-sized industrial state. 
Therefore, the United States should deal with Korea as it did 
with European allies and Japan. 29 
Li Lin Chun argued in an article in the Asian Outlook 
that carter did not create the withdrawal policy, but merely 
implemented the plan more actively than his predecessor. 
According to the author, the United states basic strategic 
policy is to keep sea power superiority in the Pacific. The 
united states participated in two major Asian land wars in 
Korea and Vietnam not to keep peace in that area but to 
consolidate its sea power because the United States thought 
it could not exercise its sea power in the Pacific without 
securing defense ports in Asian continents. But after the 
Vietnam war, the United States changed its main policy to keep 
its sea power in the Pacific without holding defense posts in 
the Asian mainland. He argued that "the decision by Carter to 
withdraw U.S. forces from Korea was a further step taken to 
implement the strategy of giving up land and holding sea power 
in Asia. 1130 
2
~ L. L. Wade's Letter to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 19 August 
1977, WHCFSF, Box no. CO-41, General CO-82. 
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chun maintained that the two communist superpowers had 
t changed their goals, strategies and tactics in Asia. He no 
recalled that the United States pulled out its troops from 
Indochina, in hoping that Peking and Moscow would cooperate 
to keep peace in that area. But it only led to the downfall 
of three democratic countries there. Chun doubted Carter's 
promise to keep peace and security in the Korean Peninsula 
after the withdrawal of the troops from South Korea. The 
author warned that the President should consider the plan 
based on military strategy rather than political strategy. 
otherwise, He said, "if something unexpected occurs, President 
carter may not be able to handle it properly. 1131 
These academic writings greatly affected the public 
debate on Carter's Korean policy. Their negative views on the 
future of American relations with the major world powers 
because of the pullout discredited Carter's announced 
rationale for the withdrawal. At the same time, these 
scholars' views gave Congressional conservatives a theoretical 
base for their objections to Carter's Korean policy. Dr. 
Zagoria and Dr. Kaplan were called to the hearings of the 
House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee and testified 
that Carter's Korean policy was a mistake. It eventually 
affected the House Armed Services Committee's approval of the 
Stratton Amendment that the Carter Administration should 
3 ~ Ibid. , 17. 
150 
suspend the policy until two Koreas settled a peace agreement. 
In addition, these scholars views gave the American public an 
impression that most experts outside the government did not 
agree with the President on the pullout issue. This made the 
public reconsider its support for Carter's Korean policy. 
CHAPTER XIII 
NEWSPAPERS VIEWS 
Before the Singlaub affair occurred, American news media 
heavily covered the Koreagate affair and showed little 
interest in the pullout issue. The Singlaub affair changed 
these newspapers' coverage. The nation's major newspapers 
competitively covered the Singlaub affair as well as experts' 
views on the issue. In addition, the papers expressed their 
own views on the pullout through their editorial pages. Major 
American newspapers were evenly divided on President carter's 
Korean policy. The conservatively inclined Wall Street Journal 
and the Chicago Tribune, as well as the independent Washington 
Post and the Detroit News criticized Carter's Korean policy 
while the left leaning New York Times and the Chicago Sun 
Times, as well as the independent St. Louis Post Dispatch, the 
Cleveland Press, and the Houston Post defended President 
Carter. The Los Angeles Times. which favored the President's 
Korean policy at first, changed its attitude later. Those 
newspapers, pro and con, attracted public attention. At the 
same time, the heavy coverage made the Carter Administration 
151 
152 
proceed more cautiously. 
The Chicago Tribune, one of the most ardent critics of 
carter's pullout policy, criticized it as an "ill-informed and 
ill-considered policy." in its editorial of 19 June 1977.1 
Through over a dozen editorials for nearly two years from the 
singlaub affair to Carter's suspension of the program, the 
paper continuously claimed that Carter's pullout policy was 
a mistake and should be suspended entirely. The editors 
contended that Carter devised this idea irresponsibly for 
purely domestic political reasons because he believed American 
people were tired of their military involvement in Asia after 
the Vietnam War. 2 They also argued that the problems involved 
in the policy went beyond Korea itself, and said, "our troops 
in Korea are an important factor in our relations with Japan 
and with both Chinas. They are a factor in our credibility 
among both our friends and our potential enemies throughout 
the world." 3 The paper requested that the President clearly 
answer these following five questions in order to convince 
Americans that this was not an "ill-informed and ill-advised 
policy" before he proceeded too far with the plan. 
1. Would the withdrawal cause Japan to become 
nationalistic and build large military forces and 
increase tensions in the Pacific area? 
2. Would it cause Japan to seek accommodations 
1
. Editorial, CT, 19 June 1977, sec. 2. 
2 
. Editorials, CT, 25 April 1978, sec. 3 and 23 January 
1979, sec. 3. 
3
. Editorial, CT, 28 July 1977, sec. 3. 
with China and Russia and cease to be a useful U.S. 
ally? 
3. Would it encourage Russia to move against 
china along the Ussuri River? 
4. Would it cause South Korea to build its own 
nuclear weapons and expedite the dangerous nuclear 
proliferation that the U.S. was eager to frevent? 
5. What would be the effect on China? 
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The editors emphasized that many Americans were concerned 
about the effects on Japan. Any results of Japanese reaction 
would harm American interests. They also argued that if the 
president proceed with his plan, the Chinese, who believed 
that American ground forces in South Korea were an effective 
leverage against Soviet expansion in that area, might sense 
a vacuum and build up its military strength in Manchuria in 
order to keep the Korean peninsula under their influence. It 
might be followed by a Soviet reaction. Therefore, it would 
increase the dangers of a military confrontation in that 
area. 5 The editors of the Chicago Tribune continued to argue 
in their editorial pages that it remained a mystery why the 
United States was seeking to pullout its ground troops from 
South Korea when its economic and military strength were 
crucial to the region. An 10 August 1977 editorial contended 
that the Carter Administration was playing a fool's game 
called "Baffle 'em all." It argued that Carter should be wise 
enough to understand that he was no longer an obscure 
4 • Editorials, CT, 19 June 1977, 
sec. 4. 
sec. 2 and 4 July 1977, 
5• Editorials, CT, 4 July 1977, sec. 1 and 23 January 
1979, sec. 3. 
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candidate and that his views might terrify the entire world. 
The editors repeatedly recommended the President to suspend 
the "entirely baffling and foolish idea. 116 
The Wall Street Journal also criticized Carter in its 
editorial of 31 May 1977 saying that Carter's unilateral 
decision to withdraw American troops from South Korea damaged 
.American credibility in the whole world even though it might 
not be followed by a new war in Korea. The editorial argued 
that it would unnerve not only the Japanese but also the 
Chinese who began to see the United States as a new ally and 
a needed counterweight to Russia. This wrong-headed policy 
might lead the Chinese reluctantly to turn against the United 
states and back toward the Soviet Union. The editor also 
pointed out that the United States was blamed for the military 
unbalance between North and South Korea. According to the 
editorial, Washington had deliberately limited the South 
Korean Army's offensive capability while promising them the 
protection of the United States defense umbrella. Meanwhile, 
Russia and China helped North Korea's massive military build-
up without such a restriction. The editor concluded that 
American ground troops should be kept in South Korea "not out 
of habit but because they are an anchor of stability that 
serves American interests," which was the same reason United 
6 
• Editorial, CT, 10 August 1977, sec. 4. 
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states troops had been in Europe for more than 30 years. 7 
In its editorial titled "Withdrawal Decision Seen as New 
Threat to Peace," on 27 May 1977, the Detroit News also 
pointed out that the decision was made without serious 
consultations with United States Army officers. The editor 
said, "the more we read and hear about the plan for a phased 
withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from South Korea, and how the 
decision was reached to adopt it, the more it worries. 118 On 
28 April the editor of the paper also stated that there was 
no sensible reason for the withdrawals at that moment because 
it would only "heighten the danger of an outbreak of war, 
threaten Japan's security and give the world the message that 
America has lost interest in Asia." 9 The editors of the paper 
also pointed out several times that Cater made a mistake in 
announcing his decision unilaterally without any concession 
from the opponents that would help to ease the tensions. lO 
After the new intelligence report was issued, the editorial 
of 28 June 1979 stated that North Korea had secretly built up 
its military power. The writer asked, "For what purpose? 
Defense against a weakened adversary?" The editorial concluded 
that "the plan for American troop withdrawals from South Korea 
7
. Editorial, WSJ, 31 May 1977. 
8• Editorial, DN, 27 May 1977. 
9
. Editorial, DN, 28 April 1978. 
1
~ Editorials, DN, 25 April 1978 and 28 June 1979. 
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should be scrapped. Peace is simply not a game that one side 
11 
can safely play alone." 
Meanwhile, in its editorial of 2 August 1977, the New 
X9rk Times supported Carter's unilateral decision by refuting 
charges that the President made his decision unilaterally, 
arguing that "the North Koreans had nothing comparable to 
trade. " Since the South Korean forces outnumbered those of 
North Korea, the editor argued, Carter could not trade with 
the North Koreans for a reduction of their forces. The editor 
continued to argue that Carter's announced withdrawal plan 
actually would reduce tensions at the DMZ at least for the 
next five years because the North Koreans understood that any 
minor conflict would make the United States postpone or even 
reverse the timetable of the pullout. Even after the pullout, 
the editor claimed, deterrence would be continued because the 
North could hardly attack the south because of the presence 
of powerful American air forces in South Korea. 12 
The Cleveland Press fully supported Carter, stating in 
its editorial of 23 May 1977 that strong air and naval forces 
as well as the United states defense treaty with South Korea 
would be enough to deter North Korea from attacking the South. 
The editor of the paper criticized the opponents of the 
President by claiming that they did not learn any lesson from 
1
~ Editorial, DN, 28 June 1979. 
1
~ Editorial, NYT, 2 August 1977. 
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recent history. The editor said, "the Korean War and Vietnam 
war proved conclusively that the American public will not 
support involvement in a land war on the Asian mainland." The 
editor concluded that an attempt to maintain U.S. infantry 
troops in South Korea indefinitely would be "not only wishful 
thinking but bad strategy. 1113 
The st. Louis Post Dispatch also supported carter 
claiming in its editorials of 7 June and 18 July 1977 that 
the withdrawal was an overdue recognition of the fact that 
"there is no longer any necessity of maintaining a sizeable 
American presence there." The editors argued that the South 
Koreans, who had a larger army, greater manpower, and stronger 
economy than the North must def end themselves against the 
North's aggression without the aid of American infantry 
troops. The editors maintained that the 30,000 American ground 
troops were numerically insignificant in demonstrating an 
effective military or diplomatic purpose. Moreover, the 
editorial continued, the withdrawals not only diminished the 
chances of American involvement in other Asian land war but 
also the further loss of American lives. Therefore, the 
editors concluded that the troops should be brought home in 
accordance with Carter's proposed withdrawal plan. 14 
The Houston Post and the Chicago sun-Times also fully 
l~ Editorial, CP, 23 May 1977. 
1
~ Editorials, St. Louis Post Dispatch, 7 June 1977 and 
18 July 1977. (Hereafter cited as SLPQ). 
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supported Carter's decision on the pullout, arguing in their 
editorials that there was considerable evidence such as the 
congressional Budget Office report, which proved that American 
ground troops in South Korea were no longer needed for 
military purposes but were there for political reasons. 15 The 
editor of the Houston Post. emphasizing a tripwire role of 
.American troops in South Korea in its editorial of 25 May 
1977, said, "It is time to end this presence that is not 
justified by the need and expense. 1116 The Chicago sun-Times 
also claimed in it editorial of 21 May 1977 that "it's in this 
country's best interest to divorce itself as much as possible 
from South Korea's repressive government, without inviting an 
attack on the South by Communist North Korea. 1117 
The Washington Post, which initiated the Singlaub affair 
by reporting the general's views, expressed its opinion 
through an editorial of 30 May 1977. It contended that the 
troop withdrawal itself was not a bad idea. However, the paper 
warned the President that if he did not manage the plan "with 
exquisite care," other major interests of the United States 
such as prevention of nuclear proliferation would be seriously 
jeopardized because the South Koreans might seek to develop 
their own tactical nuclear weapons as an alternate means of 
1
~ Editorial, CST, 21 May 1977; Editorial, Houston Post, 
25 May 1977. (Hereafter cited as HP). 
16 
. Editorial, HP, 25 May 1977. 
17 
. Editorial, CST, 21 May 1977. 
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deterrence. The editor conclusively stated that "the simple 
slogans of withdrawal are poor guides to the complexities of 
the situation on the ground. 1118 
The Los Angeles Times, the most ardent defender of 
carter, fully supported his new Korean policy from the 
beginning of his administration through its editorial pages. 
Immediately after Vice President Mondale's Tokyo meeting, the 
editorial of the paper on 2 February 1977, pointed out South 
Korea• s far greater economic and military strength. They 
justified carter's proposed withdrawal policy by saying, "it 
is matter of doing the right thing in the right way. " The 
editorial continued to say that: 
North Korean bellicosity provides some basis for 
that fear. But given the impressive military 
strength of South Korea and the clear absence of any 
soviet or Chinese interest in supporting North 
Korean aggression, a renewal of the Korean war that 
concluded19nearly 24 years ago seems extremely 
unlikely. 
When the Singlaub affair occurred, the paper conceded in 
its editorial of 27 May that the general's concern over the 
withdrawal was justifiable because military planers always had 
to prepare for the worst situation. What really bothered 
military men was that the history of 1950 might be repeated 
in Korea. But the editor recalled that the Communist North 
could attack easily attack the South in 1950 because the South 
18 
. Editorial, WP, 30 May 1977. 
19 
• Editorial, LAT, 2 February 1977, sec. 2. 
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eans were virtually unarmed. But South Korea in 1977 J(or 
Ssessed a formidable military capability. Moreover, United ~ . 
states air and naval units as well as a mutual defense treaty, 
which did not exist in 1950, strongly supported Korean 
security. In addition, China and Russia were unlikely to 
discard detente and support North Korea's unrealistic attempt 
to invade the South. Therefore, the editor concluded, carter's 
withdrawal policy was "not unacceptably risky. 1120 
When the Senate approved the Byrd Amendment requiring 
the President to consult with Congress before proceeding with 
further withdrawals, the paper, through its editorial of 31 
July 1977, criticized the Senate by claiming that the Senate 
was attempting to bind Carter's good foreign policy with "a 
judgement that falls short of being supported by the facts. 1121 
Two days later, the editor of the paper urged Congress 
to support Carter's withdrawal plan by approving the Korean 
military aid package submitted by the President. The editor 
said, "Congress, we think, ought to cooperate with this plan 
by approving the appropriations that will be necessary to make 
it work. 1122 However, the Los Angeles Times changed its 
attitude after the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the 
President suspend his withdrawal plan based on a new 1979 
20 
. Editorial, LAT, 27 May 1977, sec. 2 . 
2
~ Editorial, LAT, 31 July 1977, sec. 2. 
2
~ Editorial, LAT, 2 August 1977, sec. 2. 
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intelligence report on North Korean military strength made by 
the CIA and the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency). The paper 
urged the President to change his mind by claiming that the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff's advice "seems to us the sound course." 
The editorial of 28 June 1979 continued to say that: 
Many wars, including the North Korean invasion of 
1950, begin in miscalculation. If maintaining a 
division or so of American troops in South Korea 
helps to deter any such new miscalculation, the cost 
will be worthwhile. Certainly it would be preferable 
to the cost of misreading North Korean political 
intentions, given that ffuntry' s apparently 
formidable military machine. 
Unlike newspaper editorials, most of the nation's 
influential columnists strongly supported Singlaub's position 
and criticized the President's Korean pullout policy. Kenneth 
Adelman, who had been an assistant to Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld during the Ford Administration, argued in his 
Chicago Tribune column that Korea was one of the most 
important strategic points on earth where major five world 
powers watched with keen interest. He said no one in 
Washington understood why Carter tried to remove the primary 
deterrent force from this sensitive area of the world. He also 
argued that the President's policy would please the Soviet 
Union and particularly North Korea, but it would anger 
America's main allies such as Japan, South Korea, and many 
Europeans. Moreover, the withdrawal plan would give a negative 
impression to a new ally China. It made the United states seem 
2
~ Editorial, LA'.!'., 28 June 1979, sec. 2. 
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to have no intention of stopping Russian expansion in 
Northeast Asia. Therefore, he argued, the danger of the 
withdrawal policy would certainly outweigh the nebulous 
1:>enefits. He concluded that "the troop withdrawal could have 
1:>een a wise one, had the necessary diplomatic groundwork been 
laid and changes in the international scene been brought about 
over time. As it stands, however, it is a rather reckless 
course appealing in appearance through unjustified in 
1124 
substance. 
Norman Pearlstine argued in a column in the Washington 
fost on 29 May 1977 that the withdrawal policy was not only 
unlikely to achieve its goals but it heightened the risk of 
war as well as endangered the balance of power in Northeast 
Asia. He continued to argue that North Korea's President Kim 
Il Sung had never given up his desire to communize the South. 
But both Moscow and Peking were unwilling to allow Kim to 
attack because they did not want to confront the United States 
directly in that area. If the United States removed its ground 
troops from South Korea, their concerns would be diminished 
and the risk of attack would consequently increase. Therefore, 
he maintained, peace and stability in Northeast Asia could 
only be kept as long as the troops in Korea acted in the 
"tripwire role." Pearlstine, also emphasized that only South 
Korea positively responded to the American request for support 
24. Kenneth Adelman, "Troop Withdrawal: A Reckless Policy 
in Korea," CT, 29 May 1977, sec. 2. 
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during the Vietnam War by providing about 50, 000 of its 
troops. He warned that the United States might lose a 
valuable, loyal ally in Asia by proceeding with its policy 
unilaterally. The columnist concluded that the United States 
troops must be kept in South Korea until both Koreas completed 
a political settlement by signing a nonaggression pact.25 
J. F. terHorst, a influential national columnist, agreed 
with Pearlstine that China and Russia would not support Kim 
Il Sung's invading the South if the Second Division stayed in 
Korea. He said, "once the United States leaves, their reason 
for denying Kim's claim leaves, too." He was also concerned 
that the pullout would heighten tensions between China and 
Russia over gaining the control of the Korean peninsula as 
well as the Sea of Japan. such a confrontation would sharply 
destabilize the region and, of course, would seriously concern 
the Japanese whose defense primarily defended upon an American 
security promise. He concluded, "U.S. troops are not primarily 
in South for its needs but for ours. 1126 
Donald Morris, a columnist of the Houston Post, argued 
that North Korea's decision as to when to attack the South 
would depend not so much on the number of the ground troops 
in Korea as on America I s will to def end South Korea. He 
2 ~ Norman Pearlstine, "Why U. s. Troops Should Stay in 
Korea," WP, 24 May 1977. 
26 
. J. F. terHorst, "Who Lost Most in Singlaub Firing?," 
llli, 29 May 1977. 
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maintained that the United States commitment to South Korea 
did not really require the presence of massive ground troops. 
aowever, he concluded that the presence of the troops was the 
best proof to the North Korean that the United States was 
seriously concerning the security of South Korea. 27 
Joseph c. Harsh argued in the Christian Science Monitor 
on 26 May 1977 that the troops stayed in South Korea not for 
the security of Korea but for the protection of Japan. He 
maintained that if South Korea became communized, communists 
from the mainland could directly attack Japan unobstructed by 
any significant land barrier. Therefore, he claimed, in order 
to defend Japan properly, South Korea should be kept as a 
strong ally. He predicted that sooner or later Japan would 
take over the present America's role in South Korea for its 
own security. Until that time, he claimed, "the United States 
must stand as the protector and guarantor of South Korean 
security." The columnist, also reminded his readers that 
China's influence had been the key to the Korean problem. He 
wrote, "it would be foolish to withdraw American troops from 
South Korea if there were any reason for thinking that Peking 
wanted another Korean war. But it will be safe to withdraw 
these American troops if it is known that Peking has a tight 
2
~ Donald Morris, "Chip Shot, Bad Decision Hurt 
Singlaub," Houston Post, 9 June 1977. (Hereafter cited as HP). 
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Py 11 28 rein on ongyang. 
Jack Anderson, a prominent national columnist, expressed 
concern about South Korea's development of nuclear weapons as 
the result of the United States withdrawal of its nuclear 
umbrella as well as its ground troops from South Korea. The 
columnist, pointed out President Park's continued intention 
of developing Korea's own nuclear weapons. He cited the 
evidence of Park's frustrated attempts to buy a nuclear fuel 
plant that could produce plutonium, an essential ingredient 
of nuclear weapons. He also argued that if South Korea 
developed nuclear weapons, Japan obviously would develop its 
own nuclear bombs and Peking also would feel obliged to give 
its skill to North Korea. For this reason, he concluded, 
"keeping our troops and our nuclear weapons in South Korea may 
be the only way the United States can prevent membership in 
the nuclear club from getting out of hand. 1129 
Michael Kilian, a columnist of the Chicago Tribune, 
argued that "Candidate Carter recklessly promised to withdraw 
American troops from the Republic of Korea, ostensibly because 
of the human rights situation there." Kilian admitted that 
President Park was a dictator. But the columnist claimed that 
Park was ruling his country no harsher than did Chicago's late 
Mayor Richard J. Daley, who used secret police to check his 
2
~ Joseph c. Harsh, "The Korean Equation," CSM, 26 May 
1977. 
2
~ SFC, 28 June 1979. 
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opponents and who tried to buy votes on Chicago's West side 
during a mayoral election. Kilian emphasized the geographical 
importance of the Korean peninsula by arguing that Korea is 
not a far off Namibia." He warned the Carter Administration 
that "Whatever happens there directly and immediately effects 
Japan, China, Russia, and consequently the United States. " The 
columnist, comparing the Carter's Korean policy to that of 
Truman's, said that Carter seemed not to have learned any 
lesson from the Korean War in 1950. He concluded that the 
troop withdrawal policy was "ill considered" and Cater could 
be accused of "naivete, hypocrisy, and irresponsibility. 1130 
Meanwhile, Charles W. Yost, a syndicated columnist and 
a former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, 
defended Carter's decision in his columns in the Los Angeles 
Times on 5 June 1977 and in the Christine Science Monitor on 
3 June 1977. Yost pointed out the significant differences 
between the situation in Northeast Asia in 1950 and that of 
1977. In 1950, he argued, Stalin was eager to participate in 
the post war control of Japan because he believed Japan would 
eventually play a great role in the Asian balance of power. 
However, his attempt was repeatedly blocked by the United 
States. Therefore, Stalin encouraged Kim Il Sung to attack the 
South, hoping that an unified communist Korea would affect 
3 ~ Michael Kilian, "Korea and the Ghastly Lesson We' re 
Forgetting." CT, 24 June 1979, sec. 2 and "Do Korea's Faults 
Mean Reds Should Take over," 28 June 1979, sec. 3. 
167 
Japanese stability. By 1977, however, Japan had already become 
a great power economically and politically, and another Korean 
war would only give them a chance to be a military big power 
again. Therefore, he claimed, the Soviet Union was not in a 
position to encourage Kim in such an attack. Yost also pointed 
out that the Russians and the Chinese, who were allies in 
1950, were no longer allied but hostile each other because of 
border dispute. And both communist super powers were fearful 
that another Korean war might give the other side an advantage 
in the regional balance of power. Moreover, they did not want 
to produce an unwanted political confrontation with the United 
states by encouraging Kim to attack the South because both 
nations got significant benefits from their improved 
relationship with the United States. Therefore, he concluded, 
It is therefore difficult to imagine either the 
Soviet Union or China encouraging Kim Il Sung to 
attack the South, or its doing so against the will 
of the communist great powers. These broader 
considerations seem far more likely to determine the 
nature of any real threat in Korea than a narrow 
focus on the relative military capabilities of North 
and South, and hence fully to justify Preside111 
Carter's decision to phase out U.S. ground forces. 
The nation's influential newspapers were evenly divided 
over the pullout policy. Editors who defended Carter's recall 
of General Singlaub also approved his withdrawal policy, while 
those who attacked Carter's reaction to the indiscreet general 
3
~ Charles W. Yost, "Northeast Asia: The Real Danger is 
Unforeseen Events," LAT, 5 June 1977, sec. 4 and "For Clarity 
on Korea," CSM, 3 June 1977. 
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did not support the policy in their editorial pages. Unlike 
editors, columnists overwhelmingly criticized Carter's 
decisions on the pullout policy as well as on the Singlaub 
affair. Rival newspapers such as the New York Times vs. the 
~ashington Post and the Chicago Tribune vs. the Chicago sun 
Times stood on opposite sides on this issue because of 
ideological differences, as well as their competition for 
reputation and circulation. These papers' competitive coverage 
on the Korean pullout policy, pro or con, attracted public 
attention. 32 Growing public interest in the policy, due in 
part to the newspapers' heavy coverage, caused Carter to move 
more cautiously. 
32• George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 
1972-1977 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Research Inc., 
1977), 1113. The poll result showed that 78 per cent Americans 
answered that they read and heard about the pullout policy. 
More detailed consideration, see Chapter XIV. Public Opinion. 
CHAPTER XIV 
PUBLIC OPI:NIOlf 
Before the Singlaub affair, the American public, by and 
large, did not pay attention to Korean issues except 
Koreagate. The public generally approved of President Carter's 
withdrawal policy, partly because most people did not want to 
risk involvement in an Asian land war and partly because of 
the illegal lobbying scandal and human rights violations by 
the Park Administration. However, the Singlaub affair brought 
more attention to the Korean withdrawals. As a result, more 
Americans understood the realities of the pullout policy. 
After the Singlaub affair, Americans expressed their opinions 
on the pullout through letters to the editors of newspapers 
or periodicals. 
Many letters supported the policy, reflecting the "new 
isolationism" that was common in post-Vietnam America. Anthony 
Kang, Morristown, New Jersey, defended Carter's new Korean 
policy and said that South Korea was not vital to American 
interests. He deplored that Nixonite Asian scholars misled the 
169 
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united States into the Vietnam War and said, "why should we 
continue to apply yesterday's Vietnam policy to Korea today?" 
He argued that situations of Vietnam and Korea were different 
in many ways. But they shared a basic common factor in 
strategic and political problems. Therefore, he concluded, it 
was natural that the Carter Administration reexamine the 
united States Korean policy in accordance with the Vietnam 
experience. 1 
J. T. Van Voorhis, Chairman of Barnes & Brass Co. , 
clarkburgs, West Virginia, who favored the pullout, said, "too 
long have we been the source of too much for too many small 
countries. 112 
Edward Friedman, Chairman of the East Asian studies 
program at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, pointed out 
that "not all sources of tension stem from problems in the 
North," and argued that the United States should not act as 
a global policeman as she had done in 1945.3 
John W. Howell,jr, President of Howell & Associates, 
Inc., Springfield, Ohio, also criticized the United States' 
global role. He wrote, "The U.S. cannot police the world 
1• NYT, 7 July 1977. I have chosen these samples from 
various newspapers and periodicals. I selected these based on 
people's opinions on the pullout issue, their occupations and 
regions. Scholars who expressed their opinions through letters 
to the editors were treated with public opinion. 
2• Nation's Business 65 (October 1977): 43. 
3• NYT, 6 November 1977. 
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forever. We cannot afford to keep troops all over the world, 
especially for a dictator such as Park Chung Hee. 114 
other Americans felt that South Korea should be able to 
support itself. Gary Savage, a service coordinator for Flynn 
Hill Elevator Corporation in Long Island City, New York, 
favored the Korean withdrawal policy. He pointed out that 
nearly three decades of the United States' support for the 
Korean Armed Forces was a long enough period for South Korea 
to develop its own deterrent capability against the North. 5 
Jay C. Wockler, Santiago, California, also argued that 
"if south Korea cannot defend itself after 25 years of our 
financial and military help, then they are not worth having 
as an ally, and we might as well let them go down the drain. 116 
Richard E. Galvan, a certified public accountant in Long 
Beach, California, who was wounded during the Korean War, 
firmly stated that "we should never again fight a land war on 
the continent of Asia. " He, strongly def ending Carter's 
pullout policy, said, "air and naval support are okay. Let the 
Asiatics supply the infantry. It is less costly to help build 
their land forces than supply our own. 117 
4• Nation's Business 65 (October 1977) 43. 
5 
. Ibid. 
6 
• LAT, 9 August 1979, sec. 2. 
7• Nation's Business 65 (October 1977): 42. 
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Others defended Carter because they did not like the 
tripwire role of the Second Division in Korea. In his article 
11 Letter From Seoul, " Weyland McGleigh supported Carter' s 
cause. The Korean war was kind of a civil war, he argued, and 
another war would be possible whenever one side could conceive 
of victory. If a war broke out, the United States would 
automatically be involved in a war as long as American ground 
troops stationed there. Therefore, he claimed, the United 
states should remove its troops from South Korea immediately 
and have the Koreans solve their own problems. 8 
John M. Kane of Rockville, Maryland, argued that South 
Korean security actually could not rely on the presence of 
U.S. ground troops in South Korea. He said, "our troops are 
simply hostages to South Korea's fears of fighting in North 
Korea." He also claimed that the troops in South Korea would 
only guarantee Congress's approval of additional American 
troops in the case of confrontation.9 
Others supported Carter's withdrawal policy simply 
because they objected to Korea's undemocratic government, its 
violations of human rights and illegal lobbying. In her letter 
to the editor of the Chicago Tribune, Linda Jones, Church 
Committee on Human Rights in Asia, argued that "the lesson we 
need to learn is not from Harry Truman's mistake of troop 
8• America 136 (5 February 1977): 101. 
9• WP, 26 February 1976. 
r 
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withdrawal", but from "Iran and Nicaragua, where we have 
supported unpopular dictatorships instead of democracy." She 
added that "continued U.S. support of an unpopular dictator 
cannot but delay a peaceful solution." Therefore, she 
concluded, the Carter Administration should give priority to 
supporting a democratic government rather than a military 
. 10 
regime. 
Christopher M. Choi, Chicago, also pointed out that the 
south Korean Government not only violated the basic human 
rights of their citizens but also undermined the democratic 
process of the United States by engaging in illegal lobbying 
activities. He claimed that the Carter Administration should 
press the Park regime to restore human rights and democratic 
freedoms. If President Park refused to cooperate, Choi 
claimed, the United states should remove its ground troops 
from South Korea immediately.11 
Meanwhile, many Americans, inf 1 uenced by General 
Singlaub's assertions, objected to Carter's new Korean policy. 
Fred M. Skipper,jr., Vice President of Wyn Shields Co., Inc., 
North Charleston, South Carolina, sympathized with Singlaub's 
cause. He argued that the United states forces should be kept 
in South Korea because "the best defense of peace is a strong 
10 
• CT, 10 July 1979, sec. 2. 
1
~ Ibid., 22 December 1976, sec. 4. 
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military."12 
A State Farm Insurance Company agency manager in 
r,ansdale, Pennsylvania, George J. Atwood who favored a strong 
united States commitment to the Pacific area said that "the 
u.s. must keep a strong armed force in the Western Pacific. 
The threat of war makes this necessary. A continuous vigil 
must be kept or we could have another Pearl Harbor. 1113 
James Padilla, Manager of Leacom Cablevision Inc. in 
Truth or Consequences, New Mexico, who was also persuaded by 
singlaub, criticized Carter's Korean withdrawal policy, He 
wrote that: 
The cost of moving the U.S. Second Infantry Division 
would offset the benefits. South Korea needs 
American help in the field, as well as in the air 
and on the water. As a citizen, I would rather pay 
wi:iatey,rr we are paying, and keep North Korea in 
line. 
Other Carter critics argued that Americans spent too much 
blood and treasure on Korea to give up at that stage. Mark M. 
Mercer, Office Manager for Walters Lumber Co., Inc., Chatham, 
New Jersey, also expressed his opposition to the withdrawals. 
He wrote that "Our pulling out would only lead to the defeat 
of the South Korean forces. If we pull out, all our expenses 
and efforts to date will have been for nothing. We must stay 
until the final goal is reached and the country can be self-
1
~ Nations' Business 65 (October 1977): 42. 
13• Ibid. 
14
. Ibid. 
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protecting. 1115 
Harold B. Holtzman, an agent for State Farm Insurance 
co., in Hamburg, Pennsylvania, who favored keeping the troops 
in south Korea, said, "I feel we have paid too dearly in 
American lives to give South Korea to the communists, which 
is what we would do if we pulled out. 1116 
Others criticized the President by citing lessons of the 
past. Larry L. Warner,jr., San Pedro, Los Angeles, argued that 
if the Carter Administration proceeded with the pullout plan, 
history would repeat again. He asked the administration how 
south Korea could defend against the combined might of North 
Korea, China and the Soviet Union. He wrote that: 
American forces should stay in Korea, standing firm 
and fast against the Red hordes. Eternal vigilance 
is the price to be paid for liberty. For God's sake 
Amef+ca, throw off this cloak of apathy and wake 
up. 
In 1974, a year before the fall of Saigon, the Chicago 
Council of Foreign Relations conducted a poll about American 
involvement in another Korean war. It showed that only 14 per-
cent favored United States involvement, while 65 percent of 
them were against direct American action for South Korea. 18 
A month after the Singlaub affair, from 17 to 20 June 
l~ Ibid. 
l~ Ibid. 
1
~ LAT, 27 May 1977, sec. 2. 
1
~ Marc Leepson, "Relations with South Korea," Editorial 
Research Reports 2 (12 August 1977): 610. 
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1977, the Gallup Poll Institute surveyed public opinion about 
carter's new Korean Policy. First, interviewees were asked 
whether they heard or read about the proposal to withdraw 
American troops from South Korea during the next four or five 
years. Nationwide, 78 percent replied in the affirmative, with 
awareness highest among men, the college educated, 
Republicans, and those 50 years of age and older.19 Second, 
interviewees who said they had heard or read about the 
proposed withdrawal policy were then asked, "In general, do 
you favor or oppose this proposal?" The answers were: 
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 40 % 
Oppose ••...•.•• 38 % 
No opinion ..... 22 % 
By Sex 
Male Female 
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 42 % Favor . . . . . . . . . . 39 % 
Oppose •...••••• 43 % Oppose .••.•.••• 32 % 
No opinion ..... 15 % No opinion . . . . . 29 % 
By Education 
College High School 
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 40 % Favor . . . . . . . . . . 41 % 
Oppose ••••.•..• 42 % Oppose •.••••... 36 % 
No opinion . . . . . 18 % No opinion . . . . . 23 % 
Grade ~chool 
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 40 % 
Oppose ••.•••••• 34 % 
No opinion ..... 26 % 
By Region 
East Midwest 
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 40 % Favor . . . . . . . . . . 42 % 
Oppose ......... 37 % Oppose •••.••.•• 39 % 
No opinion ..... 23 % No opinion . . . . . 19 % 
19 Gallup, Gallu:12 Poll, 1133 . . 
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soutb West 
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 36 % Favor . . . . . . . . . . 44 % 
Oppose .•••••••• 40 % Oppose ••••.•••• 36 % 
No opinion . . . . . 24 % No opinion ..... 20 % 
By Age 
18 - i4 y~ars i!2 - i9 years 
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 46 % Favor . . . . . . . . . . 38 % 
Oppose ••••••••. 30 % Oppose ......... 44 % 
No opinion . . . . . 24 % No opinion . . . . . 18 % 
30 - 49 y~ars 50 ye~;t: and over 
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 39 % Favor . . . . . . . . . . 41 % 
Oppose •••....•. 41 % Oppose ......... 35 % 
No opinion . . . . . 20 % No opinion . . . . . 24 % 
By Politics 
ReQublicans Democrats 
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 32 % Favor . . . . . . . . . . 47 % 
Oppose ••.....•• 51 % Oppose •.•••..•• 30 % 
No opinion . . . . . 17 % No opinion . . . . . 23 % 
Inde12endent 
Favor . . . . . . . . . . 36 % 
Oppose .•••••••• 41 % 20 No opinion . . . . . 23 % 
The results showed that opinion among the various group 
was remarkably even with some difference by sex, education, 
age, region, and politics. More females than males favored 
Carter's withdrawal policy. The middle two age cohorts opposed 
the policy while Americans in the younger and older age groups 
supported the President's decision. By education, the more 
people were educated, the less they backed the President. 
Regionally, Southerners were least likely to back Carter's 
Korean policy, while Westerners mostly supported the policy. 
By politics, Carter's own party members generally approved the 
2
~ Ibid., 1133-4. Record of Gallup Poll accuracy shows 
that the error margin from 1970 to 1976 was 1.2 percentage 
Points. 
178 
Korean pullout, while Republicans strongly opposed it. 
Meanwhile, more Independents agreed with the Republican's view 
rather than that of Democrats. On the whole, American public 
opinion was evenly divided over Carter's proposed withdrawal 
policy. 
In the late July 1977, after the Carter Administration's 
further efforts to demonstrate that there was no risk of war 
even after the pullout, a New York Times - CBS News Poll 
showed that 52 percent of Americans disapproved Carter's 
withdrawal policy, while only 34 percent backed the 
'd t 21 Presi en. 
A month later, the Nation's Business asked its readers 
whether they favored the pullout or not. The answers were that 
75 percent of readers who expressed an opinion did not support 
carter's new Korean policy, while only 25 percent of them 
favored the withdrawals. 22 
Meanwhile, an NBC News poll in August showed that 45 per-
cent favored the withdrawal, while 37 percent opposed it and 
the rest were undecided. 23 
Thus, the various polls after the Singlaub affair clearly 
explained that Carter's Korean withdrawal policy was not 
2
~ NYT, 29 July 1977. The survey was based on telephone 
interviews conducted from 19 to 25 July 1977 with 1,447 
adults. It suggested a 5 percentage error margin. The rest, 
14 percent, had no firm answer. 
2
~ Nation's Business 65 (October 1977): 42. 
2
~ DN, 30 March 1978. 
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popular among American citizens. It also showed that the more 
educated middle class and admittedly conservative Americans 
believed after the Singlaub affair that Carter's decision on 
the withdrawal of the troops from South Korea was too risky 
to support. 
The pullout policy, which had given an advantage to 
carter during the presidential campaign of 1976, suddenly 
became a burden to the President when he was preparing to seek 
his second term in 1980. If he were to suspend the policy, it 
would be welcomed by most military officials and Congressional 
conservatives. At the same time, it would raise political 
problems with liberal Democrats who had fully backed Carter 
in the 1976 election. 24 If the President decided to stick with 
the policy, he had to overcome strong public objections, which 
might jeopardize his second term. Therefore, the Korean 
withdrawal policy became an "Achilles' Heel" to President 
Carter after the Singlaub affair. 
2
~ LAT, 21 July 1979. 
CHAPTER XV 
KOREAGATE AND THE KOREAN AID PACKAGE 
The Korean lobbying scandal helped Carter to make the 
withdrawal policy as a major 1976 presidential campaign issue. 
Ironically, it blocked the Congressional approval of the 
Korean aid package which was necessary to manage the pullout. 
There were three groups of Congressmen who opposed aid for 
Korea. The first group opposed the troop withdrawal policy 
itself. The second group disliked President Park's human 
rights violations. The last and most serious group of 
Congressmen feared that they might be suspected of receiving 
bribes from a South Korean agent, Park Tong Sun, if they 
supported it. 1 Congressional leaders, who believed that the 
aid bill could not pass under such circumstances, delayed 
laying the military aid bill before the Congress until 
December 1977. This delay had forced President Carter to slow 
down the withdrawals. 
1• LAT, 27 July 1977. 
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Park Tong Sun was a South Korean businessman who was 
believed to earn millions of dollars per year exporting 
American rice to South Korea. He founded the fashionable 
Georgetown Club in Washington D.C. in 1967 and spread cash 
around Washington to buy favors for his country. Park was 
believed to spend about a million dollars a year to buy 
influence on Capitol Hill. He entertained Congressmen in his 
Georgetown Club, which became a favorite gathering place for 
Washington dignitaries, made campaign contributions, arranged 
trips to South Korea, and, in some cases, simply paid cash 
outright. 2 
In its early days, the case of Park Tong Sun appeared to 
be purely a Washington scandal: a wealthy businessman bribed 
several Congressmen with money and gifts to buy friends for 
his country. 3 But the case had ballooned into a serious 
international problem when Kim Hyung Wook, the former head of 
the South Korean Intelligence Agency (KCIA), testified before 
the House Subcommittee on International Organizations on 22 
June 1977 that the Park Tong Sun affair was an "official plan" 
2
• The Economist 263 (25 June 1977): 39. 
3 WSJ, 22 September 1977. For the detailed 
considerations, see the Washington Post, 3 March 1975, 23 
March 1975, 27 July 1975, 15 October 1976, and 24 October 
1976. Park involved in the illegal lobbying since the late 
1960s. But the Department of Justice did not begin serious 
investigation until 1975. The scandal attracted the American 
public when the Washington Post on 15 October 1976 reported 
that the Justice Department was investigating an unprecedented 
Congressional corruption. 
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of the south Korean Government. 4 
Moreover, when the House Ethics Committee disclosed on 
10 July 1977 that at least 115 Congressmen or former 
congressmen were involved in the Park Tong sun scandal, 
congress moved to investigate the lobbying scandal in order 
to clarify the scandal and to regain their traditional public 
reputation. Congress, particularly the House, had become 
increasingly sensitive to allegations that a large number of 
its members received Park's money and gifts.5 Therefore, the 
House Ethics Committee hired the former Watergate special 
prosecutor Leon Jaworski to head its investigation. 6 
As soon as he took over the case, Jaworski requested that 
the state Department support efforts to obtain Park's 
testimony and to obtain records related to his activities.7 
On 23 August Park Tong Sun was charged on 36 felonies. All of 
them related to an alleged influence buying operations in the 
United States. 8 
President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, Attorney 
General Griffin B. Bell and leaders of both houses of Congress 
such as House Speaker Tip o 'Neill warned the south Korean 
4 NYT, 23 June 1977; WP, 23 June 1977. . 
5 NYT, 11 July 1977 • . 
6 SFC, 21 July 1977. . 
7 WP, 8 September 1977. . 
8 NYT, 9 September 1977. . 
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Government that failure to cooperate with American efforts to 
investigate the Park Tong Sun affair would not only strain 
diplomatic relations with the United States but also 
jeopardize Congressional approval for the Korean military aid 
9 package. 
In response to United States pressure for Park's return 
to Washington, the South Korean Government officially 
announced its non-involvement in the case on 7 September 
without mentioning whether they would allow Park return to 
the United States. It claimed that Seoul never appointed Park 
Tong sun as its agent and "what he did or did not do was not 
done with the foreknowledge, approval or cooperation of the 
government of the Republic of Korea. 1110 
Seoul officials repeatedly denied official involvement 
in the case and said, "As a fully sovereign and law governed 
nation, Korea finds no ground or no reason to turn over any 
of its national merely on the ground that he is suspected of 
having violated foreign law. 1111 President Park Chung Hee also 
continued to refuse to talk with American officials about the 
case, ironically citing Park Tong sun's human rights.12 
9 
. NYT, 4 October 1977; WP, 9 September 1977. 
10 
• WP, 8 September 1977. 
11 
• Ibid., 9 September 1977. 
12
. Ibid. 
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American officials were particularly concerned that the 
illegal lobbying affair could jeopardize Carter's withdrawal 
plan. Therefore, they emphasized to South Korean officials the 
rising anger in Congress over Seoul's stubborn refusal to 
cooperate, and urged them to send Park to Washington to answer 
bribery and conspiracy charges resulting from the federal 
grand jury indictment.13 
In response to the South Korean refusal to return Park 
Tong sun to Washington, Congressman Bruce F. Caputo, 
Republican of New York, submitted an amendment aimed at 
cutting off US$110 million of United States economic aid to 
south Korea. At the same time, Congressman Andrew Jacob 
submitted an amendment to cut all South Korean economic aid 
from the budget resolution. 14 
In explaining the proposed amendment, the Congressman 
said that US$110 million of United States Food for Peace aid 
should be cut because "through this program Park Tong sun 
perpetrated his frauds against this Congress. 1115 
Even though the House overwhelmingly defeated Jacob's 
Amendment by 268 to 120, Caputo's Amendment was defeated by 
an unexpectedly close vote of 205 to 181.16 
13 WSJ, 22 September 1977. . 
14 Ibid . . 
15 Ibid • . 
16 Ibid . . 
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since the Korean War, South Korea had enjoyed warm 
support from healthy majorities in both houses of congress. 
:EVen frequent reports about human rights violations made by 
the seoul Government had not seriously harmed Korea's status 
as a Congressional favorite. However, the result of the 
caputo' s Amendment clearly showed that the Park Tong Sun 
scandal and Seoul's stubborn refusal to cooperate had 
seriously damaged traditional Congressional attitudes in favor 
of south Korea. 17 This also made it clear that if Seoul 
continued to reject United states demands, Congress would not 
be in a mood to vote the Korean military aid package which was 
essential to proceed with Carter's pullout program. 18 
Under these circumstances, Carter formally requested 
Congress on 21 October 1977 to enact the bill and authorize 
him to transfer US$800 million worth of military equipment 
mainly held by the Second Division in Korea to the South 
Koreans without reimbursement. In his letter to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, the Speaker of the House, Walter F. Mondale, the 
President of the Senate, and the Senate Majority leader Robert 
c. Byrd, the President reiterated his determination to 
withdraw the troops from South Korea within five years. And 
then, he explained why he proposed the bill. He said, "the 
legislation I am proposing is designed to help make certain 
17 
. Ibid., 28 October 1977. 
18 
• Ibid., 9 September 1977. 
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that Korean defense capabilities are not weakened by our 
ground force withdrawal. " In order not to endanger the 
security of South Korea as well as East Asia, the President 
emphasized, it was essential to turnover the United States 
owned military equipment to the South Korean Government.19 
A week later, on 27 October, Congressman Clement J. 
Zablocki, Chairman of the House International Relations 
committee, announced that Congress would not act on Carter's 
request for the weapons turnover because there was no hope of 
passing such a bill, given Seoul's refusal to cooperate with 
the Congressional investigations into the Park Tong sun 
affair. Zablocki said he was sorry that Carter made the 
request at that sensitive moment, and said, "there is no doubt 
in my mind that under the present circumstances, without 
progress toward cooperation in the Korean investigations, it 
would be impossible to get some legislation. 1120 
Meanwhile, Zablocki' s committee unanimously passed a 
resolution requesting Seoul to "provide complete access to all 
facts relevant" to the Congressional investigations into the 
Park Tong sun scandal.21 
l~ PPP 2 (21 October 1977): 1822-33; WCPD 13 (24 October 
1977): 1576-7; DSB 77 (12 December 1977): 852-3. 
2
~ CQWR 35 (29 October 1977): 2322; WP, 28 October 1977; 
NXT, 27 October 1977 and 28 October 1977. 
2
~ NYT, 28 October 1977; WP, 28 October 1977. 
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rn his news conference, Chairman Zablocki said that the 
Korean aid package could not be discussed in Congress until 
seoul cooperated with American investigations on alleged 
influence buying. At the same time, the chairman echoed a fear 
that had been expressed by his fellow Congressman that they 
JDight be forced to vote against any form of Korean aid in 
order to prove that they had not been involved in the Park's 
scandal. 22 
congressman Edward J. Derwinski, Republican of Illinois, 
who was an ardent supporter of Korea, said that the resolution 
was "over kill." But he did not oppose the resolution. 23 
House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill said he also had no plan 
to bring the weapons transfer proposal to the House floor 
unless the South Korean Government made Park Tong Sun 
available to the House investigations. He said if Seoul did 
not permit Park to testify to the investigations on the 
scandal, they would face the risk of loss of American military 
aid. He said, "We need Tong Sun Park over here. Unless he's 
returned, you're in dire trouble. 1124 
Senate Majority leader Robert c. Byrd, who opposed the 
appointment of a special prosecutor, argued that Park's 
scandal was "overblown" and that Park himself exaggerated his 
22• CQWR 35 (29 October 1977): 2322; NYT, 28 October 1977; 
H.E, 28 October 1977. 
23 
. HTI, 28 October 1977. 
24 
. NYT, 23 January 1978; WP, 28 October 1977. 
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own importance in Washington to impress his government. But 
ayrd acknowledged the negative mood of Congress about the 
Korean scandal. He was concerned that it could affect 
congressional votes on any future Korean aid package. 
Meanwhile, Byrd urged leaders of Asian countries to press 
seoul to cooperate with the American investigation by 
emphasizing that "the stability of the whole area could be 
jeopardized by the failure of the Government of South Korea 
to act in this regard."25 
Chairman of the House Ethics Committee, John J. Flynt, 
Jr. , Democrat of Georgia, who presided over the three-day 
hearing from 21 to 23 October 1977, concluded that the bribery 
effort was an "official plan" of the South Korean Government. 
Yet to know the full truth he needed Korean cooperation. He 
made it clear an interview with a reporter that "cooperation 
meant helping to obtain the testimony of Tong Sun Park."26 
On 31 October 1977, The House of Representative 
unanimously passed a resolution requesting Seoul to cooperate 
"fully and without reservation" in the Congressional 
investigations into the Korean influence buying scandal.27 
At this point, the South Korean Government began to 
realize that any further attempt to stonewall Congress would 
2
~ CQWR 35 (29 October 1977): 2322; NYT, 23 October 1977. 
2
~ NYT, 24 October 1977 and 27 October 1977. 
2
~ Ibid., 1 November 1977. 
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not only seriously damage the diplomatic relations between the 
two countries but also impede approval of the military aid 
package. Therefore, as soon as the House passed the resolution 
unanimously, Seoul suggested to the United States that 
negotiations be resumed at the diplomatic level to find a 
solution for the Park Tong Sun affair. Finally after eight 
weeks of intense negotiations, the South Korean Government 
agreed to send Park to Washington to testify before Congress 
11 , 't 28 under fu 1mmun1 y. 
In the meantime, even before the Park Tong Sun scandal 
was settled, former Korean Ambassador Kim Dong Jo's illegal 
lobbying activities in Washington aggravated the situation. 
Kim was Seoul's Ambassador in Washington from 1967 to 1973 and 
then became national security adviser to President Park. His 
bribery of various Congressmen was revealed to the public when 
a former Korean embassy press secretary, as a witness at the 
House Ethics Committee hearing of October 1977, testified that 
he saw the ambassador stuffing a briefcase with money to pass 
to members of Congress. 29 
In his interview with a Newsweek reporter, Kim Dong Jo 
denied illegal lobbying activities and his connections with 
the KCIA. He said, "they are not only untrue, but also 
28• WP, 31 December 1977 and 27 February 1978. Park 
returned to Washington on February 26, 1978 for Congressional 
testimony. 
2
~ NYT, 27 October 1977; WP, 27 February 1978. 
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ridiculous .•• I never tried to influence American Congressmen 
or officials by conducting such lobbying activities." The 
former ambassador also claimed that his onetime secretary told 
a lie before the committee in order to justify his seeking 
political refuge in America. Kim said, 
I have never carried a briefcase in my life, let 
alone stuffed it with cash. I don't know why he is 
telling these lies. My g~113s is that he is trying 
to justify his defection. 
Leon Jaworski strongly urged the State Department to make 
Kim available to investigators of the alleged bribery scandal. 
He repeatedly claimed that without the testimony of Kim Dong 
Jo the investigation of Koreagate would not be satisfactorily 
completed. At the same time, he suggested that a threat to cut 
off aid might persuade the South Korean Government to allow 
Kim to provide sworn testimony. 31 
Secretary Vance asserted that the Carter Administration 
could not press the South Korean Government to return the 
former ambassador to Washington because he had diplomatic 
immunity in accordance with international agreements. However, 
the Secretary expressed his hope that Seoul would waive these 
rights and help with the Congressional investigations of the 
case by permitting Kim to testify before the House Ethics 
3
~ WP, 27 February 1978. 
3
~ NYT, 11 May 1978 and 1 June 1978. 
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coJD111i ttee. 3 2 Unlike Park Tong Sun case, the South Korean 
Government refused even to discuss the matter with American 
officials, and declared that in accordance with international 
convention Kim would not go to Washington. 33 
Adlai E. Stevenson, Chairman of the Senate's Select 
committee on Ethics, also urged the South Korean Government 
to permit the Committee to investigate its former Ambassador 
Kim by alleging that he was ready to block United States 
economic aid to Seoul including a US$500 million loan for two 
nuclear reactors.34 
On 10 May 1978 the South Korean Government officially 
refused to allow ex-envoy Kim to testify before the House 
Ethics Committee. 35 In his interview with the Han Kook Il Bo, 
a Seoul newspaper, on 21 May, Foreign Minister Park Dong Jin 
reconfirmed Seoul's position of blocking any Congressional 
attempt to hear Kim's testimony in connection the alleged 
bribery scanda1. 36 
Meanwhile, the House International Relations Committee 
on 24 May unanimously passed a compromise resolution, 31 to 
O, warning Seoul that it could lose United States economic 
32 Ibid., 9 February 1978 and 11 May 1978 . . 
33 Ibid • . 
34 Ibid., 26 February 1978, sec • 4. . 
35 Ibid., 11 May 1978. . 
36 Ibid., 22 May 1978. . 
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aid if former Ambassador Kim Dong Jo was not available to 
'f 37 0 31 M th f 11 H 1 d th testi y. n ay e u ouse a so passe e 
resolution, on a 321 to 46 vote, warning the South Korean 
Government that the United states might cut off economic aid 
if they did not cooperate with the Congressional 
investigations of the former ambassador. 38 Congressman Jim 
wright of Texas, the majority leader, said "this resolution 
is a very clear message." Congressman Clement J. Zablocki, 
Chairman of the House International Relations, said, "the 
resolution is unequivocal in its message - that only the full 
cooperation of the South Korean Government is acceptable." 
Thomas P. O'Neill also made it clear that an "evasive 
response" by Seoul would not be tolerated. 39 
On 22 June the House, in retaliation for Seoul's 
continued refusal to have Kim testify, voted, 273 to 125, in 
favor of cutting off US$56 million economic aid to South Korea 
under the "Food for Peace" program, the only form of economic 
aid then provided to South Korea. 40 The State Department, 
however, expressed its strong objection to the resolution 
because the resolution might require American diplomats to be 
37 
• Ibid., 25 May 1978. 
38 
. Ibid., 1 June 1978. 
39
. Ibid. 
4
~ Ibid., 23 June 1978. On 10 August the Senate refused 
to agree with the House to keep South Korea out of the Food 
for Peace Program. CQWR 36 (1978): 2201. 
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exposed to similar investigations by other nations. They were 
also concerned that further pressure on the South. Korean 
Government would seriously deteriorate its diplomatic 
relations. 41 Some Congressmen from farm states also opposed 
the resolution by claiming that it would hurt American 
42 farmers. 
Meanwhile, the South Koreans believed that US$56 million 
worth of aid would affect their booming economy very little. 
south Korea preferred to lose economic aid rather than to be 
coerced into violation of international conventions and to 
suffer an insult to its dignity as a sovereign state.43 
In the meantime, the White House announced that the 
carter Administration would begin to withdraw ground troops 
from South Korea whether Congress approved the weapon transfer 
bill or not. 44 on 9 December 1977 the carter Administration 
submitted to Congress a twelve-page report in respond to the 
Byrd Amendment requiring a periodic review of the Korean 
situation. In that report, the State Department reaffirmed 
that the withdrawal plan would be done on schedule. The report 
pointed out that the administration desperately needed 
4
~ Ibid. 
42• Ibid. 
43 
• Ibid., 23 June 1978 and 25 June 1978, sec. 4. 
4
~ NYT, 28 October 1977; WP, 28 October 1977. Jerrold 
Schecter, Press aide to Carter's national security advisor, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, announced it. 
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congressional approval of the Korean military aid bill in 
order to fulfill the pullout plan without the risk of war. It 
also pointed out that South Korea had tremendously improved 
its military capacity for defensive war. Therefore, the 
proposed pullout would not threaten the security of South 
45 Korea. 
on 8 February 1978 Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, in 
his response to questions before the House International 
operations Subcommittee, urged Congress not to cut off 
military aid to South Korea by linking the illegal lobbying 
scandal with the withdrawal plan. The Secretary claimed that 
the Congress should decide military aid to South Korea based 
on its security needs, not on the needs of a domestic 
investigation. 46 
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown also urged Congress not 
to link the military aid bill with the Korean lobbying 
scandal. Appearing before the House International Relation 
Committee, Brown said, "we condemn such actions as a serious 
misinterpretation of our governmental processes and of the 
mores of the American people. At the same time, we must not 
let the Tong Sun Park affair obscure our basic national 
interests in Korea. 1147 
45 
. 
46 
. 
47 
. 
NYT, 
NYT, 
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13 December 1977; Hf, 13 December 1977. 
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23 February 1978. 
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At the same time, two reports, opposed to linking 
military aid with the scandal, were submitted to the Congress 
by its members. on 9 January 1978 in their eighty-five-page 
report submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
senator John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, and Senator Hubert H. 
Humphrey, urged Congress not to link the Korean military aid 
bill to the bribery scandal. The report emphasized that "long-
term united States political alignments in the whole East 
Asian region must not be jeopardized for the short term 
objectives of the scandal investigation. 1148 
Another report, adopted by the House Armed Services 
subcommittee on 26 April by a seven to one vote, also urged 
congress to approve the military aid package regardless of the 
lobbying scandal in order to protect the remaining American 
troops rather than to aid South Korea. The report requested 
the President to postpone the pullout schedule if Congress 
failed to approve the US$1. 9 billion military aid package 
including the US$800 million transfer bill.49 
At the same time, inquiries on Koreagate seemed nearly 
over. After almost twenty months of investigation by the House 
and ten months by the Senate, Congress could get the whole 
picture of the lobbying scandal. Moreover, the mood of 
Congress had changed. By the end of April Congress wanted to 
4
~ Humphrey Report, 5. 
49 
• Cong. HASC 95-61, 4-6. 
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finish the investigation process as quickly and quietly as 
possible because further investigations only would harm 
congressional reputations, as well as relations with South 
50 I{orea. 
on 2 May the House International Relations Committee 
approved the US$800 million transfer to the South Korean 
Government. 51 on 11 May the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
also approved an amendment stating that the Second Division 
could transfer their weapons and equipment to the South Korean 
Army and train them in its use. 52 On 15 May the Committee 
passed the Korea military aid bill. It included the transfer 
of US$800 million worth of American military equipment, US$275 
million for supporting South Korean military modernization 
plan, and US$90 million for ammunition stockpiles.53 on 24 May 
the full House, for the first time, voted overwhelmingly, 247 
to 142, not to interfere with President Carter's withdrawal 
plan without mentioning the military aid package. 54 
On 20 July in his letter to Senate Majority Leader Robert 
C. Byrd, Carter requested him to help clear the way for the 
5
~ NYT, 22 May 1978. The evidence showed that 30 
Congressmen and former Congressmen received money from Park 
Dong Sun as contributions or gifts. 
51 NYT, 11 May 1978; .c.Qlffi36 (6 May 1978): 1111. . 
52 NYT, 12 May 1978 . . 
53 CQWR 36 (10 June 1978): 1465 • . 
54 NYT, 25 May 1978; CT, 25 May 1978 . . 
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proposed pullout plan by passing the Korea military aid 
package. At the same time, the President suggested that the 
proposed period would be "sufficiently flexible to accommodate 
developments" on Korea. 55 
on 26 July the Senate passed the Foreign Military Aid 
bill, 73 to 13, including the Korea aid package and sent it 
to the House. 56 On 20 August the House approved the bill 
authorizing the President to transfer up to US$800 million in 
defense equipment and services to South Korea through 31 
December 1982 "in conjunction with the withdrawal of the 2nd 
u.s. Infantry Division" from South Korea. 57 
Finally, on 7 September Senate-House Conferees on the 
security assistance authorization bill adopted the House 
provision, with the single proviso that all military equipment 
transfers be made in proportion to the rate of U.S. troop 
withdrawals. 58 
When news of Koreagate first broke, the affair was 
regarded simply as a weal thy Korean businessman's immoral 
activity. Kim Hyung Wook's testimony, which revealed the South 
Korean Government's direct involvement into the scandal, 
created a serious international problem. Because of the 
55 COWR, 36 (1978): 1921, 2044 . . 
56 Ibid., 2001 . . 
57 Ibid., 2045 . . 
58 Ibid., 2562 • . 
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scandal, congress reluctantly delayed the Korean military aid 
bill, which was essential for the President to manage the 
pullout. This forced Carter to delay the program. Eventually, 
it gave the President one more year to study the Korean 
situation before he made a final decision. 
CHAPTER XVI 
PRESIDENTIAL RECONSIDERATION 
While Congress was delaying the vote for military aid to 
south Korea, partly because of the Korean bribery scandal and 
partly because of Congressional reluctance to vote for troop 
withdrawals, the President decided on 21 April 1978 to 
mitigate the original pullout program for the first time since 
he took power. In a written statement, the President said, " 
In view of the crowded legislative calendar, and also because 
of other matters concerning Korea, there is a possibility that 
the Congress may not act now on this proposal. " Therefore, the 
President said that he ordered withdrawal of only one combat 
battalion of 800 troops rather than a proposed full combat 
brigade of 3,400 troops by the end of 1978. However, he added 
that non-combat elements of 2, 600 would be removed on schedule 
and his intention to carry out the full withdrawal within five 
years would be not changed. In his statement, Carter described 
his decision as a "prudent" measure, adding that approval of 
the Korean military aid package was a necessary ingredient in 
199 
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the withdrawal strategy.1 
The decision to slow down the pullout program was 
announced at the same time the Soviet Union shot down a Korean 
airliner which was off course near Murmansk, where soviet 
naval and rocket forces were concentrated. However, the White 
House denied there was any connection between its decision and 
the Korean incident. 2 
Senator Charles Percy, Republican of Illinois, who 
proposed an amendment requiring the President to consult fully 
with Congress before withdrawing the troops from South Korea, 
applauded the announcement: "by adjusting the withdrawal 
schedule, the President will gain additional time to make a 
full reassessment of U.S. pol icy in South Korea. 113 Chairman 
Zablocki of the House International Relations Committee also 
praised Carter's decision to slow down the program, 
anticipating that the President's decision would press 
Congress for immediate action on the military aid package. 4 
Meanwhile, Senator John H. Glenn, Chairman of the Asian 
Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
continued to assail the administration's overall policy, 
claiming that the President mistakenly attempted to withdraw 
1• PPP 1 (21 April 1978): 768; WCPD 14 (24 April 1978): 
768. 
2 NYT 1 22 April 1978; WP, 22 April 1978. . 
3 CT, 24 April 1978 . . 
4 WP, 22 April 1978. . 
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troops without supplying the promised military aid to South 
Korea. He added that the partial withdrawal without proper 
compensatory measures would give a bad impression to American 
allies. It would seem that the United States "is pulling back 
all over the world" without taking proper precautions. 5 
On 26 April the House Armed Services Committee, in direct 
challenge to Carter, passed the amendment proposed by Chairman 
Samuel S. Stratton, requesting the President keep 26,000 
American ground troops in South Korea until North and South 
Korea ended "the state of war" by signing a peace treaty. 
Stratton' s amendment also requested the President not to 
withdraw any troops from South Korea without getting 
Congressional approval of the Korean military aid package. 6 
On 11 May the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also 
approved an amendment requiring Carter to submit to Congress 
with "a comprehensive report on the viability of each troop 
pullout from south Korea four months in advance. 117 
At the end of May, National Security Adviser Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, who was an ardent supporter of Carter's pullout 
policy, visited China for three days to discuss normalization 
of Sino-American relations as well as Korean issues. 
Unexpectedly, in Peking, he faced strong obj actions from 
5• Ibid. 
6
. Ibid., 27 April 1978. 
7
. NYT, 12 May 1978. 
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Chinese leaders to the U.S. withdrawal program.8 
On 26 July the Senate passed the Percy amendment by a 
eighty one to seven vote. It warned that further withdrawal 
of the troops from South Korea might "seriously risk upsetting 
the military balance in that region." The amendment again 
requested the President to consult fully with the Congress.9 
On the next day, however, at the eleventh Annual Security 
consultative Meeting at the Naval Amphibious Base in Coronado, 
California, Defense Secretary Brown reconfirmed that the 
pullout would be carried out within five years despite the 
senate warning.10 
on 1 August the House, while approving the Korean 
8• NYT, 26 May 1978; CT, 26 May 1978. Brzezinski believed 
that the U.S. should use China as a lever against Russia. He 
stopped in Tokyo on the way home and told Prime Minster Fukuda 
that he and Chinese leaders did not agree on the pullout. 
Chinese objections might have affected his views on the 
policy. He also stopped in Seoul on 25 May 1978 and delivered 
Carter's personal letter to President Park reaffirming that 
the U.S. commitment to South Korea would not change regardless 
of the pullout. 
9• LAT, 28 July 1978; COWR 36 (29 July 1978): 1921. 
Senator Charles H. Percy described his amendment as a "strong, 
strong message" to the President from the Senate. He also 
claimed that the vote margin showed the clear evidence that 
the Senate was "deeply concerned" about Carter's Korean 
policy. Senator Sam Nunn added language to the amendment that 
President Carter should report to the Congress on the 
pullout's possible effect on South Korea's deterrent ability 
and the anticipated reaction from the North. The amendment 
also requested the President to submit an additional report 
to the Congress which would explain South Korea's possible 
independent nuclear weapon capability. It also asked the 
President to report the Congress about the impact of the 
pullout on the U.S. relations with Japan, China, and Russia. 
l~ LAT. 28 July 1978. 
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military aid package, passed an amendment proposed by Edward 
J. oerwinski, Republican of Illinois, 219 to 189. Like the 
percy Amendment, it cautioned Carter that his Korean 
withdrawal policy might seriously risk disturbing the military 
balance in the Far East. The amendment also requested the 
president to undertake "full advance consultation with 
congress. 1111 Meanwhile, the House rejected, 212 to 189, an 
amendment offered by Samuel Stratton to prevent further troop 
withdrawals from Korea unless the President obtained 
congressional approval first. 12 
After that, Congressional attempts to block the proposed 
withdrawal policy calmed down. The carter Administration, with 
the Congressional approval of the Korean military aid package, 
prepared to transfer weapons and equipment of the Second 
Division to the South Korean army in the connection with the 
pullout of United States ground troops. In addition, the 
administration agreed to sell most of the sophisticated 
weapons that were requested by South Korea, except sixty F-16 
fighters, in order to strengthen Seoul's military 
capability.13 
On 7 November 1978, hoping to maintain a deterrence 
against the North during and after the withdrawals, the Carter 
1
~ CQWR 36 (5 August 1978): 2044. 
12 
• NYT, 2 August 1978. 
1
~ WP, 23 November 1978. 
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Administration hastily activated the combined American - south 
Korean command which had been designed for several years to 
better coordinate their military operations in case of 
emergency in Korea. 14 At the same time, the United States 
deployed a new squadron of 12 F-4 jet fighters to a United 
states air base in South Korea in order to bolster air defense 
in accordance with the American compensation plan.15 
In the meantime, information was obtained which indicated 
that the entire withdrawal policy might need to be rethought. 
At the beginning of January 1979 the Army Times disclosed a 
new United States Army Intelligence Agency new report on North 
Korean military capability, ostensibly based on "intercepted 
communications between North Korean units, satellite 
photography and reports by South Korean agents. " The report 
concluded that North Korea's military capability was far 
greater than previously estimated. Moreover, they were 
offensively equipped and deployed. 16 The Army's new figures 
on North Korea capability were as follow: 
1
~ NYT, 7 November 1978; WP, 7 November 1978. General 
John W. Vessey, Commander of American forces in Korea and U.N. 
command, was appointed as the new commander of the combined 
forces. His deputy was a Korean four star general, and staff 
members were equally divided between two countries. 
1
~ WP, 7 November 1978. 
1
~ NYT, 4 January 1979; Norman D. Levin and Richard L. 
Sneider, "Korea in Postwar u. S. Security Policy," in The U. s. -
South Korean Alliance, Evolving Patterns in Security 
Relations, ed. Gerald L. Curtis (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington 
Books, 1983), 53. 
Previous 
Army 
Divisions 
Tanks 
figurel1977l 
430,000 
28 
1,900 
New figure 
440,000 - 500,000 
41 17 2,600 
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As soon as the new report was issued, the Pentagon's 
forty analysts started a major study of new satellite 
photographs and other data that the Army agency provided. CIA 
Director Stansfield Turner also ordered the CIA and DIA 
(Defense Intelligence Agency in the Pentagon) to reassess 
North Korea's combat strength based on the new data.18 At the 
same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to reappraise the 
military balance between North and South Korea based on the 
new Army intelligence report in order to determine whether 
they still could support Carter's withdrawal plan.19 
On 9 February Carter announced in his news conference 
that he was holding "in abeyance" any further troop reduction 
until he and his intelligence agencies reassessed North Korean 
military capability based on new intelligence data and other 
factors such as the impact of Sino-American normalization, 
Chinese opinion, and the perspective of the dialogue between 
South and North Korea. 2 O Two months later, Both the CIA and 
the DIA reported to the President that the numbers of North 
1
~ NYT, 4 January 1979 and 21 January 1979. 
18 
• Ibid., 21 January 1979. 
1
~ WP, 20 January 1979. 
2
~ PPP 1 (February 1979): 24 7-8; WCPD 15 (9 February 
1979): 247-8. 
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Korean troops reached about 600,000, over one fourth larger 
than the previous estimate. Having reviewed new information 
provided by the CIA and the DIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
April 1979 formally advised Carter to suspend the pullout plan 
until 1981. In their report, the Chiefs told the President 
that "both the increased size of the North Korean military and 
its recent muscle flexing make withdrawals too risky at this 
time. "21 
Meanwhile, the army's new intelligence report revived 
congressional criticism of Carter's withdrawal policy. In his 
letter to the President on 3 January 1979, Stratton urged 
carter to hold any further pullouts until his subcommittee 
reassessed the situation based on the Army's new report.22 He 
also claimed to hold hearings in the House on the Korean 
pullout plan in order to discuss the new intelligence 
information. 23 
On 23 January 1979 the Senate Armed Services Committee 
Pacific study Group, senators Gary Hart, Harry F. Byrd, Sam 
Nunn, and John G. Tower, sent a report to President Carter 
21 
. NYT, 18 July 1979; WP, 25 June 1979. 
22 
• NYT, 4 January 1979. 
2
~ House Armed services Committee, Investigations 
Subcommittee on Korean Withdrawal, Hearings on Impact of 
Intelligence Reassessment on Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From 
Korea, 96th Cong. 1st sess., 1979, committee Serial HASC no. 
96-16 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979), 1-101. The subcommittee 
~eld hearings on 21 June and 17 July 1979 to asses revised 
intelligence information on North Korea; NYT, 21 January 1979. 
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urging him to suspend the pullout. They pointed out that the 
new intelligence information made Carter's proposed 
withdrawal plan "too risky" at that time. The ref ore, they 
concluded that the pullout schedule should be halted until the 
risks were reassessed based on the new intelligence 
information.24 The report said, 
The withdrawal of u. s. ground forces from the 
Republic of Korea should be discontinued. The new 
U.S. intelligence reassessment of North Korean 
military strength leads us to conclude that even 
planned improvements in South Korean forces will 
not compensate for withdrawal of the U.S. 2nd 
Infantry Di vision. The reassessment casts grave 
doubt upon the validity of earlier judgments about 
the nature and stability of the Korean military 
balance that formed the basis of the 
administration's decision in May 1977 to withdraw 
U.S. ground troops form Korea It is the 
judgement of the Study Group that to proceed at this 
time with additional U.S. troop withdrawals from 
Korea would neither serve the security interests of 
the United Sta~~ nor contribute to stability in 
Northeast Asia. 
On 22 June Senator John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, also 
issued a report asking the President to halt his withdrawal 
plan until South Korea could be assured of its own defense 
against the North. He argued in his report that North Korea's 
advantage would decline in the next decade while the South's 
advantage would rise because of its far stronger economy and 
2
~ NYT, 24 January 1979; WP, 24 January 1979. They were 
all members of the Senate Armed Service Committee. 
2
~ Senate Committee on Armed Services, Korea: The U.S. 
l,roop Withdrawal Program, Report prepared by the Pacific Study 
Group, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 23 January 1979 (Washington, D. 
C.: GPO, 1979), 1. 
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iarger population. He predicted that the South could defend 
itself against the North without American help "in the not 
distant future." Therefore, he concluded that the United 
states should reserve its troop withdrawal policy considering 
the information on North Korea's military capability and 
maintain its troops until the South achieved the military 
balance with North. 26 He said, 
A recent intelligence estimate has reappraised the 
North Korean situation and concludes that its forces 
are considerably stronger than previously believed. 
It is my judgement based on this new information, 
that the risks involved in continuing the troop 
withdrawal demand that we reserve our poliS~ and 
maintain the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea. 
congressional approval of the Korean military aid bill 
encouraged the Carter Administration to carry out the policy. 
It reenforced air defense in South Korea and prepared to 
transfer weapons and equipment to the South Korean Army. But 
the Army's new Intelligence report again blocked the smooth 
process of the policy. The new report was so critical, it 
forced the President to undertake a basic reconsideration of 
his withdrawal policy. Moreover, this new report revived 
Congressional objection to Carter's Korean policy. Therefore, 
Carter had no alternative but to retreat from his Korean plan. 
2
~ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Troop 
H..ithdrawal from the Republic of Korea: An Update 1979, Report 
Prepared by Senator John Glenn, 96th Cong., 1st sess., June 
1979, LC 79-604232 (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1979), 1-2. 
2
~ Ibid., 1. 
CHAPTER XVII 
SOUTH KOREAN REACTIONS 
The South Korean leaders, who had experienced the Korean 
war and so always feared another invasion from the North, were 
dismayed by Carter's election in 1976 because of his campaign 
pledge to pull out American forces. Government officials, 
military officers, scholars, even opposition political leaders 
were worried at the prospect of President carter's new Korean 
Policy. 
As soon as Jimmy Carter was elected as the 39th President 
of the United states, the ruling Democratic Republican Party 
concluded its congratulatory statement by saying that they 
hoped President-elect Carter would "understand South Korea's 
security problems and the threat of invasion by North Korea 
and would maintain friendly relations. 111 
Kim Dong Jo, a former Foreign Minister and then a senior 
security advisor to President Park, carefully expressed his 
hope that the new Carter Administration would not change its 
1
. NYT, 4 November 1976, 26. 
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Korean policy drastically even though President-elect Carter 
vowed to remove American ground troops and atomic weapons from 
the south Korea during the presidential campaign. 2 
A few days before the inauguration, President Park Chung 
Hee expressed his opinion at a televised news conference. Park 
stated that he did not object the pullout itself, but the 
united States should not remove its ground troops from South 
Korea until the North agreed to sign "a non-aggression pact" 
that South Korea had already proposed in 1974. 3 
In an interview with Andrew H. Malcoln, a special 
correspondent to the New York Times, South Korean Minister of 
culture and Information Kim Seong Jin emphasized the important 
role of United states ground troops in Korea. Kim, who was 
Korea's chief spokesman, stated that the Americans should 
seriously consider "the expansionist tendencies of the 
Communists" in the Far East. 4 
After having failed to gain Vice President Mondale's 
acceptance of an invitation to Seoul when he visited Tokyo on 
1 February 1977, 5 South Korean officials understood that they 
could not change President Carter's mind. Thus, they began to 
2
• WP, 4 November 1976, 22. 
3 
. NYT, 13 January 1977, 2. 
4
• Ibid., 16 January 1977. 
5
• Stephen Barber, "Why Mondale Skipped Seoul," FEER 95 
(11 February 1977): 31. Carter vetoed Mondale's visit to 
Seoul. 
211 
study ways to cope with the situation. Among the most drastic 
of their considerations was the decision to build a new 
capital city about sixty miles south of Seoul for security 
considerations. This would be done within five years, the same 
period that Carter proposed to pullback American ground troops 
6 home. 
In the meantime, the South Korean Government, having 
realized that the Japanese also feared a proposed American 
pullout, attempted to cooperate with the Japanese Government 
in delaying the United States withdrawal plan. In the hope 
of more amicable relations with the new Japanese Government 
of Premier Takeo Fukuda, on 27 December 1976, Seoul released 
three Japanese businessmen who were sentenced to penal 
servitude for life for spying in South Korea. 7 on 7 January 
1977 Seoul proposed "a three nation security committee" with 
Japan and United States, hoping that it could develop into a 
collective security system like NATO in Europe. 8 
In February, Seoul sent forty-three Congressmen led by 
Kim Jong Phil, the former prime minister, to Tokyo to attend 
an annual meeting of the two countries' lawmakers. On 16 
6 NYT, 12 February 1977. Primary reason for the 
relocation of the capital was to reduce the rapidly rising 
population in Seoul rather than to consider its security. 
Because of the timing of the announcement, it brought great 
fears among the South Koreans. So the government withhold the 
Plan later. 
7 
• WP, 28 December 1976. 
8 
• Ibid., 8 January 1977. 
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yebruary 286 of both countries' legislators - 43 Korean 
delegates and 243 Japanese lawmakers including 7 cabinet 
Jllinisters - adopted a resolution expressing their "deep 
concern" over the proposed United States withdrawal policy. 9 
The resolution stated that: 
Delegations from both countries highly evaluate the 
deterrent to war which American troops in Korea have 
provided and express deep concern that, in the 
absence of a North - South Korea nonaggression pact, 
or objective proof that peace has been firmly 
established in the Korean peninsula, any reduction 
of American ground forces would be an invitation to 
instability in the Korean peninsula ... as WfJl as 
to instability in Northeast Asia as a whole. 
The Korean delegates proposed to include in the 
resolution an official request from both governments for a 
postponement of the pullout until South Korean forces could 
defend the nation themselves. But Japanese delegates, while 
backing up President Park's call for a nonaggression pact 
between the two Koreas as a precondition for the pullout, 
rejected the Korean proposal claiming it was an issue between 
the United States and South Korea. 11 
When President carter confirmed his withdrawal policy 
officially at the press conference of 9 March 1977, President 
Park made up his mind to end his country's traditional 
security reliance on the United States, and began to take 
9 
. LAT, 17 February 1977. 
l~ Ibid. 
11 
• I bid., 27 February 1977. 
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practical steps to foster the development of a self sufficient 
military capability against the North's threat.12 In June 
president Park established the Enlarged Conference for 
promotion of the Arms Industry, a special high level body 
which consisted of cabinet members, military officials, and 
business leaders in order to expedite the development of the 
defense industries. The committee decided that South Korea was 
to produce all its own arms except highly sophisticated 
electronic equipment such as aircraft within four or five 
13 years. 
At the same time, Seoul reconsidered a covert nuclear 
weapons program which was cancelled in the early 1976 because 
of strong diplomatic pressure from the United States and 
canada. 14 officially, President Park denied Korea's plan for 
l~ NYT, 20 March 1977. 
l~ Ibid., 10 October 1977; FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 10. 
South Korean Government put the defense budget of 1978 at 
about US$2 billion, about 35 percent of the total budget. It 
totaled 6.4 percent of the GNP. It was expected to climb to 
7 percent of the GNP. 
14• WP, 4 November 1978; LAT, 4 November 1978 and 13 
November 1978. According to these papers, President Park, who 
feared for his country's security because of President Nixon's 
decision to pull 20,000 troops out of South Korea in 1972, set 
up the covert nuclear weapon program. But the program was 
cancelled because Belgium refused to provide South Korea with 
a nuclear fuel laboratory equipped to handle plutonium after 
the India's surprise nuclear test of 1974. France cancelled 
the sale of the reprocessing plant to South Korea in January 
1976 under intense diplomatic pressure from the United States 
and Canada. But President Park openly vowed to develop an 
atomic bomb if the United States removed its nuclear weapons 
from South Korea. 
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15 nuclear weapons. However, a senior aide to President Park 
pointedly hinted that the policy could be changed. He told the 
reporter of the Washington Post firmly: 
As a matter of principle we should have the freedom 
to take necessary actions within our ability to 
ensure our own survival .•• As to the question of 
nuclear weapons develfgment, we would consider the 
matter on that basis. 
on 30 June 1977 Foreign Minister Park Dong Jin officially 
told the Korean National Assembly, during the debate on the 
withdrawals, that South Korea could develop atomic bombs if 
they believed that their country's survival was at stake.17 on 
2 July the Assembly passed a resolution asking President 
carter to reconsider his decision of the withdrawal. The 
Korean Congressmen expressed their thanks to the United States 
for its military support, but criticized Carter's new Korean 
policy. They stressed in their resolution that "the 
withdrawal of 33,000 American ground troops threatens peace 
in Korea, destroys the balance of power and discredits 
American commitments overseas." They also asked Washington to 
provide them with enough compensation for their armed forces 
to defend the nation against any attack from the North.18 
15 CSM, 15 July 1977. . 
16 WP, 27 May 1977 . . 
17 NYT, 1 July 1977. . 
18 Ibid., 3 July 1977 • . 
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In 1978 Seoul changed its original plan for nuclear power 
plants by doubling the size of their program. They decided to 
invest more than US$70 billion by the year 2000 in building 
forty-three nuclear plants, a capacity almost equal to that 
of the United States in 1978.19 By doubling nuclear projects, 
seoul wanted not only to cope with the energy crisis of the 
1ate 1970s but also to influence Carter's withdrawal decision 
indirectly. South Korean officials believed that American 
officials obviously understood that a peaceful nuclear 
capability could be easily changed to military purposes. 20 
In the meantime, the South Korean Government, hoping that 
the two big communist powers could restrain North Korea from 
causing tension, began to launch a careful campaign to broaden 
relations with China and the Soviet Union by giving them 
signals that Seoul was eager to explore trade, cultural 
exchange, and sports activities. In October 1978 Kim Kyung 
Won, a chief foreign affairs adviser to President Park, told 
the press in Hong Kong that Seoul was ready to open diplomatic 
relations with China. Subsequently, this message was 
repeatedly mentioned by high officials of the Korean 
Government. In December Foreign Minister Park Dong Jin 
officially encouraged businessmen to get in touch with their 
Chinese trade partners and not to be concerned with 
1
~ LAT, 19 November 1978. 
2
~ Jack Anderson, "Seoul Hints at Developing A-Weapons," 
HE, 28 June 1979. 
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ideological differences between the two countries. One 
official said, "we are enough of a substance as a country now 
that eventually China - and Russia, too - will realize it is 
nonsense not to deal with us. 1121 
At the same time, President Park proposed to North Korea 
the exchange of goods, civilian technology and capital in an 
attempt to reestablish political negotiations that had been 
suspended since August 1973. Through such broad economic 
exchanges and cooperation, Seoul hoped to reduce the 
possibility of military confrontation between the two Koreas 
after the pullout. 22 on 16 December 1978, two months before 
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's visit to Washington, the south 
Korean Government urged the Carter Administration to seek 
Chinese help in reopening talks with the North. 23 On 19 
January 1979 President Park proposed new peace talks to North 
Korea during a nationally televised news conference. He said 
that South Korean officials were ready to meet with officials 
2
~ WP, 30 December 1978. For the first time, in September 
1978, the Soviet Union allowed a South Korean Cabinet member 
(Shin Hyon Hwack, Minister of Health and Social Affairs) and 
two journalists to visit Moscow. Jae Hoon Shim, "Kisaeng and 
Making up," FEER 102 (6 October 1978): 15-6. 
2
~ NYT, 23 June 1978. 
2
~ Ibid., 17 December 1978. At the end of January 1979 
~hen Deng Xiaoping visited Washington, Carter asked him to 
influence Kim Il Sung to prevent any military movement against 
the South. Deng told the President that North Korea would not 
initiate an aggression in the Peninsula. He also said that if 
he pressed kim, the North would turn to Russia. Thus, China 
Would lose its influence. See Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith. 
Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982): 205-6. 
the North at "anyt 1· me, of anywhere, 
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and without any 
conditions" for reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. 24 
rn the next month, both sides met at the Panmunjom truce site 
and agreed to reopen the North-South Coordinating Committee, 
which was set up in 1972 for discussing political issues 
between the two Koreas and had been suspended since 1973.25 
In the meantime, most South Koreans watched the 
inauguration of the Carter Administration with anxiety but 
hoped its new Korean policy would not affect their national 
security seriously. The Hankook Ilbo, a major Seoul newspaper, 
described the new President as "no ordinary President." The 
more conservative Chosun Ilbo commented in its editorial that 
"it would be worthwhile watching how Carter's idealism fitted 
in with the realities of politics. 1126 
The South Koreans, who were waiting for a favorable word 
from President Carter, were disappointed to hear that Carter 
turned down a Seoul Government request for Vice President 
Mondale to visit Seoul on the way to Tokyo, a two hour flight 
from Seoul . 2 7 They were even more surprised when Vice 
President Mondale, who had promised European leaders to give 
full support to NATO in order to defend them against the 
2
~ NYT, 20 January 1979. 
2
~ NYT, 13 February 1979 and 16 February 1979; WP, 18 
February 1979. 
2
~ FEER 95 (4 February 1977): 24. 
2
~ Ibid. 95 (11 February 1977) 31; NYT, 29 January 1977. 
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collllllunist threat only a few days before, came to Tokyo and 
announced the withdrawals officially. This led the South 
Koreans to believe that the Carter Administration changed the 
united States' global strategy from "Europe first to Europe 
only." Therefore, they were concerned that the carter 
Administration might abandon them in case of military 
confrontation with the North, just as the United states 
abandoned South Vietnam in 1975.28 
Vice President Mondale's announcement of the withdrawal 
combined with the stunning revelation of the Seoul 
Government's new capital plan produced tremendous fears among 
seven million Seoul residents, many of whom had suffered 
severely from the Communist North during the Korean War. 
Immediately after the news was revealed, the price of stock 
dropped sharply and all real estate transactions were frozen. 
President Park tried to calm such fears by promising them to 
definitely defend the city in the event of attack from the 
North, but his words could not put to rest wide-spread fears 
among his people.29 
Opposition to Carter's withdrawal policy created a rare 
national consensus in South Korea. From top government 
officials to a shoe shine boy, everybody was skeptical and 
seriously worried at the prospect of a new American Korean 
28 
. Cong. HASC 95-71, 210. 
29 
. NYT, 12 February 1977. 
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policy which might threaten their country's survival. They 
JcneW that North Korean forces were within easy striking range 
of seoul. Once United States ground troops were removed, they 
understood, it would be impossible for the United States to 
save south Korea from the invaders from the north. One citizen 
said, "the geography explains a lot about this country. How 
would people in Washington feel if there were 10 Russian 
divisions sitting as close as Dulles Airport? 1130 A shoe shine 
boy in a Seoul tea room said, "No, I don't want American 
troops to leave." A more affluent customer, who expressed his 
objection to the U.S. pullout, told a correspondent of the 
Christian Science Monitor: 
I've been through the first Korean War and I'm not 
afraid to die if it means a better life for my 
children. But there is no sense dying in a useless 
war. If the North Koreans invade, certainly the 
Americans will bomb them. And if Seoul is taken 
certainly we will take Jr back. By that time how 
many of us will be dead? 
The South Koreans suspected the rationale explained by 
Mondale in Tokyo that South Korea's growing economic and 
military strength made the presence of American troops in 
Korea unnecessary. One citizen said, 
We just don't see how the U.S. can justify their 
force reductions here on the grounds of our 
developed economy •.• How does our economy compare 
with Germany's? You don't hear anything about an 
American withdrawal from there. It just seems that 
the U.S. cares more about Europe than it does about 
3
~ USNWR 82 (6 June 1977): 18. 
3
~ CSM, 25 July 1977, Eastern edition. 
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Korea. 32 
Dr. Kim Jun Yop, Director of Korea University's Asiatic 
Research Center, also questioned the real purpose of the 
pullout. He said, 
First of all, to an outsider, it is not clear at all 
what the purpose of withdrawal really is ••• I do 
not believe that Washington has yet offered a 
satisfactory explanation of why the troops had 
better be withdrawn. To save money? To improve 
security? To support democracy? To promote detente? 
To appease Pyong Yang? To please Korea's critics? 
What conceivable, rational purpose could be really 
served by '1\thdrawal is a question I find impossible 
to answer. 
Many South Koreans also worried about the loss of the 
second Division's deterrent function. A retired Korean Major 
General, Kim Chum Kon, Dean of Graduate School of Business and 
Public Administration at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, 
emphasized the deterrent role of the Second Division. He said 
that "when U.S. troops are deployed along the main invasion 
route, they cannot be avoided in the event of an attack. 
That's the deterrent value. 1134 A senior aide to President Park 
said, 
If the concept of deterrence is valid in Europe ••. 
it is even more valid on the Korean peninsula. There 
has been no actual war in Europe since World War II. 
But North Korean tanks smashed across the 38th 
parallel five years after World War II in open 
defiance of the line of division agreed upon between 
3
~ FEER 97 (5 August 1977): 13. 
33 
• Zagoria, "Leave Korea", NYTM (2 October 1977): 18. 
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the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 35 
south Korea's Primer Minister Choi Kyu Hah regarded the 
united States troops in South Korea and in NATO as "two 
pillars of policy" that deter the Soviets aggressions from the 
both sides. He argued that the Soviet Union was acting 
cautiously because they could not adventure either eastward 
or westward. He alleged that if the United States would remove 
the troops from South Korea, Russia would feel free to behave 
, l , 36 more aggressive yin Europe. 
Many Koreans were also perplexed at the unilateral nature 
of carter's pullout decision. They did not understand why he 
got nothing in return from the North. Foreign Minister Park 
Dong Jin said, "withdrawal could have been used as one of our 
most important bargaining chips in settling the Korean issue." 
He continued to argue that carter gave a tremendous advantage 
to North Korea by fixing the period of the withdrawal over the 
next five years. He said, "to say everything in advance sounds 
honest. But when the other side doesn I t apply the same 
honesty, I'm afraid we end up the losers. 1137 
South Koreans pointed out Carter's decision was ill-
timed. They were already in the midst of army modernization 
program that would be completed by the beginning of the 1980s. 
3
~ CSM, 25 July 1977, Eastern edition. 
3
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TheY believed that the best American policy was to wait and 
iet its development go forward until the South Korean Army 
could reach parity with the North. One of President Park's 
aides said, 
we are in the process of becoming stronger ••• we 
have to make adjustments now, initiate changes. The 
withdrawal raises totally unnecessary additional 
risks that shouldn't arise. When South Korea will 
improve its armed forces to ,itch the North, that 
will be the time to withdraw. 
Like other Koreans, dissidents opposed to President Park 
believed that American withdrawal would increase the risk of 
war. Father Jack Corcoran, an American missionary, who was 
quite familiar with dissidents, said that almost all 
dissidents were against the withdrawa1. 39 Even Kim Dae Jung, 
the leading dissident, declared his opposition to the pullout, 
while in jail, claiming that it might encourage Kim Il Sung 
to attack the South. 40 Former President Yoon Bo Sun 
emphasized that Kim Il Sung could not be trusted. He said, 
"they are beyond common sense. An American withdrawal might 
not prompt an immediate invasion, but it could cause the North 
to rethink the possibility. 1141 
3
~ NYT, 7 August 1977. 
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. CT, 5 September 1977, sec. 3. 
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Lee Chul sung, newly elected Chairman of the New 
oemocratic Party which was the leading opposition party in 
south Korea, urged the Carter Administration to withhold its 
pullout decision until South Korea could achieve military 
balance with the North. 42 At the same time, he expressed his 
concern that Washington's excessive public pressure over 
president Park's human rights violations together with a 
campaign for the pullout might provoke a strong nationalistic 
reaction from both the repressive Park's regime and the South 
Korean people. This could give President Park further excuses 
to clamp down on the freedom that opponents still enjoyed. 43 
In order to discuss the above problems with political and 
government leaders of the incoming Carter Administration, Lee 
decided to visit Washington in January 1977.44 In New York, 
on March 8, Lee again expressed his view that even though he 
did not favor the permanent presence of United States troops 
in his country, he hoped the United States would keep its 
42
. Ibid. 
4
~ Economist 262 (5 February 1977): 71. 
4
~ John T. Connor to Vice President Walter F. Mondale, 
12 January 1977, NSC Memorandum 782, WHCFSF co 41. co 82-2, 
FG 38; Kim Jun Yop, Director of Asiatic Research Center in 
Korea University, to Zbigniew Brzezinski,31 January 1977, NSC 
Memorandum 807. WHCFSF co 41. co 82-2, FG 6-12. According to 
Nsc Memoranda 782 & 807, the NSC staff regarded Lee Chul sung 
as an instrument of President Park's Government and not a 
Korean dissident. Yet because of his legislative 
responsibilities, they decided to allow him to make a brief 
c~urtesy call on the Vice President, but politely turned down 
his request to see Dr. Brzezinski. 
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ground troops until South Korea could assure its security. He 
added, "such time is at least 10 years away. 1145 
Yu Chin o, a former chairman of the chief opposition 
party, remembering the U.S. pullout of 1948 and the late Dean 
Acheson's statements, said "the United States should not 
repeat the mistakes it made just before the start of the 
Korean War 27 years ago. 1146 
Kim Hyung Wook, a former director of the South Korean 
central Agency who revealed details of the Park regime's 
covert operation for buying influence in United states 
congress, claimed in Washington that the South Korean forces 
were too weak to face the North Korean Army. He said, "the 
presence of U.S. ground troops in Korea is the only effective 
deterrent force against North Korean aggression. • . Their 
withdrawal from Korea at this time is wrong. 1147 
The human rights campaigners, who believed withdrawal 
would increase the risk of war, were very concerned about 
Park's anticipated curbs on their activities once American 
pressure was removed and South Korea had a self-reliant 
defense. One Christian mentioned an old Chinese saying that 
"two people can be in the same bed but with different dreams." 
He went on to say human rights campaigners agreed with 
45 
. NYT, 8 March 1977. 
4
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president Park on the pullout, but for different reasons. 48 
one dissident, who experienced prison life for criticizing 
the government, expressed his objection to the withdrawals. 
He said, "in comparison with North Korea our country is free, 
even though I criticize... In South Korea, we have the 
possibility of Democracy one day. 1149 The Families Association 
of Prisoners of Conscience in Korea delivered a statement that 
the withdrawal would give Park cause to control the nation 
more tightly: "we are worried that the withdrawal of U. s. 
troops from Korea will cause further suppression of the people 
along with strengthening of the dictatorship. 1150 A Korean 
professor explained what worried the critics of President 
Park: 
Many of the President's critics look to the United 
States Government and American press for support in 
their struggle. They are concerned that the UnJted 
States troop withdrawal will leave them alone. 
Many Koreans perceived that Carter linked the pullout 
with Koreagate and human rights violations. They regretted 
that Carter did not separate these issues and their country's 
security. One citizen complained about Carter's pullout 
decision by arguing that: 
Ninety per cent of Koreans are in love with 
48
. Frederick A. Meritz, "Koreans See u.s. Presence as a 
Rights Safeguard," CSM, 3 June 1977. 
49 
• CT, 5 September 1977, sec. 3. 
50 
• WP, 30 March 1977. 
5
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Americans, but now American boyfriend forgets us. 
we don't understand. We wonder why you blame all 
this Koreaga~ on us, when it was just one man, 
Tongsun Park. 
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Former President Yoon Po Sun, who was on trial for 
criticizing Park's dictatorship, told a New York Time reporter 
that "we can't ask the United States to go simply because 
inadvertently they helped to maintain Mr. Park's dictatorial 
machinery. And we can't help the North Korean cause just 
because we don't like what Mr. Park is doing. 1153 He warned 
that if the United States left South Korea because of Park's 
violations of human rights, it would challenge "America's own 
liberal values of human rights and democracy. 1154 The seventy-
nine-year old resolute foe of Park continued to say that: 
You are bound to help us. . . It is your 
responsibility because there are no boundaries on 
humanitarianism. But ggove that you have a special 
relationship with us. 
The carter Administration's public pressure on the South 
Korean Government over human rights violations was the most 
baffling and irritating issue to President Park. Moreover, 
Park was especially afraid of his fellow citizens' impression 
that Carter decided to withdraw American ground troops from 
South Korea because of his violations of human rights, since 
52
. Nick Trimmesh, "Even South Korea's Dissidents Want 
the u.s. to stay," cr, 5 September 1977, sec. 3. 
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this kind of negative impression could jeopardize his 
political life.56 Therefore, Park reconfirmed that the human 
rights issue was not relevant to his country and made it clear 
that he would not free political prisoners to please Carter. 57 
park's aides also repeatedly denied human rights violations 
in south Korea. They claimed it was a "biased opinion" of the 
united States. Many officials believed that some kind of 
restriction on political activities was necessary because of 
their unique situation, trying to develop their economy while 
continuously coping with the North's threat. They also 
regarded the Carter Administration's open pressure on the 
human rights issue as a challenge to their legal system and 
interference in their domestic political affairs. 58 Even 
mild-mannered Deputy Prime Minister Nam Duck Woo, who was 
educated in the United States, defended his government's 
restrictions on opponents' activities. He told a correspondent 
of the Time that: 
There is not one developing country in the world 
where Western democracy really works. The government 
in a developing country must give guidance, 
direction,(and) stability. It is the only way to 
grow. If students are in the streets all the time, 
everybody~ nervous, business suffers. We cannot 
afford it. 
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In the meantime, Carter's removal of General Singlaub 
stunned the South Koreans because most of them understood that 
the general was a man who knew most about North Korea because 
of his position as senior UN command delegate at the Panmunjom 
peace talks. Singlaub's dire prediction that the pullout would 
1ead to war in Korean peninsula was splashed across the front 
pages of all Korean newspapers and received heavy TV and radio 
coverage for several days. 6° Former President Yoon told a 
reporter that General Singlaub "spoke for all of us." Park 
Joon Kyu, the Policy Committee Chairman of the ruling 
Democratic Republican party, ridiculed the general's 
dismissal. He said, "if punishment is necessary, why shouldn't 
Carter recall General Vessey, who is the Supreme U.S. 
Commander here? 1161 
Editors of Seoul daily newspapers wrote long articles 
about Singlaub's thirty year military career. They argued that 
the general spoke correctly and the White House did not have 
as good a sense of North Korean capabilities as the United 
States Command in South Korea. 62 An editor of the Seoul Daily 
Newspaper, who saw the Singlaub affair as a power struggle 
between Washington and the Seoul command, said, "it's Vessey' s 
6
~ WP, 21 May 1977; FEER 96 (10 June 1977): 12. 
6
~ Ibid. 
6
~ CSM, 31 May 1977. 
229 
white flag, isn't it?1163 
The Singlaub affair led to street demonstrations and 
rallies throughout Seoul. On 22 May more than 500 Christians, 
including many critics of President Park, met at Saemunan 
church in downtown Seoul in order to support Singlaub' s cause. 
They prayed for a reversal of Carter's decision on the 
pullout. Reverend Kim Jong Dae praised Singlaub for "pointing 
out a very grave flaw" in President Carter's policy. Reverend 
Kim Kwan Suk, Secretary General of the Korean National Council 
of Churches and a leading human rights campaigner, made a 
speech before the audience saying that "we tried to express 
our misgivings and uneasiness about the troop withdrawal ••• 
If it's possible, we would like to reverse the decision. 1164 He 
later met Under Secretary of State Habib and explained Korean 
church leaders' fears over the possible North communist's 
aggression after the withdrawal. At the meeting, he also asked 
for Carter's strong commitment to human rights in South 
Korea. 65 
At the same time, hundreds of other Christians, who 
carried banners and placards declaring "Absolute Opposition 
to the Withdrawal of U.S. Forces" or "The Withdrawal Would 
Threaten the Church," assembled at the residence of United 
6
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states Ambassador Richard L. Sneider to protest carter's 
pullout decision. 66 
Opposition to the withdrawal had created a rare consensus 
in south Korea, and even Habib's confirmation of America's 
continuing commitment to South Korea could not ease discontent 
there. A cartoonist of the Cho Sun Il Bo, a Seoul conservative 
daily newspaper, depicted the mood among the South Koreans in 
its front page cartoon. It showed a bewildered Korean holding 
carter's letter promising American commitment after the 
pullout while thousands of troops were seen going home. The 
Korean complained, "only this letter?1167 
Indicating the South Koreans' fear over the withdrawal, 
a senior Park aide told a New York Time reporter that "if we 
had our way, the United States would bring in an additional 
two di visions. 1168 A South Korean Air Force general claimed 
that two thousand aircraft would be needed to compensate for 
the withdrawal. 69 The local Korean papers also claimed that 
South Korea would need at least US$25 billion to finance a new 
five year army modernization plan in order to keep military 
balance with the North without the presence of American ground 
6
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67 
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troops in South Korea. 70 
The Korean Christian Ad-hoc Policy Committee, which was 
supported by about 400 ministers belonging to eighteen 
protestant denominations, placed a half page advertisement in 
the Washington Post appealing for the aid of American 
churchmen in changing Carter's policy. They emphasized in the 
declaration that all churches in North Korea were wiped out 
and many church workers and believers were killed by the 
communists. Moreover, they reminded Americans that many 
Christian believers were murdered brutally by Northern 
communists during the Korean War. The declaration stated that 
"because we know all too well the inhumanly brutal nature of 
the Communists, we do not regard the murder of the good 
citizens of Cambodia as simply some other person's business." 
The committee concluded its declaration by saying that they 
would continually oppose the withdrawal of U.S. troops from 
South Korea until permanent peace would be settled in the 
Korean peninsula "according to God's will. 1171 
In October, Reverend Kim Kwan Suk and sixteen other 
Korean church leaders, who were participating in a meeting of 
Korean and American church leaders in New York, tried to 
persuade their American counterparts William P. Thompson, 
President of the National Council of Churches (NCC), Claire 
7
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Randall, General Secretary of the NCC, and other American 
church leaders to oppose the planned withdrawal. But they were 
very disappointed to find that in reality many American 
ministers favored Carter's troop withdrawal policy and refused 
to support the Korean church leaders proposa1. 72 
Unlike other communities, the Korean business community, 
which had heavily relied on foreign capital and trade, was not 
affected seriously by the pullout policy. At the beginning of 
the Carter Administration, many businessmen expressed their 
concern over a possible cut in foreign loans and a future 
shrinkage of the Korean economy. With considerable anxiety a 
corporate lawyer told a Washington Post reporter: 
The retreat of American troops increases the risk 
of war... With the President and the Congress 
showing they don't want to help South Korea. We 
wonder if the Ame,:jcan banks will want to keep on 
lending us money. 
As time went on, however, there were few signs that 
foreign businessmen and bankers were shying away from doing 
business in Seoul. The world's conservative bankers had never 
abated their business in Seoul. The country's economy was the 
fastest growing in the world during the 1970s, averaging 
7
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nearly 11 per cent real growth per year. 74 
Some Korean big businessmen even expected that the 
pullout would require more business investment in the defense 
industry. Kim Woo Choong, President of Dae Woo Industrial 
company, who believed the withdrawal would actually expedite 
the development of the Korean defense industries, expected 
that foreigners would not cut their business because of the 
proposed pullout. Kim told a reporter from the Washington Post 
that foreign investors, whom he had met, did not express any 
worries. Kim said, "businessmen are very realistic. They're 
worried about return equity. Who is leaving? More are 
coming. 1175 
As Kim expected, American investors never cut their 
business in Seoul. Zoltan Merszei, President of Dow Chemical 
Company, who planned a US$250 million project in South Korea 
told a Wall Street Journal reporter that: 
There isn't even a wait-and-see attitude. People are 
looking to do things here. We feel that South Korea 
offers us the opportunity and the return on 
investment we're s~~ing. So we think Korea is a 
good place for Dow. 
74• WSJ, 30 August 1977. In 1976, South Korea's GNP jumped 
15.2 per cent to US$25 billion. According to a confidential 
report of the World Bank issued earlier 1977, South Korea had 
been transformed from "one of the poorest developing countries 
to a semi-industrialized nation." 
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Du Pont also planned to open a liaison office in Seoul 
in late August 1977. William Dizer, General Manager of its 
Tokyo office, told a reporter from the Wall Street Journal 
that: 
We've been thinking about this for several years. 
I don't think the troop withdrawal has even been a 
factor in our decision. We've been verr, much 
impressed with the progress in South Korea. 7 
At this point, South Korean business leaders did not have 
any difficulty in borrowing the necessary money from foreign 
investors. Kim Woun Gie, Governor of the Korean Development 
Bank, even complained with pleasure that foreigners were so 
eager to lend money to Korean borrowers that there was much 
more credit than could be used. 78 By the end of 1978, about 
1,500 American firms opened business in South Korea and its 
trade reached to US$7 billion and was rapidly growing. 79 
During the first year into the Carter Administration, 
there was still no sign of anti-Americanism in south Korea, 
despite strong objections to the pullout. Nick Thimmesh, a 
Chicago Tribune correspondent, depicted the mood of Seoul: 
The South Koreans cling to the U.S. to the point of 
dependency. There are more hurt than angry that Mr. 
Carter announced weakening of the relationship ••.• 
The gratitude South Koreans feel for the U.S. 
remains strong. There are no "Yankee, Go Home!" 
sings, no declarations from dissidents that the U.S. 
77• Ibid. 
7
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7
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is a fickle exploiter. 80 
Bernard Weinraub, a New York Times special reporter, also 
expressed a similar opinion. He said, 
Although American officials are worried about anti-
American sentiment, the South Koreans express more 
sorrow and puzzlement than anger and insist th<il 
the reasons for the pullout are incomprehensible. 
By the middle of 1978, however, relations had become 
strained. In April 1978 when State Department announced an 
American table tennis team's plan for attending an 
international tournament in Pyong Yang in the following year, 
rumors suddenly spread out Seoul that the Carter 
Administration was considering three-party talks - the United 
States and the two Koreas - an idea which was submitted by 
President Tito of Yugoslavia to President Carter, but rejected 
by Seoul. 82 The South Koreans, remembering what happened in 
South Vietnam after the Paris peace talks, were again worrying 
that the United States might abandon their country as she did 
in Vietnam after the peace talks in Paris. This event together 
with the humiliation of Koreagate and the Blue House bugging 
incident, 83 in which the CIA was alleged to have bugged the 
80 
. Nick Thimmesh, "U. s. Stay," CT, 5 September 1977, 
sec. 3. 
8
~ NYT, 7 August 1977. 
8
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8
~ American papers reported that the CIA activated 
electronic surveillance of the Blue House, the presidential 
residence in Seoul, since 1970. The reports said that the CIA 
Placed a listening device inside the Blue House and got 
information about the illegal lobbying affairs. The State 
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south Korean presidential residence, produced anti-Americanism 
in south Korea. William Chapman, Special correspondent of the 
~ashington Post in Seoul, reported this mood in Seoul: 
The current jitters follow a series of events that 
have combined to provoke rare signs of anti-
Americanism in South Korea. It began with the troop 
withdrawal announcement, continued through the 
humiliating Tongsun Park affair, and came to a head 
in the reaction to the alleged bugging of President 
Park Chung Hee's official mansion, the Blue House:s-4 
In May 1978, Dr. Brzezinski visited Seoul on the way to 
his home from China in order to calm the South Koreans' loud 
protests over the pullout plan. In Seoul, he tried to assure 
Koreans that they did not have to worry excessively about a 
possible North attack after the pullout by pointing out to 
them the fact that South Korea's US$40 billion economy was 
four times larger than that of the North and its population 
was twice the North's. Of course, South Koreans were not 
pleased to hear his explanation of rationale of the pullout. 
Park Cheong Hoon, Chairman of the Korean Trade Association, 
told a reporter from the New York Times that: 
Once you withdraw forces completely, North Korea 
will be tempted to attack. Brzezinski is not a 
better judge than our generals facing the North ••• 
They have all the intelli%~ce reports on the North 
Korean military build up. 
The South Koreans who feared another war in the peninsula 
Department officially denied it. But it aggravated anti-
Americanism in South Korea. NYT, 19 June 1977. 
8
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8
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strongly objected to Carter's pullout policy even before 
carter took the oval office. As the process went on, however, 
the Koreans realized that they could not change Carter's 
policy and tried to prepare themselves for self defense. They 
gave unanimous support to their government's campaign for a 
self sufficient military capability by approving a 40 percent 
increase in the defense budget. 86 It strengthened President 
Park's political position and gave momentum to expedite the 
development of South Korean defense industries, which were 
started in the early 1970s when President Nixon removed 20,000 
American troops from South Korea. 
The South Korean Government reconsidered a covert nuclear 
weapons program and doubled the number of planned nuclear 
power plants in order to influence Carter's new Korean policy. 
At the same time, the government began cautiously to change 
its traditional security reliance on the United States, and 
tried to reach accommodation with communist countries, 
including North Korea by exploring trade and cultural and 
sports exchanges. This campaign was partly successful, and 
Seoul was able to invite the Eastern block as well as the West 
to the Seoul Olympics in 1988. 
Meanwhile, President Carter's unilateral announcement of 
the withdrawals served to plant anti-American sentiment in the 
Korean public mind. Before the withdrawal policy anti-
8
~ LAT, 1 September 1979. 
238 
.Americanism had been almost nonexistent in South Korea since 
the end of the Korean War. This was aggravated by the 
humiliation of Koreagate, the Blue House bugging affair, and 
the Kwangju crisis of May 1980.87 
87
. Jae Hoon Shin, "Gunfire Ends the Insurrection," FEER 
108 (30 May 1980): 9-10. In the Kwangju incident, the South 
Korean Government calmed an insurrection by force. casualties 
numbered anywhere between 200 and 300. Radical Korean college 
students have claimed that the United States, which had an 
operational responsibility for the Korean Army, allowed them 
to crush this peaceful demonstration for democracy by force. 
They also maintained that casualties numbered about 2,000. 
CHAPTER XVIII 
CARTER'S TRIP TO KOREA AND SUSPENSION OP THE PULLOUT 
While Seoul officials were approving Park Tong Sun's 
return to Washington for Congressional testimony, they 
carefully floated an idea of a summit meeting between 
President Carter and President Park in order to discuss 
problems of the proposed withdrawal plan. But President 
Carter, who earlier rejected Seoul's request that Vice 
President Mondale visit Seoul on the way home from Tokyo at 
the beginning of his term, ignored the idea. 1 
In July 1978, however, President Carter expressed 
interest in a possible meeting for the first time in a news 
conference, saying that he had no plans to invite President 
Park to the United States but had no objection to meeting 
him. 2 At the end of 1978, partly because the Korean lobbying 
scandal was almost over and partly because congressional 
1
. NYT, 8 January 1978. 
2• PPP 2 (20 July 1978): 1330. 
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objection to the withdrawal had calmed down after passage of 
the Korean military aid package, the President considered 
visiting Seoul and using the proposed weapons transfer as 
1everage to improve human rights in South Korea. Carter 
informed the Koreans that he intended to visit Seoul after the 
. 't 3 Tokyo economic summ1. 
As soon as Carter's plan to visit Seoul was announced, 
three leading Korean opposition leaders, a former President, 
Yun Po sun, a religious leader, Ham Suk Heon, and a former 
President candidate, Kim Dae Jung, sent a letter to Carter 
asking him to help with freeing about 400 political prisoners 
and repealing emergency decrees that blocked Korean political 
freedoms since 1972.4 But, after realizing that their request 
was not officially recognized by the White House, the 
opposition began to criticize President Carter while opposing 
his trip to Seoul. 5 
Meanwhile, one month before Carter's official visit to 
Seoul, the South Korean Government abruptly freed sixteen 
opposition figures to improve the political climate. 6 At the 
same time, however, the Seoul Government began to prevent 
leading opponents from participating in any dissident meeting 
3 WP, 8 November 1978. . 
4 NYT, 27 May 1979. . 
5 Ibid., 14 June 1979 • . 
6 Ibid., 27 May 1979. . 
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designed to stop carter from coming to south Korea. 7 The 
Education Ministry ordered university authorities to shorten 
the spring term in order to bar students' demonstrations 
during carter's stay in Seoul. Kim Young Sam, new head of the 
leading opposition New Democratic party, strongly criticized 
the government's over-reaction. He remarked that "the 
government is going crazy. 118 
As Carter's visit came nearer, there was a wave of 
repression including house arrests. Kim Dae Jung who was freed 
in December 1978, but then was put under house arrest, said 
that "we are suffering from so-called Carter shock. We 
expected the human rights situation to improve at least before 
President Carter's visit, but just the opposite has 
happened. 119 
Meanwhile, on June 20, Carter told a Japanese reporter 
that he would meet not only President Park but also opposition 
party leaders as well as religious leaders and others to 
discuss ways of improving human rights in South Korea. At the 
same time, the President, admitted that a new CIA report 
confirmed that North Korea had a stronger military capability 
than previously estimated. He also told reporters that he 
would discuss that matter with President Park and his local 
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commanders in south Korea before he made any further decision 
concerning the pullout. 10 
Carter reaffirmed that he had made no decision on the 
pullout issue yet in his letter to Whan Hyon So, the president 
of the Oriental Press in Korea. Carter said, "I want to take 
look at the situation, talk to President Park, and consult 
with Congress" before he made up his mind. The president 
added, "whatever decision is made, one thing is clear: Our 
commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea is 
unshakable. 1111 
On 29 July, unlike previous Presidents, Carter arrived 
in Seoul at night12 and spent the first night with American 
soldiers at Camp Casey, the headquarters of the Second 
Division, north of Seoul and twelve miles south of the DMZ. 
He did this in order to show the South Koreans his desire to 
keep a certain distance from President Park.13 In a brief 
speech at Camp Casey after jogging with American soldiers for 
three miles, the President hinted that he would press 
l~ PPP 2 (20 June 1979): 1111; WCPD 15 (23 June 1979): 
1148. 
l~ PPP 2 (23 June 1979): 1153; WCPD 15 (2 July 1979): 
1153. 
1
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met Park Chung Hee at Kimpo on the evening of 29 June. And 
then, he went to Camp Casey where he stayed overnight at the 
residence of General Robert C. Kingston, Commanding General 
of the Second Division. 
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president Park to improve human rights conditions in South 
I(orea by emphasizing the fact that 50,000 young Americans lost 
their lives for "equality, justice, freedom, and the 
preservation of basic human rights" for the South Koreans 
during the Korean War. 14 
The next day, Carter attended at a welcoming ceremony at 
Yoido Plaza. The President was warmly greeted by about soo,ooo 
citizens who lined a four-mile route through downtown Seoul. 
President Carter, who encountered only massive police security 
in Tokyo a few days before, was very impressed by the big 
welcoming crowd. Near the Seoul City Hall, he abruptly got out 
of his open roof limousine to shake hands with people in the 
crowd. 15 
At the first meeting at the Blue House after having 
completed the exciting thirty-minute motorcade in downtown 
Seoul, President Park directly challenged Carter's withdrawal 
policy, hoping that the President would formally announce the 
suspension of his plan. Carter, who had already been pressed 
14: NYT, 30 June 1979; WP, 30 June 1979; LAT, 30 June 
1979; PPP 2 (30 June 1979): 1201-2; WCPD 15 (9 July 1979): 
1201. 
1
~ LAT, 30 June 1979. A month later, on 31 July, at a 
town meeting at Bardstown, Kentucky, Carter told American 
citizens how much he was impressed, saying that "I just came 
from South Korea just 2 or 3 weeks ago, I have never had such 
an outpouring of a welcome in my life. There were literally 
millions of people on the street expressing their thanks to 
America for guaranteeing the independence and freedom of the 
people of South Korea." PPP 2 (31 July 1979): 1349; WCPD 15 
(6 August 1979): 1349. 
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by domestic and foreign leaders about the pullout issue, did 
not want it raised again by President Park. Secretary Vance 
described the situation later in his book, Hard Choices: 
When he reached Seoul, he found to his intense 
annoyance that President Park intended to raise the 
issue with him directly. He asked us to prevent this 
from happening, since he already knew Park's views. 
However, despite our warnings, Park began the first 
meeting between the two men with a forty five minute 
statement on the dangers that the troop withdrawal 
policy created for his country and the region. We 
could almost feel the temperature in the room drop 
as Park continued, through an interpreter, his 
assault on the policy. Sitting between the President 
and Harold Brown, I could feel the contained anger 
of the President, but there was not~ing to be done 
but let the drama play itself out. 
Carter ignored Park's presentation on the pullout issue. 
Instead, he took up mainly the issue of human rights 
violations under the Park regime. 17 The President pointed 
out that Park's violations of human rights were undercutting 
American public support for the United States security 
commitment to South Korea. 18 President Park tried to defend 
his strong rule by arguing that some restrictions on human 
rights was inevitable in his country in order to defend the 
nation against an aggressive North Korea as well as to 
expedite economic development. 19 
16 
. Vance, Choices, 129. 
17 
• Ibid., 130. 
1
~ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of 
the National Security Adviser. 1977 -1981 (New York: Farrar, 
Straus, Giroux, 1983), 128. 
1
~ NYT, 30 June 1979; LAT, 30 June 1979. 
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That afternoon, Secretary Cyrus Vance, Ambassador William 
H. Gleysteen, and Assistant Secretary Richard c. Holbrooke 
gave a firm warning to President Park through his aides that 
if he wanted to avoid a personal rupture with Carter, Park 
should not press him about the pullout policy. They also made 
it clear that the policy would be decided not in Seoul but in 
Washington after consul tat ions with Congressional leaders. The 
message got through, and the state dinner was successful.20 
At the state dinner toast, President Park did not mention 
the troop withdrawal and only criticized North Korea's 
military buildup. He could not help noting, however, that "the 
clouds of war still hang over the Korean peninsula." He also 
expressed thanks for American cooperation in the development 
of his country and expressed his hope that Carter's state 
visit to South Korea would consolidate friendship between two 
countries.21 
In his response to Park's statement, Carter emphasized 
that "the United states has been, is, and will remain a 
Pacific nation and a Pacific power." He also reaffirmed that 
the United States commitment to South Korea's security would 
be "strong, unshakable, and enduring." The President, praised 
South Korea's economic accomplishments, said that South Korea 
proved the fact that "a free economy is the clearest road to 
2
~ Vance, Choices, 130. 
2
~ PPP 2 (30 June 1979): 1202-4: WCPD 15 (9 July 1979): 
1202-4. 
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shared prosperity and a better life for all." And then told 
the Koreans that improvement of human rights should keep pace 
with the country's dramatic economic progress. He said, 
There is abundant evidence in Korea of the dramatic 
economic progress a capable and energetic people can 
achieve by working together. I believe that this 
achievement can be matched by similar progress 
through the realization of basJ~ human aspirations 
in political and human rights. 
On Sunday morning, Carter met twelve Korean church 
leaders, including Kim Kwan Suk, President of the National 
council of Christian Churches of Korea and a leading anti-Park 
campaigner, at the residence of United States Ambassador 
William Gleysteen.23 At the evening reception, carter had a 
twenty-three-minute talk with Kim Young Sam, Chairman of 
Korea's New Democratic Party. They discussed issues of human 
rights and political freedom. Carter did not, however, meet 
Kim Dae Jung, Seoul's most prominent dissident, who was forced 
to stay at home. 24 Meanwhile, Secretary Vance handed in a list 
of over 100 names of political prisoners to Foreign Minister 
Park Dong Jin calling for an investigation and their 
release. 25 
22 PPP 2 (30 June 1979): 1205; WCPD 15 (9 July 1979): . 
1205. 
23 WP, 1 July 1979; ~, 2 July 1979, sec . 2. . 
24 NYT, 2 July 1979 and 3 July 1979 • . 
2
~ NYT, 2 July 1979; LAT, 2 July 1979. It was the first 
time that the United States submitted a list of political 
prisoners to South Korea or any ally asking that they be 
freed. 
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During the forty-three-hour visit, Carter officially 
reaffirmed that his withdrawal policy remained unchanged, but 
he privately told President Park that he was studying a delay 
of the pullout of 19,000 of the 31,000 ground troops, and also 
hinted that his administration was seriously considering the 
total suspension of the program.26 
In the joint communique issued at the conclusion of 
meetings with President Park on 1 July 1979, Carter left open 
the possibility of a further pullout of the troops from South 
Korea. However, he reaffirmed that the United States would 
keep the Mutual Defense Treaty with Seoul and protect the 
Koreans under United States• nuclear umbrella. In the 
communique, Carter and Park proposed a three-way parley to Kim 
Il Sung in order to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula. 
At the same time, the Presidents ordered Secretary of State 
Vance and Foreign Minister Park to get in touch with the 
Foreign Minister of North Korea "in an appropriate manner. 1127 
Two weeks later, on 17 July, the South Korean Government 
announced the release of eighty-six political prisoners, the 
largest release of dissidents since 1975, in accordance with 
Carter's recommendation during his visit to seou1. 28 
2
~ WP, 2 July 1979; CT, 1 July 1979; LAT, 1 July 1979. 
2
~ PPP 2 (30 June 1979): 1208; WCPD 15 (9 July 1979): 
1205; ~, 3 July 1979; LAT, 15 July 1979. Three days later, 
on July 3, North Korea rejected the proposed three way talks 
claiming that the reunification was a domestic issue. 
2
~ NYT, 18 July 1979; ~, 17 July 1979. 
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Three days later, on 20 July 1979, after having completed 
withdrawal of only 3,670 troops including one 674-man combat 
unit, 29 Carter formally announced that he would suspend the 
Korean pullout plan based on new intelligence assessments of 
North Korea's military strength and other factors, such as the 
steadily growing Soviet military power in East Asia. In his 
statement, read by Security Advisor Brzezinski, the President 
declared that withdrawal of the Second Infantry Di vision "will 
remain in abeyance." Carter also revealed in his statement 
that he would not discuss the issue for the rest of his term 
by saying that "the timing and pace of withdrawals beyond 
these will be reexamined in 1981. 1130 
As soon as Carter announced his decision to suspend the 
proposed withdrawal plan, the Los Angeles Times, the most 
ardent defender of Carter's pullout policy, declared its full 
support for the decision by claiming in its editorial of 25 
July that "it is the right decision. 1131 
There is no evidence that Carter's trip to Seoul affected 
the Korean withdrawal policy. Carter already had made up his 
mind to suspend the pullout before he reached to Korea. His 
official visit to Korea was designed to provide a face-saving 
setting for the suspension of the withdrawal policy. At the 
29 
• CT, 21 July 1979. 
3
~ PPP 2 (20 July 1979): 1275-6; WCPD 15 (23 July 1979): 
1275-6; DSB 79 (September 1979): 37. 
3
~ Editorial, LAT, 25 July 1979. 
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same time, Carter believed that he could use the possibility 
of suspension as leverage to improve human rights in South 
Korea. Therefore, Carter outrightly gave Park a list of 
political prisoners he wanted released. It was an 
unprecedented diplomatic action by the United States. Carter's 
message got through and Park released political prisoners in 
accordance with Carter's request. Overall, Carter's trip to 
Seoul was successful. He announced the suspension of the 
pullout policy under relatively favorable circumstances. 
CHAPTER XIX 
JAPANESE REACTIOHS 
The Korean peninsula has been regarded as "a dagger 
pointed at the heart of Japan" because the two countries are 
located less than one-hundred miles apart with strong 
geopolitical and psychological ties. 1 Therefore, the Japanese 
have historically been sensitive to the implications for their 
nation's security of the situation in the Korean peninsula. 
The 1977 edition of Japanese Foreign Policy. an annual 
Japanese government publication, stated that "the Korean 
Peninsula is a very important region whose peace and security 
is vital to Japan's own security. 112 Moreover, close economic 
ties with South Korea established during the 1970s made the 
Japanese especially nervous about President Carter's intention 
1
. WP, 28 December 1976. 
2
. Yashuhisa Nakada, "The Korean Peninsula and Japan's 
Security, the Resurgence of Japanese Politico - Military Roles 
in the 1980s." WHCFSF. General CO 82-2. CO 78, In his 
article, Nakada recommended that U.S. ground troops continue 
to stay in South Korea. This article was sent to Brzezinski 
on 12 May 1977 by William R. Kintner, President of Foreign 
Policy Research Institute in Pennsylvania. 
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to withdraw the Second Division. In 1976 Japan enjoyed a 
US$900 million favorable balance of trade out of total US$3.8 
billion bilateral trade with South Korea. They had invested 
US$2. 8 billion in South Korea, which was Japan's largest 
market in Asia and was second only to the United States as a 
destination for Japanese exports. 3 
Because the Japanese benefited greatly from the status-
quo in the Korean peninsula, they did not want the situation 
destabilized by the withdrawal of United States ground troops. 
Therefore, immediately after Carter's November election 
victory, Japanese officials expressed deep concern over 
Carter's proposed withdrawal policy. They emphasized that the 
pullout might not only destabilize the Korean peninsula but 
also threaten the security of Japan. 4 Japanese Vice Defense 
Minister Takashi Maruyama, who voiced outspoken opposition to 
the pullout plan, claimed that even when South Korea became 
strong enough to defend the country themselves, the presence 
of U.S. ground troops would be "an absolutely essential 
prerequisite for retaining stability" on the Korean 
peninsula. 5 Foreign Minister Iichiro Hatoyama, reminded the 
United states that its withdrawal in 1948 caused the Korean 
War, said, "If you look at history, it is a fact that war 
3• WP, 13 November 1976 and 17 February 1977. 
4
. Ibid., 13 November 1976. 
5
. Ibid. 
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occurred once in Korea because of withdrawal of U.S. troops 
there. Hence, our anxieties. 116 
At the beginning of December 1976, the Tokyo Government 
urged the President-elect not to make any sudden withdrawal 
decision. Prime Minister Takeo Miki said, "it is conventional 
Japanese thinking that drastic changes in the military balance 
in the Korean Peninsula are unfavorable to peace and security 
there. 117 However, in the middle of January 1977, Foreign 
Ministry officials, who agreed with Defense Ministry officials 
that any drastic change of the United States• Korean policy 
would threaten Asian political stability, began to say they 
were not in a position to oppose Carter's new Korean policy. 
They said, "what we want is some kind of U.S. guarantee for 
stability there. 118 
At the meeting with Vice President Mondale, Japanese 
leaders expressed their opinion that "the withdrawals would 
be a serious mistake. 119 They emphasized that any sudden, 
drastic troop withdrawal could create a military imbalance in 
Korea and it would not only threaten the security of South 
Korea but also endanger Japan's security. However, Japanese 
officials, who understood President Carter would not rescind 
6 LAT, 1 February 1977. . 
7 NYT, 2 December 1976. . 
8 Ibid., 16 January 1977 • . 
9 Vance, Choices, 128 . . 
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his pullout plan, tried to lengthen the United States pullout 
schedule. Japanese officials told Mondale that they were not 
in a position to oppose an American plan itself, but it should 
be done "slowly, gradually and after consultation with Japan 
and the South Korean Government. nlO Even after the meeting, 
Japanese officials publicly expressed their hope for the 
mitigation of the plan by declaring that they understood the 
pullout of all troops from South Korea would be taken over 
"many, many years. 1111 
However, Japanese officials made it clear at a meeting 
with the vice president that they did not want to discuss with 
the United States delegates the specific timetable and number 
of soldiers to be withdrawn, partly because they could not 
alter American policy and partly because they knew the South 
Koreans were very sensitive to outsiders•s interference in 
their security problem. 12 Foreign Minister Iichiro Hayotama 
said, "the rate at which the 42,000 U.S. troops are brought 
home is essentially a matter for Washington and Seoul to 
negotiate. 1113 Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, emphasizing the 
larger issue of the United States role in regional stability, 
also said, "any withdrawal is a matter for the United States 
10 WP, 2 February 1977. . 
11 NYT, 4 February 1977. . 
12 Ibid • . 
13 WP, 1 February 1977. . 
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and South Korea and not a subject in which Japan can 
interfere. 1114 Immediately after the meeting with Mondale, the 
Prime Minister sent a warning letter to other government 
agencies that "noisy opposition to the withdrawal would be 
unwise. 1115 
The official Japanese policy of being noncommittal to the 
pullout was clearly displayed when Fukuda rejected President 
carter's proposal for a broadened Japanese political role in 
international affairs. At the Washington Summit Conference 
Fukuda expressed his grave doubts about the withdrawals. He 
said it would upset the military balance and consequently 
threaten peace and stability in Northeastern Asia. Fukuda also 
made it clear that Japan would not take any role in the 
security of South Korea. 16 Japanese policy regarding the 
pullout had remained noncommittal. When Defense Secretary 
Brown explained to them the results of the consultations with 
Seoul officials in July 1977, Foreign Minister Hatoyama told 
Brown that "we don't have any disagreement at a11. 1117 
While Japanese officials were noncommittal officially, 
many of them privately expressed their worries about the 
pullout to the news media. Even Prime Minister Fukuda himself 
1
~ LAT, 17 February 1977. 
15 
. WP, 8 July 1977. 
1
~ NYT, 22 March 1977. 
l~ WP, 28 July 1977. 
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expressed his doubt about Carter's plan of strengthening South 
Korean Army and United States Air Force in South Korea in 
order to keep stability in the Korean peninsula. He said, 
"that's what I think Carter has in mind. 1118 One Foreign 
Ministry official told a correspondent of the U. s. News & 
world Report that: 
We'll continue to explain to the u.s our own 
opinions and concerns as well as the concerns of 
other Asian countries. So if it is true that the 
U.S. is revising its Asian policy, Japan's view and 
the view~9 of Asia will be understood and 
reflected. 
Ambassador Fumihiko Togo, who served as Deputy Foreign 
Minister before he came to Washington, addressed the annual 
meeting of the Mid-Atlantic Regional Organization of Asian 
Studies at Princeton University. He said that the troop 
withdrawal should be reconsidered so as not to upset the 
balance of power in the Korean peninsula, emphasizing the 
United States' role in keeping peace and stability in the Far 
East. 20 
Many Japanese Defense Ministry officials also expressed 
their suspicions about the United States' promise that it 
could keep peace and stability on the Korean peninsula after 
1
~ LAT, 28 March 1977. 
1
~ USNWR 83 (18 July 1977): 54. The reporter asked one 
Western Japanese expert that "What role do the Japanese want 
the U.S. to play in Asia?" The expert answered, "exactly what 
it is doing now, no more and no less." 
2
~ NYT, 31 October 1977. 
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the pullout without securing assurance from Moscow or Pyong 
Yang. Moreover, they believed that the rationale for the 
pullout offered by the United States was "inadequate" 
considering the fact that the Soviets had steadily increased 
their air and naval strength in the Far East while American 
naval and air forces in the Pacific declined. 21 
Many Japanese security experts regarded the Soviet Union 
as a potential major enemy and doubted America's will to keep 
the balance of power in the Far East. They opposed the pullout 
by warning that the Soviet navy would dominate Japan's air and 
sea routes if the United States undertook further troop 
withdraws in Asia. 22 They were concerned over Russian 
expansion into South Korea after the U.S. pullout. They argued 
that such a move would not only increase a threat to Japan's 
security but also disturb its oil supply line from the Middle 
East. 23 
President Carter's pullout policy combined with the rapid 
Soviet military build up in the Far East produced a major 
defense debate in Japan. This received the greatest attention 
in the news media after a Soviet Mig-25 landed in Japan on 6 
21 
• Ibid., 1 August 1977. 
2
~ WP, 28 July 1977. 
2
~ NYT, 12 February 1978. 
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September 1976.24 An editorial in the Mainichi Shinbun of 16 
January 1978 pointed out that President Carter's decision to 
withdraw the troops from South Korea was part of America's 
long term policy of "separation from Asia. 1125 
Two days later, the Nihon Keizai reported a similar view 
that the United States was beginning to separate from Asia 
while the Soviet Union was building up its military power in 
the Far East. The paper also reported a Japanese defense 
official saying that "today Korea and tomorrow Japan ••. the 
United States' separation from Asia is real. 1126 
The Asahi Shinbun, the world's largest newspaper with 
twelve million circulation, on 25 February 1978 pointed out 
that the United States commitment to Japan had weakened. An 
editorial stated: 
The U.S., while showing concern over the Soviet 
naval build up in the Far East, is still moving to 
diminish its presence in Asia ••• As a result, the 
Japanese commitment .~7 is apparently becoming less important to America. 
2
~ Oida Kejo, "The Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Troops from 
South Korea and Our National Security" (in Japanese), KoKubo 
27 (January 1978): 9; NYT, 22 March 1977. On 6 September 1976 
a Soviet Mig-25 was landed at a Japanese civilian airport by 
a defecting Soviet pilot. It was undetected by Japanese radar. 
That event greatly dismayed Japanese leaders because it proved 
the weakness of the Japanese defense system. It fueled the 
defense debates in the news media at that time. 
2
~ Bernard K. Gordon, "Loose Cannon on a Rolling Deck: 
Japan's Changing Security Policy," Orbis 22 (winter 1979): 
975, cit., Mainichi Shinbun, 16 January 1978. 
26 , 
. Ibid., 969, 975, cit., Nihon Keizai, 18 January 1978. 
27 
• Ibid., 975, cit., Asahi Shinbun, 25 February 1978. 
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on 30 March the paper warned the Japanese that Japan faced 
the most difficult challenge to its security since the Second 
world War. 28 
The Tokyo Shinbun speculated on a possible Soviet naval 
invasion of the northern island of Hokkaido. At the same time, 
the Yomiuri Shinbun claimed that the Japanese could no longer 
trust America's will to defend Japan. The newspaper alleged 
that the United States was planning to move its Pacific 
seventh Fleet to the Atlantic in the event of confrontation 
in Europe. 29 Pointing out the fact that American predominance 
in the Pacific was ending because of growing Russian naval 
power in the Far East, the Yomiuri Shinbun urged the Japanese 
Government to rethink its traditional security ties with the 
United States. 30 The Sankei Shinbun also pressed Japanese 
political leaders to reconsider their defense policy, pointing 
out that the Soviet Union had quickly increased its military 
power in Asia. 31 
Most Japanese defense officials agreed with the news 
media's viewpoints. Shin Kanemaru, Director General of Japan's 
Defense Agency, expressed his concern over Russia's strong 
military buildup. He said, "Russian warships and other vessels 
28 
• Ibid., 968, cit., Asahi Shinbun, 30 March 1978. 
2
~ NYT, 14 May 1978. 
3
~ Gordon, "Loose Cannon," 973, cit., Yomiuri Shinbun, 
4 February 1978. 
3
~ Ibid., 970, cit., Sankei Shinbun, 10 February 1978. 
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make such frequent appearances in the Sea of Japan these days 
that we might as well refer to those waters as the Sea of 
Russia. 1132 In comparing the military power of Japan with that 
of the Soviet Union, Kanemaru, pointing out that Russia 
deployed 2,000 aircraft in the Far East while Japan possessed 
only 400 aircraft, said that Japan had nothing more than 
"bamboo spears against machine guns. 1133 
The annual Japanese defense "White Paper" of 1978, unlike 
the previous papers, regarded the Soviet Union as Japan's 
principal potential enemy. The paper stated that "given this 
increase in Soviet forces in the area, the United States 
seventh Fleet did not have the strength to fully protect 
Japan's vital sea lanes. 1134 Mr. Atsuyuki Sassa, a defense 
adviser at Japan's Defense Agency and a chief of the study 
group which helped produce the White Paper, expressed his 
concern about the strength of Soviet power in the Far East. 
He told a correspondent of the New York Times that "even if 
they did not use nuclear weapons, their forces are strong 
enough to destroy us, especially hitting our sea lanes. 1135 
Many other Japanese experts also urged the Fukuda 
Administration to set up a more independent defense posture. 
32 NYT, 14 May 1978. . 
33 Ibid • . 
34 Ibid., 29 July 1978 • . 
35 Ibid • . 
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Tadae Takubo, Editor of the Foreign News Department of the 
Shigitsushin, argued in an article in the Chuo Koron that 
carter's pullout policy was an extension of the Nixon 
Doctrine, which had aimed to press Japan to bear more defense 
responsibility commensurate with its economic power. He 
maintained that the Japanese Government had to make use of 
that opportunity to build up a self-reliant defense capability 
as well as to reach accommodation with the Communist great 
powers.36 
In his article, "The Withdrawal of U. s. Troops from South 
Korea and Its Problem" published in Sandai Hogaku, Hitegiro 
Kodani agreed with Takubo that the real goal of the policy was 
to urge Japan to spend more on its own defense. He pointed out 
that the credibility of American security promises had sharply 
declined among the Japanese after the Vietnam War. He 
maintained that Japan had to break away from its traditional 
security reliance on the United States and establish an 
independent defense capability. Moreover, he claimed, for its 
security Japan should ultimately assume the American defense 
role in South Korea. 37 
3
~ Tadeo Takubo, "The Real Meaning of the Withdrawal of 
U.S. Troops from South Korea" (in Japanese), Chuo Koron 92 
(March 1977): 246-8. 
3 7• Hi tegiro Kodani, "The Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from 
South Korea and Its Problem" (in Japanese), Sandai Hogaku 11 
(December 1977): 330-2. 
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Oida Kejo also emphasized the importance of the Korean 
Peninsula to Japan's security in an article in the Kokugo 
(National Defense). He wrote, "the withdrawal is not only a 
Korean problem, but also is ours." Kej o claimed that the U.S. -
Japanese Security Treaty should be reconsidered and Japan had 
to strengthen the Self-Defense Force (SDF,) especially by 
considerable expansion of naval and air forces. Thus, they 
could cope with any threats from the western coast as well as 
from the northern border. 38 
In an article published in the Jiyu, Takashi Den, a 
political commentator, was concerned about the potential 
Japanese economic losses due to the proposed withdrawal. In 
order to protect that profitable market, he maintained, Japan 
had to continue its investments boldly in South Korea even 
after the pullout in order to prevent North Korea's military 
attack on the South. 39 
News media debates and discussions over the national 
security greatly influenced public opinion. A Yomiuri Shinbun 
nationwide poll in April 1978 showed only 21 percent of 
Japanese believed that the United States would keep the joint 
security treaty in the event of war while 38 percent doubted 
3
~ Oida Kejo, "The Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from South 
Korea and our National Security" (in Japanese), Kokubo 27 
(January 1978): 22-4. 
3
~ Takashi Den, "Significance of U.S. Troops in Korea 
and Important Choices of the Concerned Countries" (in 
Japanese), Jiyu 19 (March 1977): 23-4. 
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the United States•s will to honor the treaty.40 The debate 
sparked a new campaign to heighten awareness of the national 
defense issue. It consequently led the Japanese to reconsider 
building up the Self-Defense Force, which had been regarded 
as "taboo." An Asahi Shinbun nationwide poll at the beginning 
of 1978 showed that 77 percent of the Japanese supported the 
existence of the SDF, and many of them urged the Japanese 
Government to strengthen the SDF. 41 The Defense Agency's own 
poll in the same period showed the highest record of 83 
percent approval of the SDF since the end of World War II. 42 
Partly because of the encouraging results of these polls 
and partly influenced by Carter's pullout policy, Prime 
Minister Takeo Fukuda brought up the defense issue in his 1978 
Administration Policy Speech at the opening session of the new 
Diet. 43 In the debate about the defense issue, surprisingly, 
the opposition Komeito (Clean Government Party) , generally 
considered pacifist, changed its traditional attitude and 
declared its support of the SDF. 44 The Japanese Government 
4
~ NYT, 14 May 1978. 
4
~ Gordon, "Loose Cannon," Orbis 22 (Winter 1979): 972. 
42
. Ibid. 
43
. NYT, 14 May 1978. This was the same time as the 
President's state of the union address in the United States. 
Mentioning the defense issue in Administration policy speeches 
was very rare because supporting the SDF in the Parliament was 
a "taboo" in Japan. 
4
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increased its defense budget by 12.4 percent, amounting to 
US$8.76 billion, without facing any severe objections, and 
allocated US$2 billion to buy new aircraft, ships, and 
sophisticated weapons. 45 At the same time, Japan's National 
Defense Council decided to buy 100 F-15 fighters and 43 P-3C 
anti-submarine patrol planes, at the cost of US$4.5 billion, 
from the United States over eight to eleven years. This was 
the biggest aircraft order Japan had ever made. 46 
Meanwhile, voices for reconsidering Japan's traditional 
reliance on the United States for its security became louder. 
The Japanese Government tried cautiously to reach 
accommodation with Communist countries such as China and North 
Korea. 47 In attempting to have a dual diplomatic relations 
with the two Koreas, the Japanese Government, while officially 
supporting Seoul, sent a delegation led by Congressman Chuju 
Kuno, who was a member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, 
to Pyong Yang. They instructed the delegates to issue a joint 
communique to back up the North Korean position that all 
foreign troops and nuclear weapons in South Korea should be 
removed. 48 
4
~ Ibid., 12 February 1978. 
4
~ Ibid., 29 December 1977. According to Gordon, Japan 
chose the F-15 because of its "look down" radar and its 
defense superiority against invading aircraft. 
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In order to improve relations with China, the Japanese 
Government approved the Japan-China Long Term Trade Agreement 
for eight years in February 1978. Moreover, Tokyo planned to 
provide a huge low interest loan program to China to expedite 
economic cooperation by solving China's foreign currency 
needs. But being faced with the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development's (OECD) regulation that the 
lowest interest limit on such loans was from 7. 25 to 7. 5 
percent, the Japanese Government unprecedentedly decided 
directly to deposit more than US$1 billion in cash in the Bank 
of China in Peking at a 6 percent interest rate. In October 
1978 Japan moved closer to China by inviting Chinese Vice 
Premier Deng Xiaoping to Tokyo and by signing the Peace and 
Friendship Treaty with China. 49 
As a result of Carter's withdrawal policy, the Japanese 
realized that they could not rely on the United States for 
their national security. It led the Japanese to understand 
the importance of their Self-Defense Force which had been 
ignored by the Japanese public. As a result, Tokyo could build 
up the Self Defense Force without any public opposition. At 
the same time, the Japanese Government also began cautiously 
to accommodate the communist super powers, especially China. 
They signed Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peaceful Understanding 
prior to the normalization of Sino-American relations. At the 
4
~ CSM, 14 December 1978. 
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same time, the Japanese concretized dual diplomatic relations 
with North and South Korea to enhance their security and 
economic interests. 
CHAPTER :X:X 
CONCLUSION 
President Carter's Korean withdrawal policy was one of 
the most controversial foreign policy issues during his entire 
Administration. Dr. Nam Joo Hong claimed in his book, 
America's Commitment To South Korea, that Carter's pullout 
policy was Nixon's legacy. It is true that the withdrawal 
policy was partly a continuation of the so-called Nixon 
Doctrine that the United states would no longer take a front 
line security role for the defense of Asian allies. However, 
Carter proceeded with the policy based on his own initiative 
and for his own purposes rather than as an extension of the 
Nixon Doctrine. Carter introduced this idea when he was an 
almost unknown presidential candidate fighting for national 
recognition. Carter read American public opinion as disgusted 
by negative images of South Korea, as well as opposed to 
further American involvement in any Asian conflict because of 
the aftermath of the Vietnam War. He successfully made the 
Korean withdrawal a major campaign issue in differentiating 
himself from other presidential candidates. 
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Carter's withdrawal policy contained several weak points 
from the start. First, he did not seek out the opinions of 
military experts before making his campaign promise. Second, 
the campaign pledge became a major United States foreign 
policy without serious consultation with military experts, 
Congress, and leaders of the concerned countries. Third, he 
boxed himself into a corner on the issue when he prematurely 
announced the policy. His administration had not sufficiently 
studied all possible options and ramifications. 
From the beginning of the Carter Administration, there 
was discontent with the policy within the government, and it 
faced some opposition from Congress. However, voices of 
opposition to the policy were not strong enough to attract 
public attention until the Singlaub affair occurred. 
President Carter, who was concerned about the growing 
opposition to the pullout within his administration as well 
as outside the government, needed to take strong action 
against General Singlaub in order to prevent further open 
opposition to his foreign policy from subordinates. The abrupt 
summons of the general was intended to show that Carter had 
made up his mind already and would not change it. At the same 
time, the President expected to calm down growing opposition 
within his administration by punishing Singlaub severely. 
In dealing with the Singlaub affair, however, Carter made 
a serious mistake by recalling the general to the White House. 
He should have ignored the general's remarks published on the 
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front page of the Washington Post or should have had Defense 
Secretary Harold Brown or Chief of Staff of the u. s. Army 
Bernard W. Rogers take care of the case by removing the 
general from his Korean post quietly. President carter I s 
unnecessary overreaction caused the heavy media coverage of 
the Singlaub affair as well as the withdrawal policy itself. 
It was followed by a full scale debate in Congress on his new 
Korean policy, as well as a lengthy academic discussion on the 
issue. 
By humiliating the patriotic and professional general, 
Carter gave the American public the negative impression that 
he had broken his campaign promise that, unlike his 
predecessor, he would welcome open discussion on American 
foreign policy. Moreover, Carter's tolerance for Ambassador 
Young's maverick activities in the United Nations while he was 
punishing Singlaub planted in American minds the negative 
image that the President applied a double standard in dealing 
with public officials. 
At the same time, the Singlaub affair reminded the 
American public of President Truman's recall of General 
MacArthur during the Korean War and incited public debates on 
the Korean issue. As a result, the American public, who 
tacitly approved Carter's new Korean policy when it had been 
given little attention, began to realize the disadvantages as 
well as advantages of the pullout policy. Many Americans then 
urged the Carter Administration to consider the issue more 
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cautiously. Various polls demonstrated this opinion shift. 
The Singlaub affair gave Congressional conservatives the 
momentum to rebut Carter's pullout policy. During the Vietnam 
War, Congressional conservatives supported the 
administration's policy while liberal Democrats were in 
opposition. But, in dealing with the withdrawal policy, 
ironically, they changed their positions and liberal Democrats 
tried to defend the administration while Congressional 
conservatives attacked it. Among Congressional opponents, 
Congressman Samuels. Stratton, Chairman of the House Armed 
Services Investigations Subcommittee, played the most 
important role in rallying Congressional opposition to the 
Carter Administration's one sided handling of the pullout 
policy. His proposed amendment, attempting to stop the further 
withdrawal of 26,000 American ground troops until North and 
South Korea achieved a political settlement, could not be 
approved by the full House. But Stratton's campaigns against 
the pullout were influential enough to attract Congressional 
attention to the issue, and it destroyed the Carter 
Administration's policy momentum. 
Moreover, military officers and security experts• 
overwhelming opposition to the policy became a heavy burden 
for the President. In addition, overseas allies' warnings, 
especially from Japan and the new ally, China, could not be 
ignored by Carter. 
As Carter well understood, considering the growing 
opposition within and outside the government, 
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the Korean 
withdrawal policy, which had provided him with an advantage 
in the 1976 election, could be used to criticize him in the 
next election. As a matter of fact, Carter, who did not 
produce any remarkable domestic policy achievements, wanted 
to demonstrate his expertise in foreign policy by ending the 
threat of American involvement in an Asian land war with the 
removal of all ground troops from South Korea. By the middle 
of 1979, however, Carter had achieved several notable 
diplomatic successes by completing the Panama Canal Treaties, 
the Camp David Agreement, the normalization of relations with 
China, and the signing of the SALT II. 1 Therefore, he did 
not have to wrestle with the controversial pullout policy that 
had become less important to him politically. 
In addition, The South Korean Government's threat to 
develop nuclear weapons for its survival after the American 
pullout embarrassed the President because it could directly 
cause the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the 
world. As every United States President before him had fought 
to restrict nuclear weapons, Carter did not want to go down 
1• Panama Canal Treaties signed on 7 September 1977 and 
it was ratified in April 1978. On 15 September 1978 Carter 
announced normalization of diplomatic relations with China and 
their official relations began on 1 January 1979. Premier 
Begin and President Sadat signed the Camp David Agreement on 
26 March 1979. Carter signed SALT II at Vienna summit on 18 
June 1979. But it was not approved by the Senate because 
conservatives believed that the treaty would give the Soviets 
a first strike potential. See Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 
82, 194-195. 
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in history as the President who expedited the expansion of 
nuclear weapons throughout the world because of his Korean 
withdrawal policy. 
Having considered all these factors, Carter had no choice 
but to suspend his withdrawal policy. However, it was not easy 
for him to announce the suspension of the policy because he 
repeatedly and strongly confirmed his intentions to the 
American public. Of course, the suspension of the policy would 
please Congressional conservatives, the military, scholars, 
and many American citizens who favored the status quo on the 
Korean peninsula, but it had the potential disadvantage of 
raising political problems with liberal Democrats who fully 
backed him in the 1976 election. Fortunately, Congressional 
delay on the Korean aid package because of the Koreagate 
affair gave him an excuse to slow down the schedule. Even 
after Congress approved the Korean military aid package in 
August 1978, Carter did not attempt to restore his original 
pullout schedule. Instead, he adhered to the delayed schedule. 
An early 1979 Army intelligence report on the North Korean 
strength, and the CIA and the DIA's confirmation of the Army 
report gave the President a face saving excuse to suspend his 
pullout policy. 
In his visit to Seoul, Carter believed he could use the 
suspension of the policy as leverage to improve human rights 
in South Korea. He openly pressed President Park to improve 
human rights and urged Park to restore democratic process. At 
272 
the same time, Carter proposed to North Korean leaders a 
three-way conference. If it was successful, Carter thought, 
he could produce another Camp David achievement in the most 
sensitive area in Asia. If the North rejected his proposal, 
it would provide him with a good excuse to suspend the pullout 
policy. As Carter expected, President Park yielded to his 
pressure and freed eighty-six political prisoners as soon as 
he returned home, while Kim Il Sung rejected his proposal for 
a three-way conference. Thus, in July 1979, Carter announced 
the suspension of the Korean withdrawal policy under 
relatively favorable circumstances. 
The fiasco of Carter's Korean proposal should teach 
politicians that it is dangerous for presidential candidates 
to use national security issues in their campaigns without 
access to classified information and without broad 
consultations with experts and concerned foreign leaders. In 
the middle of the 1970s, South Korea, an emerging economic 
power, was expected to assume more defense responsibilities. 
But the country was not yet strong enough to stand on its own 
feet. Moreover, considering the tremendous tension between 
North and South Korea, the rapid buildup of Soviet naval power 
in the Pacific, followed by the Soviet-Vietnam Treaty of 1978, 
Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, and the Chinese border war 
with Vietnam in February 1979,2 Asia was not as stable as 
2• Levin, and Sneider, "Korea in Postwar," 53. 
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Carter believed. With his Korean policy Carter had jumped into 
Asian affairs with both feet before even knowing how deep the 
water was. 
As a result of the pullout, anti-Americanism, which was 
almost non-existent in South Korea since the end of the Korean 
War, was inflamed. On the other hand, Carter's initiative had 
some constructive effects. It impelled South Korea to expedite 
the development of defense industries. Thus, the South Koreans 
were able to achieve a more independent defense capability. 
Although Carter's action may have been premature, it did lay 
the groundwork for the future withdrawal of American forces 
by encouraging Korea and Japan to do more in their own 
defense. At the same time, the pullout policy encouraged South 
Korea toward a more independent diplomacy. Relations with 
other communist countries were actively improved, with added 
gains in the widening of trade relations. Although they would 
not be diplomatically formalized until the late 1980s, these 
changes began to take shape a decade earlier. 
In South Korea Carter's withdrawal policy created a very 
rare national consensus in opposition to the policy and it 
temporarily strengthened President Park's political position. 
Paradoxically, the decision to suspend the pullout, which 
freed South Koreans from worries of another war, allowed them 
to continue to campaign strongly against President Park's 
dictatorship, to demand the restoration of democracy, and 
ultimately to topple Park after seventeen years' rule in South 
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Korea. 
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